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1 Executive Summary
Scanteam of Norway with Demex of Denmark were contracted by the Survey Action
Center (SAC) to carry out an evaluation of the Global Landmine Survey (GLS)
process. The work was done during the period May-October 2003. The main findings
and recommendations are the following:
Main Achievements

The GLS process can, after only a few years, point to some very impressive
achievements:
The mine action community has been able to come together to establish the
Survey Working Group (SWG) and GLS through a collaborative and deliberative
process unheard of in any other sector of development and emergency action.
Landmine Impact Surveys (LISs) have been finalized in over half a dozen
countries, and are underway in almost another half a dozen.
The LIS produces reports, databases, and other outputs that provide a qualitatively
better and more accurate description and analysis of the mines/UXO problems,
and thus provide a better basis for mine action (MA) decisions.
The LIS has developed a methodology and standards which are recognized and
followed by key actors involved in landmine surveying. These are set out in
Protocols and Advisory Notes that are easily available and which are subject to a
process of continuous discussion and updating.
The surveys that are carried out become known by the full GLS community and
are thus subject to considerable discussion and debate.
The GLS has often introduced new and better tools to the partnering countries
(such as GIS-based information, powerfully searchable IMSMA databases,
examples in how to carry out and run large-scale surveys).
The GLS process has undoubtedly contributed to maintaining mine action higher
on donors’ agendas than would otherwise have been the case. This is reflected in
the successful mobilization of funds for the LISs (with the Angola LIS over USD
25 million), reminding donors of the commitments made under the Ottawa Treaty.
The GLS process has undoubtedly also contributed to increasing the profile of
MA in the partner countries. This has partly been done by providing national
authorities and mine action stakeholders with a series of information-rich products
that are useful for decision making but also useful from a purely informational and
awareness-raising perspective vis-à-vis the population at large. The LIS
strengthens the argument for allocating national resources to MA as the factual
basis regarding the mine/UXO problem and what to do about it is both
qualitatively and quantitatively better. Finally, the LIS is a major support to
national authorities and local mine actors in their own fund raising dialogue with
the donor community.
The GLS is evolving, with more efforts and attention now being paid to areas such
as training/capacity building, including the use and updating of the Information
Management System for Mine Action (IMSMA) database, follow-up use of the
LIS results through Strategic Planning, etc.
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Planning Landmine Impact Surveys

 The LIS is a costly undertaking, and should therefore, as far as possible, follow
international "best practice" standards and procedures:
o The request for a LIS should be handled according to UNMAS 2001 TOR
and subject to a critical assessment of the need and utility of a LIS.
o The Advance Survey Mission should become a standard project planning
exercise, using Logical Framework Approach (LFA) participatory
processes. Sufficient time should be used to ensure that the identification
of the main project elements are done satisfactorily, local skills should be
fully utilized in the planning, local stakeholders fully involved regarding
problem definition and choice of implementation modalities.
o Project planning should be contracted out based on clear TORs, where
having an SAC staff member as part of the mission is helpful.
o The implementation of the LIS should be set out to tender based on
International Competitive Bidding principles.
o Whether the same entity can both plan and implement a LIS should be
considered by the SWG. If this is accepted, the potential role conflict
needs to be solved through satisfactory procedures.
The LIS is currently structured as a "stand alone" event and is an externally driven
and defined process that is poorly integrated into national tools and tasks:
 Links and "hooks" (such as data transferability) to other processes and instruments
should be developed to enhance relevance and usability of LIS results (broaden
user groups and beneficiaries). A strong participatory planning process can ensure
that these dimensions are properly addressed.
 MA in general and LIS in particular should move towards more general sectorplanning approaches developed in host countries, and adopt to the processes and
criteria that are applied to other sector interventions in the country.
 The planning should include a standard LFA risk assessment, looking at all the
elements of the goal hierarchy. Particular attention should be paid to a realistic
assessment of the key national institutions regarding their commitment and
capacity to participate in and use the results of the LIS:
o If there is Low Capacity, the LIS should have a Capacity Development
component as an integral, early and important part of the LIS.
o If there is Low Commitment, it is doubtful if it is meaningful to carry out a
national LIS. Alternative models should be explored instead.
 The overall plan from planning through implementation needs to be sorted out
with the national government. If the LIS requires a separate MoU or other formal
government agreement, this should be in place before the project planning begins.
 Project planning should include the Expert Opinion Collection (EOC) process to
give the project document a solid informational basis so that budgeting and
timeline preparation is realistic.
 The project document should be subjected to the normal scrutiny by national
authorities and local stakeholders before final approval.
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 SAC/SWG should organize one or two regional workshops with local partners to
discuss current LIS standards, including more flexibility for local adaptation.
 SAC is encouraged to use ISO 9000-2000 Quality Management System for GLS.
Implementing Landmine Impact Surveys

 LIS reporting should be streamlined. Only information required for decisions is
forwarded (apart from the contents data). This should be done throughout the LIS
structure, so that there is performance- but not activity-tracking at higher levels.
 The standard questionnaire should be reviewed for a focus on collecting only
"first order" data. Other variables should only be included if it is clear that they
will be used by actors for important decisions
 Internal Quality Assurance systems should be a key criterion when selecting
bidders for implementing a LIS. "Best practice" internal QA systems should be
posted on the SAC web-site (helpful if for example NGOs in Angola were to do
regional LISs).
 QA resources should be spent more evenly across the three dimensions of data
quality: (i) is the survey asking the right questions (relevance)? (ii) does the
survey generate answers to the questions being asked (validity, reliability)?, (iii) is
data integrity along the information chain maintained?
 Local partner institutions for the implementation of the field survey should be
identified, to ensure that learning from the LIS survey process is internalized by
national institutions and not just simply by the individuals engaged.
 Active involvement of local social science skills should be encouraged: (i) as
trainers/teachers, (ii) as analysts and disseminators of results, (iii) as resource
persons to the LIS itself (discussions of local adaptation of questionnaires,
weighting schemes, as external QA for testing survey instruments and techniques).
Results and Impact from Landmine Surveys

Donors do not use the LIS results directly, but are interested in seeing that partner
authorities do – it provides an assurance that MA resources are being planned better.
National authorities by and large are using the LIS, and in most cases trying to shape
national MA plans based on it.
Local operators generally do not use the LIS for their planning, in part because
funding often determines where they work – donor behavior becomes a blockage to
more rational MA resource use through the project approach.
 There is a need for MA actors to come together to see how the LIS can be used for
more rational sector resource allocations. National concerns and priorities should
be a major benchmark for individual organizations' priorities.
The weights attached to the various factors in the impact survey clearly can alter the
ranking of communities, but weightings will always remain subjective preferences –
there are no obvious "objective" weights.
The general triage of "high", "medium" and "low" impact makes sense, and the cutoff points between them are and will necessarily remain arbitrary, no matter where the
border values are set. The key is to ensure that the weights are in accordance with the
kinds of concerns national authorities have regarding the negative impact of mines
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and UXO. In order for decision makers to see the consequences of alternative
weighting schemes, simulations could be done on a constructed case.
 What is more important is to increase the relevance of the LIS within the national
planning system by linking up to general planning priorities (such as in PRSPs),
so that the LIS ratings enter the final resource allocation decisions.
All the reports need to be available in the language/s used by mine action actors and
local authorities.
The LIS database is a key output of the process and its value needs to be ensured
through (i) easy and open access to both data and results, (ii) a program of continued
and structured updating of key variables, (iii) accessibility in terms of low-cost and
easy-to-use software platform (relative to situations in differing countries).
Having IMSMA as the standard database for mine action makes sense from a
pragmatic efficiency point of view. The challenge is to develop it in two areas: (i)
making transfer of LIS data to other databases easier (continuing the development of
the data transfer protocol "maXML"), and (ii) make its access to MA operators easier,
so that data are more directly user-friendly. GICHD might consider a workshop with
key users to identify key steps to take in this connection.
General Issues in Landmine Impact Surveys

 The SAC should continue its role as fund-raiser; coordinating and management
role for those LISs that are under its purview; prepare in collaboration with
partner authorities the agreements necessary for a LIS, including the TOR for the
project preparation work; participate on the project planning process; tender the
LIS implementation and ensure fair and transparent decision making in awarding
the contract; and provide the training and other support services that are agreed to.
 SAC should avoid direct management of LISs and focus strategic management of
the GLS process and its accomplishments. A key role is collecting, analyzing,
disseminating and discussing "lessons learned". A key target group for this, apart
from the SWG itself, is interested stakeholders in partner countries.
 The SWG should remain an open deliberative body but where partner country
stakeholders should be invited in. Regional workshops as part of a more proactive capacity development effort could be highly constructive.
 The SWG Protocols/Advisory Notes provide helpful standards, though there is a
need to accept flexible adaptations to country specific situations.
 The SAC management/board selection processes are opaque – formal
accountability seems difficult to pin down [no real conclusions or
recommendations – simply an observation for consideration].
 The need for external QA and a formal Certification process is questioned. If
instead LIS implementers are asked to implement a QMS according to ISO 90002000, further external verification would seem superfluous, especially if national
authorities accept this as they do for other national survey processes.
 UNDP has supported various forms of capacity development. This focus should
be maintained but built on better principles of sustainability.
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2 Introduction and Background
The Global Landmine Survey (GLS) program was conceived in March 1998 when the
Ottawa Workshop on Mine Action Coordination agreed on the need for an
international effort to survey landmine-affected countries. Subsequently, the Vietnam
Veterans of America Foundation (VVAF) and Handicap International (HI) organized
meetings of interested parties to develop a collaborative GLS program. The program
was to identify the geographic distribution of landmines and to understand better the
social and economic impact of these landmines on mine-affected communities.
A Survey Working Group (SWG) agreed to lead the program and appointed VVAF to
create and manage a Survey Action Center (SAC). The SAC was tasked with
coordinating landmine impact surveys (LIS) worldwide, providing technical support
and mobilizing resources. In 2001 SAC was established as an independent Center.
The first LISs were carried out in Mozambique and Yemen. Since then surveys have
been completed in Afghanistan, Cambodia, Chad, Lebanon, Somaliland and Thailand,
and a modified survey and socio economic analysis conducted in Kosovo. Surveys are
underway or about to be finalized in Angola, Azerbaijan, Bosnia-Herzegovina,
Eritrea, and Ethiopia, and are planned for Vietnam and Sudan, among other countries.
When the GLS program was launched it was envisaged that it would end once surveys
had been carried out in all the major mine-affected countries. The program is now
considered to be more than 50% complete, and it was therefore considered timely to
undertake a formal and independent evaluation of the LIS process. The evaluation is
to form part of a broader strategic review of the GLS program.
Based on an open tender process, Scanteam of Norway in collaboration with Demex
of Denmark was awarded the contract to carry out the evaluation (see Annex A for the
TOR). The evaluation took place May-September 2003 with field visits to seven GLS
countries: Bosnia-Herzegovina, Cambodia, Chad, Ethiopia, Mozambique, Thailand
and Yemen. Interviews were carried out in five donor countries (Canada, Denmark,
Norway, Switzerland and the US) as well as with UN agencies in New York and
Geneva. Telephone interviews and E-mail exchanges were used with a number of key
informants (see Annex C for persons interviewed). In addition a document review was
carried out (see Annex B for complete list).
2.1

Objectives of the Evaluation

The objectives of the evaluation were two-fold:
Examine the current GLS organizational structure and LIS methodologies:
procedures, tools and assumptions.
Evaluate the utility, efficacy and use of the survey results.
Based on the evaluation of the above two areas, the team was to make
recommendations for improvements to the overall effectiveness and efficiency of
impact surveys.
This evaluation therefore looked at what has been attained by the LIS itself, but also
what has been attained through the use of LIS outputs. Another issue was the role of
national stakeholders in the stages of LIS implementation and use of LIS products.
The purpose has been to identify possible improvements to on-going and future
surveys, to enhance their value to both national and international officials and other
potential users of the survey results.
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2.2

Structure of the Report

The third chapter discusses the approach and methodology used. Chapter four looks at
planning the LIS, chapter five discusses implementation experiences, while chapter
six looks at the results achieved and their impact. Chapter seven then summarizes by
looking at the overall process, including the roles of the key international actors.
A series of annexes are attached. Annex A provides the Terms of Reference, Annex B
the list of documents reviewed and Annex C persons interviewed. Annexes D through
J are country studies for each of the seven countries visited.
2.3

The Evaluation Team

The Evaluation was carried out by four international and five local consultants. The
international consultants came from Scanteam, which has broad international
evaluation experience (Mr. Arne Disch, team leader, and Mr. Atle Karlsen). Demex
added the mine action background (Mr. Erik Lauritzen and Mr. Niels Strufe). The
international team is responsible for the report including all annexes.
Local consultants were used in five countries: Ms. Anne Thomas/Cambodia, Ms.
Tihut Yirgu Asfaw/Ethiopia, Ms. Pamela Rebelo/Mozambique, Mr. Taweekiat
Prasertcharoensuk/ Thailand, and Dr. Faiz Mohammad. In most cases, the local
consultants carried out a series of preliminary interviews before the international team
arrived, participated with the international team during the fieldwork, and followed up
on issues that required clarification. They were also largely responsible for the
planning of the field work visits and meetings.
2.4

Acknowledgements and Disclaimer

As with most Evaluations, the great challenge was accomplishing the tasks within the
limited time available. Our first thanks go to all our informants who set aside time to
answer questions they often had already answered many times before! Government
officials, NGO staff and donor representatives in the seven countries visited were
without exception extremely generous with their time, for which we are very grateful.
UN staff in New York, SAC and VVAF staff in Washington, GICHD staff in Geneva,
donor and NGO representatives in their capitals, members of the Survey Working
Group, and former survey team members and quality assurance managers were all
extremely helpful – the UN, SAC and VVAF also in tracking down documents, from
processes that have generated more than their fair share of paper!
Throughout the process, we have been struck with the seriousness and
professionalism of persons met. While there are a number of observations made
throughout this report that point to ways in which the Evaluation team believes the
LIS and other aspects of mine action can be improved, the current shortcomings are
clearly not due to lack of dedication and concern.
The Evaluation team alone is responsible for the analyses and conclusions of the
report, as well as for any remaining errors contained herein. The opinions expressed
should not be attributed to the SAC, any of the organizations under review, or any of
the other participating organizations or institutions mentioned in this report.
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3 Approach and Methodology
The TOR for the evaluation asks a formidable range of questions (see Annex A). The
Evaluation therefore had to define those that were considered the more important.
Appropriate tools had to be developed to generate the information required and to
record it, before the analysis could be done.
As with most evaluations, this one was based on a mix of document review and
interviews and discussions with key informants. Identification of documents and
persons to speak with was thus part of the process. Finally, the findings had to be
checked to ensure that information collected was indeed correct, and that
interpretations of the information was reasonable.
3.1

Key Issues

In order to structure the study, the issues contained in the TOR were structured into
four sets of key issues, which are then subsequently treated in separate chapters in this
report: the planning phase of the LIS; the implementation; the outputs and their
impact; and finally overall issues that affect a LIS process and its results.
Planning the LIS

In the sphere of the planning of the LIS, some of the key questions the Evaluation
asked were:
LIS Planning: Were the different stakeholders aware of a LIS being planned in their
country? Were they involved in planning it? If so, what role did they play? Did
national authorities provide any guidance or clear decisions regarding the role and
involvement of the public sector and other stakeholders? Did stakeholders feel their
experience and views were used? Did they feel that the LIS staff were interested in
involving national stakeholders?
LIS Methodology: Were stakeholders familiar with the LIS methodology? If so, what
did they think were the strong and weak points about it? Was it seen as appropriate in
the particular country context?
Links: Was the LIS linked to national or local planning and surveying processes
(national development plans, etc)? Did the LIS fit in well with other planning
processes and instruments that they were familiar with? Where was there room for
improvements?
LIS Implementation

Regarding the implementation of the surveys, some of the issues raised were:
LIS Teams: What was the impression of the management of the LIS process? What
were the views of the survey teams – were they knowledgeable about the task,
committed, qualified, well trained? What were possible positive and negative aspects
of the international and local teams?
Use of tools: The surveys followed some internationally developed standards, quality
assessment approaches, software (IMSMA). What was the impression of these
(quality, relevance, ease-of-use)? When these are compared to tools used in other
surveys (health, food security, poverty reduction strategies, etc.), what were seen as
advantages or disadvantages? Could the LIS benefit from the survey experience in
other sectors?
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Consultation: Who was consulted by the survey at national, regional, local levels?
Did stakeholders experience the consultations as open, listening? Compared to other
surveys and planning processes, how was the LIS viewed? What have been the
reactions to the LIS by those who were consulted/surveyed?
LIS Implementation: What were the views on the process itself – timetable, resource
use, the way the survey was conducted locally? If informants were to provide advice
regarding the LIS process itself, what would that be?
LIS Outputs and Impact

Regarding the results of the LIS (in those countries that had finalized one) and how
they were used and were of value, questions that were asked included the following:
Survey results: What was the quality, relevance of the survey report? Who has access
to the report? Who has access to the data? How easy is it to use the data? Were they
familiar with the impact ratings in the report ("high", "medium", "low")? Do they
agree with the ratings? Should the ratings be done differently – if so, how?
Strategic Planning/Task Assessment and Planning (only in countries where
appropriate and with the central actors for whom these issues are relevant):
What was the impression of the strategic planning work? What is the value-added? Is
the training helpful? Does the software address the right issues? Does Strategic
Planning make it easier or more difficult to link up with other national planning
processes? In what ways do Strategic Planning and TAP improve the utility of the
LIS? How can possible shortcomings be addressed?
Practical results of LIS outputs: What are the national authorities using the LIS
survey for? What is being done with the database? Is the database updated – if so,
how often, and for what purpose? Apart from national authorities, who else is using
the LIS survey in their work (NGOs, regional authorities, local communities)? What
do they use the survey for?
It also became apparent that there was a need to situate the LIS within the larger
development planning debate and experience, since what is new and important with
the LIS as compared with standard "Level 1"-surveys is the concern about the socioeconomic impact of landmines and unexploded ordnance (UXO), and how this should
affect mine action planning and resource use, so this has been included as well.
3.2

Evaluation Process

The evaluation was carried out in a series of steps. The first phase was a general
orientation phase. The team leader participated in the Survey Working Group (SWG)
meeting in Geneva on May 12, where the general approach was presented and ideas
and information provided. A general overview of key informants and important
documentation was collected, and a Scoping Study presented on May 20 to the
Evaluation Steering Committee.
A visit to Canada and the US to talk with key informants in the UN system, the SAC
and VVAF, and other stakeholders took place in June, while other members of the
team visited Geneva for meetings with the GICHD. A series of telephone interviews
were carried out, and a desk study of the key documentation done. Based on this, an
Inception Report was presented to the Evaluation Steering Committee on June 20.
The international team had divided tasks among themselves, among other things the
countries that were to be visited. The TOR for the job specified that seven countries
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were to be included, and that each visit take one week. This was a limited period, so
in five of the seven countries experienced local consultants were hired to do both
preliminary work, plan the full field work, and follow up once the international team
left. Two of the international consultants visited each country, with one being
"primary responsible". Each international consultants thus had two countries each
except the team leader, who had one, but then in charge of the overall report.
A first set of three countries were visited end June-early July by both teams, and
based on this, some adjustments were made to the planning of the second set of four
countries, which were visited in August. Because of the very short time in-country,
the international consultants often split in two: one would take a slightly longer fieldvisit with the local consultant, while the other would have a shorter field trip and
interview more of the stakeholders in the capital (government, NGO head offices,
donors etc).
3.3

Document Study

The document review was largely a desk study done before the field work began. It
was complemented with follow-up work as a series of key documents were not
received till after the field work had been carried out.
An inventory of known documents was prepared, and focus was on (i) general
background information, (ii) GLS instruments (protocols etc), and (iii) country
relevant information for the seven countries to be visited. The latter group of
documents – the largest set – was distributed according to who had main
responsibility for that country. The other documents were distributed across the team
such that it was ensured that all relevant information had been read by at least one
person on the team, and thus was "available" as input to the reports and the annexes.
3.4

Interviews

Three sets of interviews were carried out. The first one was with central informants
from the main partners in the GLS on the donor and implementation side: the SAC
and VVAF in Washington, the various UN agencies in New York and Geneva,
representatives of international NGOs, and donors.
The second set of interviews was done during the field work. Information was
collected from stakeholder representatives through one-on-one interviews, discussion
groups, and group interviews in villages.
The third and final set of interviews were done after the field work was over, going
back to some informants or reaching some others that were seen as important to
provide complementary information to that already gathered.
In planning for the interviews, a Conversation Guide was prepared – one used for the
first set of donor-country interviews and the second one for the field work. These
Conversation Guides were distributed before the meetings so that informants knew
what the team was looking for. It also helped the consultants focus on getting the key
information during the limited time available for each interview.
Interview notes were typed out and distributed among the consultants, not least
because the key consultant for a country was not present at all the interviews and
these hence had to be shared.
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3.5

Quality Assurance

The Evaluation has turned out to be fairly complex, so a number of steps were taken
to assure the quality of data collection and analysis.
Two preparatory reports were produced for the Evaluation Steering Committee and
the SAC, noted earlier: the Scoping Study and the Inception Report. Both studies
were commented on by the Steering Committee and SAC, providing feed-back to the
team's ideas on work plan, focus, and preliminary findings.
Once the field work had been done, the team wrote up Country Study Annexes. These
were first discussed within the team, re-drafted, and then sent to stakeholders in the
country visited. The stakeholders were asked to comment on the factual content,
identify possible misunderstandings, but also point out disagreements with the
analysis, conclusions and recommendations. The revised annexes have been included
here in this report, and these form a key set of building blocks for the main report.
The international team has met twice during the process – once in Oslo in July, and
once in Copenhagen in September. During these meetings the various aspects of the
report were discussed, and Scanteam has organized an internal meeting in Oslo to go
over the methodology with other staff of the firm. During the Copenhagen meeting, a
representative from Cranfield Mine Action Center came over and gave a presentation
on the Strategic Planning process that they are managing.
The final quality assurance step has been the chance to present the main parts of the
report to the Survey Working Group at its meeting on October 15-16 in Copenhagen.
An outline report, highlighting what the team felt might be the more controversial
issues, was distributed a few days before the meeting. A presentation of the report was
made followed by several sessions of discussion that brought out a number of issue
for the team to consider.
A complete draft report was then prepared to the SAC for circulation to the SWG (the
current document). Actors were thus given the opportunity to comment on both the
main report and the country annexes, before the consultants finalized the report
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4 Planning the LIS
The objective of a LIS is "to facilitate the prioritizing of human, material and financial
resources supporting humanitarian mine action at the national, regional and global
level through the completion of Level One Mine/UXO Impact Survey" (SWG, June
1998, quoted in LIS Advisory 03, Survey Overview). In line with this, a LIS is to
provide (op. cit., p. 2):
"Accurate information for strategic planning and resource mobilization:
o Clearly defined needs and program requirements;
o Informational tool for planning support and reporting;
Baseline data to measure progress and support country Mine Action Centers:
o Clear measures of performance;
o Well supported comprehensive quality assurance;
A platform to support multi-sector programming and research efforts."
There are therefore three constituencies that are foreseen for a LIS:
Funding agencies that want better information for decision making regarding their
support to mine action around the world;
National authorities including Mine Action Centers (MAC) that need the
information for planning, monitoring and assessing mine action activities;
Operators working in mine affected countries engaged in mine action – demining,
victims assistance, mine risk education, mine information/data collection
activities.
The SAC and SWG formalized the procedures to be followed when carrying out a LIS
in the form of nine Protocols and six Advisory Notes (see Appendix B, SAC 2003ao). This covers the full process from the Advance Survey Mission, Expert Opinion
Collection, a thorough discussion on data requirements and questionnaire, to the data
analysis, discussions on the socio-economic indicators, etc.
The protocols were based in part on the experiences from some of the first landmine
surveys that had been carried out in Afghanistan, Angola, Cambodia and Laos, as well
as the United Nations' International Standards for Humanitarian Mine Clearance
Operations. During the so-called "Brussels workshop" held in May 1998, UN
agencies, NGOs and donors came together to agree on principles for landmine
surveys, and the first protocols were agreed to. They have been revised, with the
current protocols/advisory notes largely dating from January 2003. Some of these are
still not considered final, however, as discussions are still on-going on some of the
issues, such as Protocol 06, "Visual Inspection".
4.1

Background

It is important to realize that the LIS process has been in existence for only about four
years. The development cycle has therefore been extremely intense, and has followed
an unusually structured path. The Survey Working Group, but in particular the
SAC/VVAF put in a very dedicated effort to put together the procedures and
structures for the first LISs. There was a need for new tools concerning the socioeconomic measurement, where largely qualitative data collected from communities
through rapid surveys (structured interviews and map-based information) were to
form the basis for ranking the impact of mines/UXO. The procedures for transforming
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such verbal/”soft” data into quantitative ratings is a major methodological
achievement.
While one might disagree with some of the contents of some of the Protocols and
Advisory Notes, their production and the systematic and thorough analysis that lie
behind them reflects a dedication and an accomplishment that is exemplary. The
methodology and these standards are now internationally recognized and followed by
the key actors involved in landmine surveying. The Protocols and Advisory Notes are
furthermore publicly available and subject to continuous discussion and updating
through the SWG.
Perhaps more important is that the mine action community – the NGOs and UN
agencies involved – has been able to come together to establish the GLS through a
collaborative and deliberative process unheard of in any other sector of development
and emergency action. The donor community was involved in the formation of the
SWG (during the Brussels workshop), but have since pulled out since the SWG
primarily focuses on the operational issues of mine action (MA).
On the other hand, partner country actors – mine action centers, local operators, etc –
are not part of the SWG. This is a major weakness in terms of credibility and
legitimacy when it comes to discussing and deciding issues, such as new versions of
Protocols. While the UN agencies presumably can speak on behalf of the international
community, the NGOs cannot claim that they represent any other constituency except
themselves. The SWG is thus a self-constituted body with no formal status within
formal mine action. Whether this is a problem or not depends on what the future of
the SWG becomes – whether it will continue to limit itself to addressing only LISs, or
take on other issues within mine action.
4.2

Preparations for a LIS

The Protocols are in a number of areas quite demanding. The costs of the LISs are
thus substantial, where the typical LIS has cost around USD 2 million, but where the
Angola LIS is budgeted at over USD 6 million. The planning that goes into a LIS is
therefore important to enhance both efficiency and effectiveness.
An LIS is to be based on a request by national authorities to the UN system. A UN
Assessment Mission visits the country in question, and based on the visit and the
dialogue with the authorities a decision is taken regarding the need and utility of an
LIS1.
Once the request has been accepted, the SAC is contacted to begin planning the
survey process. This involves several tasks: mobilize the resources, organize an
Advance Survey Mission (ASM) to plan the LIS, and contact potential implementing
agencies that might want to carry out the LIS.
The ASM has a detailed list of tasks to carry out in a short period of time (Protocol
01). The mains tasks are (i) to get agreements with national authorities on all the
formal requirements to carry out an LIS, (ii) visit the mine action community for
discussion and joint planning, as well as information collection, (iii) identify sources
of information and national skills that can be used for the LIS, and (iv) put together a
1

The process that is to be followed is spelled out in UNMAS (2001): "Impact Survey Certification
Committee: Terms of Reference". In principle it is quite rigorous and in line with standard UN (UNDP)
procedures for screening requests for assistance from member governments.
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draft project proposal with a timeline and budget, as the basis for planning the LIS.
The practical information that is expected to be collected is comprehensive, whereas
the picture of the mine/UXO problem may be more uncertain as there is limited time
for identifying the probable scope of the issues.
The ASM is to consist of (a minimum of ) two people, one of whom is a SAC staff
member. The other has usually been a representative of the organization that has been
selected to carry out the LIS.
Selecting LIS Countries

The process by which countries are accepted for an LIS varies. The standard
procedure is through the UN system (see footnote 1). The first countries included
Mozambique, Chad and Thailand. In the case of Thailand, which is not a heavily
mine-affected country, the Thai Government's own strong request, combined with the
fact that Thailand was the first country in the region to sign the Ottawa Treaty, led the
UN system to conclude that a LIS was indeed useful. In the case of Mozambique, and
later on Cambodia, a particular donor – Canada – took the initiative. The reason was
that Canada and other donors were providing considerable funding for mine action, in
Mozambique including for capacity development, but did not feel comfortable that the
overall resource allocation and use was well planned.
The process for accepting countries, and prioritizing among them, should ideally have
followed more planned procedures with the more heavily mine-affected countries
coming first. In the real world, a number of factors have intervened to make the
prioritization more ad hoc. Some governments have been reluctant to invite in
external bodies to carry out information intensive surveys in sensitive areas (many of
the mined areas may still be politically contested or a security zone). In other
countries, governments may have been opportunistic, sensing both that a LIS could
provide a high-profile event that would "market" their commitment to mine action –
politically a positive signal – while there undoubtedly also were expectations that the
survey would make donors more aware of the mine/UXO problem and thus help
generate more external funding for mine action. The fact that the LIS itself is a grantfunded activity also means that governments may be more interested than the issue
itself warrants from a national planning perspective.
Because of the possible distortions that exist in terms of the incentives to governments
for wanting or discarding the possibilities of a LIS, the UN Mine Action Service
needs to make a careful analysis of the arguments for a LIS. The first issue is if there
is a genuine need for a LIS – the suspected mine/UXO problem requires a serious
planning exercise – and the second is if the LIS is likely to be used such that resource
use in fact will improve – the utility issue. The process regarding a request for a LIS
should therefore follow the procedures established so as to avoid major resource misallocations: undertaking an expensive LIS in a country that really does not warrant
one.
The Advance Survey Mission and Project Planning

The ASM as a planning process presents serious challenges. The time line for the
mission has generally been very short, and the limited staffing – in principle only two
persons – means that the mission may not have sufficient skills for doing a
satisfactory job.
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The outline of the project document that has been elaborated in Protocol 01 is largely
in line with standard Logical Framework Approach (LFA) project preparation. There
is an overarching Goal followed by the Objectives and then the Outputs that are to be
produced by the LIS2. But the project documents that have been seen by this
Evaluation have been quite variable in quality, largely because the actual planning
process falls short of what are recommended as “best practice” planning approaches
by the Development Assistance Committee (DAC – see footnote 2).
First of all is the process itself. While the LFA approach is best known (or disliked!)
for the (in)famous logframe matrix, the core of the approach is the participatory
planning process that should be followed: the stakeholder-, problem- and solution
analyses, followed by the risk and alternative analyses3. The main purpose of this is to
build a consensus with the key local actors ("stakeholders") around the understanding
of the problem to be addressed, the solution set that is chosen, and finding
collaborative mechanisms for implementation. This entire process seems to be
missing from LIS planning, and this may lie at the heart of the short-comings that the
LIS process is experiencing (a theme that will be returned to below).
While a rapid ASM may produce a formal LFA outline or matrix, the contents of the
elements is often weak. In the Objectives hierarchy, the Goal and Purpose
(“Objectives”) need to make sense in the national context (see section 4.3). Another
concern is the discussion of external factors and risk analysis (see section 4.4).
While the limited time has been a serious constraint, the Protocol itself needs
upgrading. It puts a lot of emphasis on getting background information that is relevant
for planning the logistics of the LIS. But there is relatively little concern about what
this Evaluation would consider to be higher-order concerns. While it is important that
the LIS "does the things right" (efficiency), it is more important that it "does the right
things" (effectiveness). This is where the criticisms of the key aspects of the LFA
come in (the next two sections), but also issues surrounding the ASM itself.
The first one is the question of whether the limited ASM mission contains good
programming skills, not from a technical survey point of view, but from a mine action
planning perspective (section 4.3). The second is if the ASM itself is structured well
in terms of what are considered "best practice" principles for general project
programming. The time constraint, a Protocol focused on the logistics planning and
narrow planning skills have led to project documents that have been unrealistic both
with respect to defining the problem, and the necessary budget required to do the job
properly. The basis for mobilizing funding and for the implementing entity to plan for
the task is thus unsatisfactory.
The ASM tends to include staff from the agency that later on implements the LIS. The
ASM is thus almost a preparatory phase of the LIS itself. In some cases, the LIS has
been initiated immediately after the ASM, so that there has been no time for local
2

The DAC of the OECD – the secretariat in Paris that serves as a coordinating body of the bilateral
donors – has put together a series of standards and "best practice" approaches for development
cooperation. The DAC standards for project preparation, using the LFA, has a somewhat different
language. Instead of Objectives being sub-ordinate to Goal (or Development Objective in UN system
language), the entire goal hierarchy is collectively referred to as the Objectives of the project, and the
second-order Objective is the project Purpose (or Immediate Objective in the UN system).
3

A standard manual is NORAD's "The Logical Framework Approach", which has been translated into
more than a dozen languages and is used by bilateral agencies as well as international and local NGOs
around the world. See NORAD (1999).
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actors to respond to and digest the project proposal. There is thus also a serious
potential for role conflicts, as the ASM team can easily be accused of preparing a
document that is suited to the known implementing agency (itself). The potential for
such impropriety is normally something international actors are very conscious of and
do a lot to avoid.
Local consultants are normally an important part of any planning process. These
could be recruited from the local mine action community, but normally would be
professional consultants who are familiar with the local framework conditions and are
able to guide the international programming team. There seems to be very little
involvement of local skills in the ASM except as informants.
There would normally be a time lag between the preparation of the project and the
beginning of the implementation, to allow local actors to consider and comment on
the proposal. This among other things is important for the ownership dimension to
take hold.
Another issue is the extent to which such ASM missions in fact take place. This
Evaluation was not able to find formal ASM reporting from several LIS processes.
The attention to the planning dimension in general is therefore a weak point in the
LIS.
Contracting for the LIS

The normal procedure till recently for contracting the organization to implement the
LIS was simply that the SAC Board made the selection. This procedure contains two
problems. The first one is the one noted above, that the agency was often selected
before the planning had begun, so that it would take part in the ASM as well as do the
LIS. This was justified on the grounds that it made the overall process faster and more
efficient since the SAC then had only one party to work with throughout the process.
The other problem was the selection process itself. In some sense it was “open” since
any organization that wanted to take on the task could put itself forward. But the
decision and the criteria for the selection were not transparent, and there were
complaints that Board members allocated LIS tasks to themselves. To what extent this
is actually the case can be debated – but the appearance of possible role conflicts was
quite clear.
Due to complaints about lack of transparency, the SAC Board in May 2002 changed
the procedures, establishing a three-person committee to nominate the implementing
partner (SAC 2002). One person was to be from the SAC Board while the other two
would be appointed by the Board but could not be Board members. These latter two
would change for each LIS.
While in principle this makes the process somewhat more transparent, major flaws
remain. In the first place, the new Board Policy underlines that “this is not a tendering
process but a partner selection process. This document in no way alters the
fundamental role of the SAC Board to appoint the implementing partners,..” (SAC
2002, Introduction). So while the Nominating Committee shall make its proposal, “the
final decision … remains with the SAC Board of Directors. If the Board chooses to
appoint other than the recommendation of the Nominating Committee this decision is
final. To serve the purpose of transparency, however, the SAC Board shall be required
to state its reasons in writing to the SWG” (SAC 2002, pt. 3). It then ends with a point
4 on Sole Source: “SAC, in special circumstances, may recommend to the
Nominating Committee that the normal practice be abridged and a sole source
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contract be awarded. In these cases, SAC shall spell out the circumstances it feels
warrants this recommendation”.
This policy is clearly unacceptable. It is not in line with standard procurement rules of
the UN system, the World Bank, or what the donor community is working hard to
establish as “best practice” in normal development cooperation based on Good
Governance principles.
Normally procurement of services above USD 1 million – which every LIS has been –
would have to follow International Competitive Bidding (ICB) principles4. This
becomes even more important here since the procurement is done by the SAC, which
is a purely self-constituted body with unclear governance rules (how the Board is
elected, its period of membership, its representativity, etc.). It is difficult to
understand how the UN system could accept this situation (UN system representatives
have sat on Nominating Committees, but are also fully in the picture regarding SAC
procedures and actions). It is also hard to believe that the donors, whose funds are
financing the LISs, would find this procurement policy in order.
At the same time, it is clear from discussions with some NGOs that they see no
problems with the idea that a million-dollar plus task like a survey can be negotiated
directly between an NGO and a donor, or through a host government. The idea that
tasks that are considered to be primarily targeted to the NGO community should be
put out to tender seems alien to several. The thinking is rather that if an NGO comes
up with a good idea, like some form of a survey, and can get somebody to fund it, this
is acceptable – "this is the way the NGO community often generates its business".
Compared with this approach, the SAC Nominating Committee may be considered
one step forward – but there is still a long way to go!
However, the partner selection might be decided by the partner country. In Ethiopia,
the government wanted Norwegian People's Aid (NPA) to carry out the LIS because it
trusted NPA given NPA´s earlier presence and services in the country.
As noted earlier, the agency that is given the contract to plan would in normal
bilateral cooperation not be allowed to bid for the implementation. In some agencies,
this is addressed by having an independent appraisal before the implementation task is
set out to tender5. But project planning remains an identifiably separate task from
project implementation.
The objection to tendering that comes up is that this makes for a more bureaucratic
and thus slower and hence more expensive approach. The lessons from development
cooperation, however, is that this procedure provides better value for money, and thus
is worth it.
In the case of the LISs, there are several problems identified that may in fact be better
addressed through such a tender process. The first one is that there is disappointingly
little continuity of survey management from one country to another: few staff that
worked on a survey done by an organization participated in any subsequent surveys
4

A number of bilateral donors have an even lower threshold value, such as USD 500.000.

5

In the Danish system, for example, a firm can be contracted to do the planning, and Danida's
Technical Department will then lead an independent appraisal. Once the appraisal has been completed
and the project document revised according to the appraisal report, all firms are permitted to tender, as
Danida feels that the Technical Department will have verified that there are no "hidden agendas" and
biases in the final project document that would favor the planning firm over its competitors.
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done by the same organization6. That means that much of the learning that takes place
in the course of running a survey is lost, hence the argument for continuing allocating
surveys to the same NGOs loses much of its validity. If an invitation to tender made it
clear that a key criterion for weighting proposals would be experience of team
members and in particular of the project manager, the probability of bidders ensuring
that they have recruited experienced staff would increase considerably.
Other considerations can also be better specified in an invitation to tender, such as
how Quality Assurance is to be addressed, the pre-testing and social science skills that
will be employed for the questionnaire, etc (these issues will be raised later in this
report). In each case, as particular considerations come up and as lessons are being
learned, SAC would be able to define what it is that is required and expected, apart
from what can be read from the protocols, ensuring value for money.
Conclusions/Recommendations:
The LIS process has only been in existence for four years, yet has made strides
through a consistent and persistent development of the methodology to be used. A
set of publicly available Protocols and Advisory Notes have been produced that
are under constant revision, and are now widely accepted internationally as
standards for such survey work. This is the result of a unique coming-together of
the key actors in the UN and NGO mine action community – though the lack of
partner country representatives weakens the SWG's credibility and legitimacy
when formal decisions are taken.
 The LIS is a costly undertaking, and should therefore, as far as possible, follow
international "best practice" standards and procedures:
o The request for a LIS should be handled according to UNMAS 2001 TOR.
It should be subject to a critical assessment of the need and utility of a fullscale LIS.
o What is currently an ASM should become a standard project planning
exercise, using LFA participatory processes. Sufficient time should be
used to ensure that the identification of the main project elements are done
satisfactorily, local skills should be fully utilized in the planning, and the
involvement of local stakeholders needs to be ensured regarding problem
definition and choice of implementation modalities.
o The project planning task should be contracted out based on clear TORs,
where the practice of having an SAC staff member as part of the mission is
helpful.
o The implementation of the LIS should be set out to tender based on ICB
principles.
o Whether the same entity can both plan and implement a LIS should be
considered by the SWG. If this is accepted, the potential role conflict
needs to be solved through satisfactory procedures.

6

One interesting exception is in the NPA part of the Angola survey, where NPA has hired the former
manager of the GSI survey conducted in Cambodia. But NPA, which is the agency that has carried out
the most LISs – in Thailand, Ethiopia and now Angola – has not been able to find somebody within its
own staff to become project manager.
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4.3

LIS and Development Planning

For national authorities, mine action (MA) is one of many interventions required for
sustainable development in mine-affected communities. MA ought therefore to be
part of the larger planning and monitoring concerns of government. The LIS, which is
concerned with blockage of access to key resources and the negative impact of
mines/UXO (victims in particular) should therefore be seen as one of the many
planning and management tools the government has for better resource allocation,
monitoring and implementation.
From a general development perspective, MA enters as another concern on the
development agenda, just as gender did some 20-25 years ago, environment 15-20
years ago, "good governance" and human rights ten years ago, etc. The pattern is also
similar: these concerns were first driven by concerned groups who brought to the
issue particular tools and skills, started out with demanding separate funds and
treatment, but over time became integrated into larger processes due to lack of
sustainability and impact through the marginalization and "separateness" of the work.
The LIS itself is conceived as a stand-alone exercise, however – there is nothing in the
protocols that ensures its integration into other planning processes. Yet any donorfunded activity should be assessed in light of what other potentially complementary
activities are in place or are being considered. The LIS planning should therefore
carefully analyze what kinds of links can be established to other national information
and planning tools, since the LIS generates high quality data on a number of variables.
Key processes in poorer countries would be Poverty Reduction Strategy Processes
(PRSPs), but in general the links to national statistical offices, regional and national
spatial planning bodies, and to planning ministries or similar national coordination
institutions should be sought7. It is not always feasible to establish such linkages, but
if the planning process concludes that the LIS indeed should be a stand-alone event
(for example in a country recently emerging from conflict with no or little structured
planning and information collection), then the LIS itself should be down-scaled.
A key aspect of this “linking” analysis is the study of relevant information already in
place within the mine action community. In a number of countries where mine action
has been taking place for years, actors have already generated various kinds of data:
victims’ databases, various mine contamination surveys, etc. Being able to access and
use this data has been problematic, for a number of reasons. In some cases, operators
have collected data based on their own direct needs, so specifications and variables
used do not match what the LIS is to collect, the quality of the data is unknown, the
data are not in the public domain so other actors have not had a chance to comment,
etc. In Cambodia, an earlier survey in southern provinces did not include the kind of
quality assurance the LIS demands, so while “lessons learned” were valuable, the data
were not. Similarly for the victims’ database, which had been in existence for a
number of years, but where in particular the linking of accidents with the accident
site/community was found to be so different that it could not be merged with the
database the LIS was to generate (see Annex E). Being able to piggy-back and link is
thus not easy, but needs to be carefully studied during the project planning phase.

7

This is not saying that a LIS would easily "fit" with other information gathering activities, or could
piggy-back on other activities. There are often high costs to such coordination – see for example Aldo
Benini et. al. (2003) which analyses the experience from the Lebanon LIS of taking advantage of
agricultural survey data to get a better socio-economic impact analysis.
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LIS planning should also consider what kinds of aid management/aid coordination
bodies exist, so that the LIS as process and the LIS products are as well coordinated
with other bodies as possible. It will ensure a higher profile and better acceptance
among actors who may be "gateways" to other decision makers.
The experiences from gender, environment, and human rights action point to the need
to move from project to sector or program planning (such as SWAPs, Sector Wide
Approaches to Programming); more holistic planning such as PRSPs; longer time
horizons to ensure that interventions such as capacity development are addressed
properly; clearer prioritization so that activities are in line with resources and priority
tasks are addressed based on national criteria (transparency in resource allocation);
national authorities must clearly be the decision-makers ("in the driver's seat"); local
ownership must be in place so that relevance and sustainability are assured. One subconclusion of this is that the LIS itself ought to be analyzed and inserted into the MA
"sector" debate. The LIS should be seen as useful by key MA actors before many
resources are allocated to the survey itself.
Conclusions/Recommendations:
The LIS is currently structured as a "stand alone" event and is an externally driven
and defined process that is poorly integrated into national tools and tasks.
 Links and "hooks" (such as data transferability) to other processes and instruments
should be considered or developed to enhance relevance and usability of LIS
results (broaden user groups and beneficiaries). A strong participatory planning
process can ensure that these dimensions are properly addressed.
 MA in general and LIS in particular should move towards the more general
sector-planning approaches developed in host countries, and adopt to the
processes and criteria that are applied to other sector interventions in the country.
4.4

Project Document and Risk Assessment

The risk analysis in the ASM Protocol looks at factors such as weather and the
security situation – factors that impact on the delivery of the project's Outputs. But a
greater concern are the factors that will affect the higher-level objectives since the
Outputs are only means to an end: the LIS is to support decision making, with the
Goal being a mine-risk free society or similar. That is, the fundamental assumption is
that LIS outputs will be used by key actors, where the main ones are (or ought to be!)
national MA bodies/authorities. An important task of the project planning should
hence be to carry out an analysis of the national capacity to manage, participate in and
use the LIS. The two sets of questions that are important for this risk analysis, are:
Is/are the national MA institution/s likely to be active participant/s in the LIS?
Is/are the national MA institution/s likely to use the LIS results actively?
The key dimensions are capacity/ability to participate/use the results (they have staff,
operating budget, etc), and commitment/willingness (authorities and institution really
want to participate and use the LIS). Such a risk-matrix is thus the following:
Capacity / Commitment 

Low

High

Low

Unwilling & incapable

Incapable, but willing

High

Unwilling but capable

Willing and capable
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Defining in which quadrant an institution falls is important, because the top-left
quadrant (low capacity and low willingness) is, in LFA terminology, a “killer
assumption”: if a key institution belongs here, the LIS itself is probably not viable.
Thailand clearly falls into the Willing and Capable category, and Yemen is close: it
has allocated as much of own resources as could reasonably be expected. Ethiopia is
similar to Yemen, with strong political will to manage and own the process and its
results, though with insufficient own means to address it fully.
Angola would be in the opposite corner – a regime that so far has shown neither
commitment nor built any serious own capacity in the MA sector.
Cases like Mozambique and Chad are less easy to decipher. There is clearly very little
capacity, but the big problem is to understand whether there is or is not political will
to address MA seriously.
Commitment is an internal decision variable, under the control of national
authorities. If they do not show commitment, there is little external agencies can do,
especially in the short run.
Capacity is something that donors can contribute to – in fact that is what donors
largely do! – so this can become a joint responsibility. But Commitment is more
important than Capacity. Without the Commitment no amount of Capacity is of much
use.
In general the project document should be more elaborate on what the situation at the
end of the process is expected (or desired) to be. This will make it clearer which
assumptions are either explicitly or implicitly required for this result to be realistic.
This would most likely point to a need to discuss the role of the various stakeholders,
both during preparation, implementation and then use of LIS results afterwards. This
stakeholder analysis would also make it clearer how good the planning process has
been in terms of the involvement of the various stakeholders during the planning, so
that something can be said about revealed commitment and thus the likelihood of
expected end-of-LIS situation.
Conclusions/Recommendations:
Generally, the project documents do not reflect the serious risks related to the political
capacity and commitment of the beneficiary. An assessment of the risk of delays, lack
of funding owing to political reasons etc. is missing.
 The planning should include a standard LFA risk assessment, looking at all the
elements of the goal hierarchy.
 Particular attention should be paid to a realistic assessment of the key national
institutions regarding their commitment and capacity to participate in and use the
results of the LIS:
o If there is Low Capacity, the LIS should have a Capacity Development
component as an integral, early and important part of the LIS.
o If there is Low Commitment, then it is doubtful if it is meaningful to carry
out a national LIS. Alternative models should be explored instead8.

8

In Angola, active operators could carry out LIS-like surveys in the areas they work in, to ensure that
second-order (regional) resource efficiency is attained. This would also lay the foundations for either a
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4.5

Structuring LIS Planning

LIS planning is today too truncated with insufficient participation by key stakeholders
in the identification and formulation of the project document. The information base is
too narrow. The result has been that knowledge about and interest in the LIS has been
limited, while some of the proposed timelines and budgets were unrealistic, leading to
extensions and changes to these critical LIS parameters. The ASM should be
transformed into standard project planning, with more time spent on collecting data
on the core issue, namely the mine/UXO problem. The Expert Opinion Collection
(EOC) should therefore be an important part of the planning exercise (further EOC
can be carried out by the LIS itself, if this is found to be helpful).
The necessary political framework conditions – agreements such as Memoranda of
Understanding (MoUs) – should be in place before the formal planning begins. While
this may delay start-up, it is important that the government has assumed the political
commitment up-front. The MoU in Ethiopia was signed after the mobilization for the
LIS began, delaying start-up by several months, increasing costs considerably.
Separating the planning from the implementation, with these two activities are carried
out by different organizations, may entail information loss. But even the EOC is little
more than a planning tool for the actual LIS. Providing a better picture of the task at
hand through a more thorough and rigorous planning will likely offset this possible
downside. The implementing organization should consider ways in which it can tap
into the information mobilized by the planning mission, such as the local consultants.
There is concern within the MA community that this more formal planning may make
the undertaking more bureaucratic and costly, reducing efficiency. But the lesson from
development cooperation is clear: getting the planning right first time around
enhances effectiveness (achievement of project purpose), and this is a much greater
concern. Short-term efficiency concerns should therefore not upstage the longer-term
effectiveness considerations.
Conclusions/Recommendations:
 The overall plan from planning through implementation needs to be sorted out
with the national government. Formal clearance, such as a separate MoU or other
government agreement, should be in place before project planning begins.
 Project planning should include the Expert Opinion Collection (EOC) process to
give the project document a solid informational basis so that budgeting and
timeline preparation is realistic9.
 The project document should be subjected to the normal scrutiny by national
authorities and local stakeholders before final approval. Without this, national
ownership becomes problematic.
 SAC/SWG might want to organize one or two regional workshops with local
partners to discuss current LIS standards and the need for flexibility to adjust to
partner country conditions and needs.

“retrofit” national survey later on, or at least create solid partial bases for a later national effort.
Following the LIS standards would ensure that these options are realistic
9

This form of information collection is in principle what project planners do, but the EOC standards
are better and more specific, so the LIS would be “best practice” in this field.
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5 Implementing Landmine Impact Surveys
Most of the Protocols and Advisory Notes, logically enough, address issues
concerning the actual implementation of the LISs. This goes from organizational
issues, to problems how to carry out the interviews, the visual inspections of
Suspected Hazardous Areas (SHAs), and surveys based on sampling, retrofit surveys,
and false negative sampling. These documents are generally very operational and
provide clear advice as to how the survey should be done. Protocol 05, which is the
guideline for the interviewers, is particularly important – and good – as it discusses
how interviews are to be conducted, the structure and phasing of the process (doing
the visual inspection of the SHAs after the interviews are done), the biases that are
inherent in such an interview-based survey, etc. The Protocol notes the need for
addressing the gender dimension properly, the variation in backgrounds required of
the community group being interviewed, and the problem of having the interview
certified by the community leader. Since the background of the surveyors has varied
considerably between and within country teams, these kinds of clear guidelines are
obviously helpful, both for the surveyors themselves, management, and the ones
responsible for training the surveyors.
In terms of the actual implementation of the LIS, in virtually all cases the processes
have been exemplary: operational plans have been made, external and national staff
have been recruited according to job descriptions, various forms of training/skills
upgrading have taken place, testing of the survey instruments have been carried out
and modifications done, and the field work then done according to (sometimes
revised!) time plans and largely within (revised !) budgets. Yet a number of LISs have
faced criticism.
5.1

Dialogue with Stakeholders

As discussed regarding the planning of the LIS, a key issue is the dialogue with local
stakeholders. This includes national and regional authorities, development actors in
mine-affected areas, and local mine action agencies, including the international
NGOs. In line with the Protocols, in all the countries visited by this Evaluation there
has been a serious effort at ensuring this kind of dialogue, and clearly much time has
been spent in the early phases of the LIS to verify available databases, contact
stakeholders, etc. But because the planning phase has been rushed, stakeholders were
not brought into it, do not feel much ownership to the LIS, and thus do not always
pro-actively engage.
Perceptions about the dialogue are in some cases very contradictory. While some are
adamant they were not really consulted, the LIS implementers are equally clear on the
lengths they went to ensure involvement by all relevant actors10. The bottom line
seems to be that for whatever reason, in some countries key actors did not feel they
were taken seriously and thus (i) believe they were not able to contribute the
information they already had, (ii) therefore disengaged somewhat from the LIS
process, and (iii) tend to discount the LIS results afterwards. This Evaluation would
attribute a lot of this problem/short-coming to the rushed and thus truncated planning
process, which in particular did not engage the stakeholders in the kind of
participatory planning process that long experience in development cooperation points
to as necessary for participation, engagement and ownership.
10

The most controversial cases were Cambodia and Mozambique – see Annexes E and H.
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5.2

Project Set-up and Capacity Building

The protocols assume that the LIS is largely to be handled as a “turn-key” project: an
external agency is given the contract to deliver some outputs, and thus should focus
on doing this on time and within budget. The attention to issues like the follow-up use
of the LIS results and capacity building is thus second-order, though these are critical
for attaining the higher-order objectives – more efficient MA resource use.
All LISs had established links with the national mine action center (MAC) or
authorities. The longer-term effect varied considerably, however. In some cases LIS
project management was established within the premises of the national counterpart
agency, which assisted skills transfer and other forms of learning. Even in cases
where this took place, such as in Thailand, however, longer term capacity
development has been elusive, largely because the Thai MAC is within a military
structure. Due to the rapid turn-over in military staff, two years after the termination
of the survey virtually none of the officers who had participated on the LIS remained
within the TMAC. UNDP had hoped to have their capacity building project in place
by the time the LIS began, so that training of also civilian authorities could be done in
connection with the field work. The agreement with the government was delayed by
18 months, however, so that by the time the project was agreed to, the possibilities for
involving also civilian (more permanent) structures had been lost (Annex I). This case
shows, in the view of this Evaluation, another example that argues for doing the LIS
planning carefully: get the various components of a more consistent mine action
program in place.
In Yemen, and currently in Ethiopia, the ownership by the national authorities is such
that the links to LIS management will have a more enduring impact (Annexes G and
J). In Mozambique, little was attained in the area of capacity building, in part because
the LIS project in its early phases was not located with the national MAC. But in
Mozambique an analysis of the national MAC would also have shown that the
political commitment to ensure capacity development was extremely weak, so the
attempts to ensure sustainability of the use of LIS outputs would have to be structured
around this.
Conclusions/Recommendations:
 The problem of Capacity Development should be given attention during project
planning. If local capacity is seen as a problem, sufficient attention to how this
should be addressed during the LIS should be included as part of the LIS project.
5.3

Activity Management

One of the most striking features of the LIS process is the very careful and detailed
planning of the field work, and then the near-obsession with sticking to the time
schedules. On the one hand, the LIS exhibits some "best practice" characteristics in
terms of planning the logistics, the administration, the communication and
management of a large field-based survey. National census authorities and others who
carry out large-scale surveys can undoubtedly learn a lot from this.
Time Management

On the other hand, the tight timeline set for the entire exercise becomes a straight
jacket in that more time for quality-assurance steps (see below) may be excluded. The
need for deadlines due to cost considerations is appreciated. The overall need to set
very tight deadlines is not understood, however, since no LIS – as far as the
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Evaluation was able to establish – ever had to deliver key information into a timecritical decision-making process (annual budgeting/planning cycles, Parliamentary
decisions, etc.).
Instead a combination of factors seems to be contributing to this exaggerated time
concern. The first is seeing the LIS as stand-alone, so it does need to be concerned
with any other efficiency criteria but its own, so “getting the job done” becomes task
number one. The second is undoubtedly the military influence on the thinking about
how best to achieve one’s objectives, with detailed planning followed by disciplined
implementation. Finally is the continued tendency to see all mine action as an
emergency activity, so that time remains of the essence.
Information Management

The reporting back from the field has been very intensive. Data transfer from the
survey itself is of course critical. But in most cases management seems also to have
been engaged in constant surveillance of the activities as such, with an intensive
activity-based reporting taking place. This has been a very time/administration
intensive activity which in the opinion of this Evaluation does not generate much
value-added for managing such a survey. Normally one would use simple "variance
reporting", so that deviations from the foreseen program are conveyed to management
for discussion and decision. Otherwise decisions are pushed as far down the hierarchy
as possible, so that area managers or the equivalent take the daily decisions on how to
cope with unforeseen events and delays.
This tendency for over-reporting goes all the way through the system, with SAC
sending out weekly reports from every LIS process underway. One thing is that it is
unclear why this is done – hopefully nobody outside the LIS management interferes in
how the local contractor does the job. But the other thing is that management clearly
must spend considerable time on these reports, which are of the kind that most
managers today would like to avoid: lots of detail on activities, but little of substance
on achievements.
Conclusions/Recommendations:
 LIS reporting should be streamlined so only information required for decisions is
forwarded (such as variance-reporting), apart from the contents-reporting on the
data. This should be followed throughout the LIS structure, so that there is
performance- but not activity-tracking at higher levels.
5.4

Questionnaire

Two of the longest LIS documents address the questionnaire issue. The 140-page
Protocol 3 is called “Minimum (!) Data Requirements and Questionnaire” while
Advisory Note 4 is a “Background Paper on Socio-economic Indicators”. These are
thorough discussions regarding the data to be collected, and why. The data needs have
evolved as a function of the felt needs by key actors in the LIS processes. When the
questionnaire is discussed with actors in the countries to be surveyed, the typical
change request is to add more data because each actor has some additional variables
that it would be helpful to get information on. The net result has been that the
questionnaire is being felt as too large and unwieldy. More important, however, is that
most of the information is in fact never used by anybody.
The starting point should once again be in the planning exercise. Which actors are
likely to use the database, and for what purpose? This is where the “hooks” to other
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surveys and planning processes is important. If it is likely or certain that the LIS
database will be used also by other actors for decision making, it may make sense to
add some additional variables in order to provide the value-added for other central
processes, since the LIS already is such an expensive undertaking (other actors who
wish to engage in mine affected areas may want such information for taking own
decisions, such as health authorities for more effective victims' assistance
interventions or education authorities for rebuilding education infrastructure, for
instance).
As long as the LIS is structured as "stand alone" and thus is not specifically going to
feed into any planning process outside the MA community – and this was the case in
all the countries visited by this Evaluation – then the basic approach should be
according to what the protocol itself suggests: a "minimum data needs" survey. All
the information on social infrastructure (schools etc) is of little use unless these
particular buildings are blocked by mines and thus enter the “blockage” analysis.
An argument was made both in some countries visited and by some of the MA
agencies that the LIS high-quality data can be used by other ministries. This argument
might be valid in a country where the LIS is a truly national survey, like in Cambodia,
since it then gives a picture of the entire country. In almost all countries, however, the
LIS only gives data on the mine affected communities, which is a very biased sample.
The LIS data can therefore not be used to extrapolate to the national level, so for a
ministry to have very good data on 14% or even 36% of the communities is not
helpful from a planning perspective. The one exception is that in several countries, the
GPS data were used to update the national gazetteer.
LIS data may be of more interest at local level in mine intensive regions, but in no
country this Evaluation visited did we find any agency outside the MAC that was
using the LIS data for planning purposes. In Cambodia the Land Use Planning Units
(LUPU) in the most mine-affected provinces were just being trained in the use of the
LIS data as this mission visited during the summer of 2003, more than a year after the
LIS had been completed. The Evaluation noted that the data being collected by
LUPUs contained many of the same variables, so there was a possibility of some
synergy. But by and large the LUPUs collected the data in the field for those specific
communities where they were considering land allocation activities – and these
decisions were not driven by the kind of top-down strategic data pictures that the LIS
generates but from a bottom-up political process. So even in Cambodia, the use of the
LIS data was virtually nil outside the MA community.
A similar picture emerges regarding the socio-economic information. Data on
distribution of labor across sectors etc is potentially interesting if it is used for
something. For the LIS ratings themselves they do not enter, so they are not a "first
order" piece of information such as the blockage and victims data. If there is more
refined analysis being carried out in terms of understanding larger implications
(blockage of pasture land in a village where only 5% engage in livestock raising is
very different from one where 80% have livestock), this may be helpful, but this kind
of more detailed analysis seems to be done only when actual development activities
are being considered for the village, not in the LIS study itself.
Conclusions/Recommendations:
 The standard questionnaire should be reviewed for a focus on only collecting
"first order" data. Other variables should only be included if it is clear that they
will be used by actors for important decisions
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5.5

Quality Assurance

Another strength of the LIS is the quality assurance (QA) that is applied to the
process. The QA has two dimensions – internal and external.
The internal QA is the most important. This has varied from informal supervision
systems to a very structured program such as the one in Cambodia that itself took
about 10% of total resources. This included the programming of data consistency
checks for data entry, the UN mandated re-survey of 3% of communities, etc.
External Quality Assurance

The external QA Monitor (QAM) supplied by the UN has often come in too late in the
process. Exactly where the problem lies is not totally clear, but late QA is poor QA,
since "quality at entry" is key to overall quality. If the intention is to ensure quality
through external QA supervision, then the QA manager must be in place by the time
the key decisions are being taken at the beginning of the process.
The QAMs have in fact functioned as senior advisers to LIS management as well.
This service has been very much appreciated – but exactly because there has been so
little learning across LIS processes that the QA managers represent "institutional
memory".
The need for the external QA hinges to a large extent on whether or not the UN
Certification Process is still seen as necessary. If that disappears (see more on this
later), what largely remains would be the senior advisor services. This is turn is only
required to the extent that the LIS process itself is not able to ensure more continuity
and consistency.
External Quality Assurance and ISO Standards

According to Terms of Reference for the UNMAS Certification Committee (UNMAS
2001), the key element of the certification process is QA monitoring based on the
external QAM. The task of the QAM is very comprehensive and requires a high
degree of presence in the field controlling the LIS activities. The budget of the QAM
for the LISs have been USD 40-50.000, reaching USD 90–100.000.
The International Standardisation Organisation (ISO) has issued a set of guidelines for
Quality Management Systems (QMS) called the ISO 9000-2000 series. ISO 90002000 is widely implemented in the development sector among major donors,
consultants and contractors. It is described in International Mine Action Standard
(IMAS) 07.10 "Guide for the management of demining processes". It encourages
managers of demining organizations to examine how to apply the principle of quality
assurance to mine action.
The principle of ISO 9000 compared with the LIS certification processes and QAM is
that the ISO 9000 is based on management procedures whereas QAM is based on
control by checking and repetition of processes/activities. Application of ISO 9000 to
mine-clearance is controversial because of the risk of accidents. Applying ISO 9000
to the LIS process does not contain this problem so the Evaluation believes that the
ISO 9000 would be appropriate to the LIS (and the certification procedure, if this is
kept).
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Use of ISO 9000 Standards

The big issue is how many more LISs the SWG expects are still to be carried out. If
there are only a few major mine-affected countries yet to be surveyed, it may not be
necessary to implement major changes. The basic question then becomes whether
Certification is necessary or not. If not, the second issue is then whether the kind of
external QAM is required, or whether it is largely the "senior advisor" services that
are most sought. And this need, as noted earlier, can be better addressed by ensuring
that the incentives for the implementing partner are such that they are not likely to get
the contract unless they have such skills in place (they can in fact include such senior
skills directly as part of their tender proposal).
On the other hand, if there is a felt need for continued external QA, the Evaluation
would suggest moving to using the ISO 9000-2000. In the context of the GLS, this
would requires the following steps:
The LIS process should be subject to a QMS covering external and internal QA.
An external audit of the external QA system should take place as a basis for the
certification process.
SAC or UNMAS should contract a professional (certified) QA auditor to perform
an audit of all future LIS.
A LIS Advisory on the Quality Policy and Certification Process based on external
Quality Audit should be prepared.
A LIS Protocol on a standard Quality Management System for all LISs should be
prepared.
It is anticipated that the consequences will be that:
The LIS process, certified against an understood and known standard, will gain
more credibility in the national and international development sectors.
The certification process will be easier and more transparent.
The cost of QA can be reduced.
Content of Quality Assurance

Regarding the content of the QA, the Evaluation finds that there is too much attention
paid to the third-order issue of data veracity ("are the data entered in the database the
information that was provided by the informants?").
The first-order issue of whether the survey is asking the right questions has been
addressed above (should the survey contain all the current questions – is this
necessary to answer the key concerns?). The second order issue, which is often the
most difficult in such surveys, is if the questions being asked in fact generate the
information desired (are data collected valid and reliable?). This needs to be tested
for, and this is in part what the pre-test is meant to do.
The one study of the validity/reliability of the LIS survey data that this Evaluation is
aware of was quite critical to the LIS information. Three villages in Mozambique
were visited, where the researchers spent a couple of weeks in each place to be able to
collect more careful and in-depth data. The basic finding was that the rapid survey
could not capture the impact picture very well (Millard and Harpviken 2000). They
furthermore point to methodological biases in question formulations ("how many
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have been hurt…" rather than the more neutral "has anybody been hurt…"). They also
note that the selection of informants in several cases was not good – the best
informants were not included. This included the rather obvious one of including local
mine operators, an observation that is in line with the comments received by this
Evaluation in a number of countries. Another issue that was raised by several fieldbased organizations during this Evaluation was that the rapid survey techniques being
used may not succeed in collecting the information desired (information is missed,
partial/distorted information is received – for a number of reasons).
One reply to the Millard/Harpviken critique is that the kind of in-depth study that they
carried out is not realistic to replicate by a national survey – the purpose of the LIS is
exactly to try to scale down to a few common denominators the concerns of local
communities. But the study does point to problems with the validity/reliability of the
picture that emerges that a QA system should try to address. The best means for doing
this is probably to carry out some in-depth re-visits of communities visited early on in
the process, to check if information collected can be verified by more in-depth
studies. If not, the LIS needs to consider what is causing the biases and adjust the
information collection instrument or procedure.
The current QA systems thus seem to focus on whether the data transmission chain
from informant to database was able to maintain data integrity. The answer was
largely Yes, but with very high QA verification costs. This focus on data integrity
when data reliability/ validity is a bigger issue seems to be a misplacement of effort.
Conclusions/Recommendations:
The certification process is rather complicated and expensive, and not in line with
international "best practice".
 Internal QA systems should be a key criterion when selecting bidders for
implementing a LIS.
 "Best practice" internal QA systems developed in connection with LIS
implementation should be posted on the SAC web-site as help for other LIS
implementers (helpful if for example NGOs in Angola were to do regional LISs).
 The role of external QAM may not be necessary (see later).
 QA resources should be spent more evenly across the three dimensions of data
quality: (i) is the survey asking the right questions (relevance)? (ii) does the
survey generate answers to the questions being asked (validity, reliability)?, (iii) is
data integrity along the information chain maintained?
 Application of ISO 9000-2000 should be considered.
5.6

Local Survey Skills

The LIS uses local surveyors to carry out the actual field work. The recruitment base
for the surveys have varied considerably, from Cambodia where the implementer was
locked into hiring only former deminers, to Mozambique where most of the surveyors
were recent university graduates with no demining and little field experience. The
implementers have had to balance the need for getting as accurate readings on spatial
parameters as possible – location of village, of accident sites, size of SHAs, etc – as
well as distinguish poor data from valid, and to ensure that all the voices and interests
have been duly heard. This requires a range of skills that few individuals have,
particularly in skills-scarce societies like Mozambique. The training that has been
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provided seems in most cases to have been quite good and relevant given the
background of the team members, though experts in both mine area surveillance and
group interview techniques would consider the training to be rather superficial, with
consequent results for the quality of the information collected11.
The Evaluation would not be so harsh in its conclusions, however. By and large the
teams seem to have been very dedicated, have worked hard, have taken the task
seriously, and delivered often outstanding performance in terms of data collection.
Staff have been tested before the real field work and often been re-trained/had their
skills upgraded during breaks in the actual field work. This approach is probably "best
practice" in terms of survey staff hired for large-scale field surveys. The survey staff
have therefore been through a very good school in terms of the organization, running
and implementation of such surveys. The issue is if the country benefits as much from
this valuable capacity development as is possible.
The first question is if LIS management has searched for possible institutional
partners in recruiting surveyors. National statistical offices, social science
departments at universities, independent research institutes and other bodies may be
interested in finding collaborative arrangements to either have own staff or people
they otherwise use for their own survey activities involved in the LIS, in large part for
the learning effect (but the LIS is also often interesting to the individuals as
employment opportunities). The "capture" of the lessons from the LIS is then much
greater as the surveyors and their new skills are known to logical future users of these
same skills.
Local social science/university skills should also be used as much as possible. Several
possibilities exist: (i) act as trainers to surveyors, (ii) become involved in the
discussions on weights, and in the analysis of the final data (having graduate students
do their theses on LIS data could be very valuable), (iii) do research-based village resurveys, to provide an independent QA on the survey instruments being used. The
idea would be that local science skills are used to re-visit some of the first
communities surveyed by the LIS, to verify that instruments and approach generates
valid and reliable information, and if not to provide ideas on how this can be corrected
for. By involving researchers in the effort early on, the LIS will also generate an
important set of stakeholders as well as key persons for maintaining "institutional
memory" about the LIS and its results.
Conclusions/Recommendations:
 The project planning process should include the identification of possible partner
institutions for the implementation of the field survey, to ensure that as much of
the learning from the LIS survey process as possible is internalized by national
institutions and not just simply by the individuals engaged.
 The active involvement of local social science skills in the LIS process could be
encouraged along several lines: (i) as trainers/teachers, (ii) as analysts and
disseminators of results, (iii) as resource persons to the LIS itself, including on
discussions of local adaptation of questionnaires, weighting schemes, and as
external QA for testing the survey instruments and techniques.
11

Several social scientists spoken with were quite critical of the kinds of skills that the surveyors were
given. The Evaluation believes on balance, however, that the kind of training that would be necessary
to attain the quality that these informants find desirable, is not realistic. It is more important to verify
that the instruments are as good as possible, and then train the surveyors in using the instruments.
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6 Results and Impact of Landmine Surveys
The last two Protocols address the questions of Impact Scoring and the Data Analysis
– how to process the data generated from the survey to produce the main outputs of
the LIS: one or more reports detailing the process and presenting the findings, often
broken down by region; the database, including with possibilities for map-based
presentation; and some analysis of the data, in particular providing a rating of
communities ("impact scoring") in terms of severity of the impact of the mine
problem for the communities based on the variables and weightings of these that have
been discussed before the LIS begins. These outputs are to contribute to the Purpose
of ensuring better decision making and deployment of scarce MA resources, with the
Goal of eliminating or reducing the negative consequences of mines and UXO incountry.
6.1

Use of LIS Outputs

As noted, the intention of the LIS process was to make the information available to
three sets of actors, for better decision making and action by them: international
funding agencies; national mine action authorities, and MA operators on the ground,
whether engaged in demining, MRE, victims assistance, etc.
Donors

The response from the donors is that they themselves do not use the LIS reports for
own decision making, but it is important to them to know that the host country does!
That is, they want to feel reasonably certain that local MA resources are used well,
and having a LIS in place as the basis for planning is seen as a strength.
While the LIS is therefore not contributing much to donor decisions directly, as had
been the intention, the LIS is indirectly important as it provides the donors with a
possibility for verifying if a partner country is in fact using the LIS information or not.
While at first glance this may seem a somewhat disappointing conclusion, it is in fact
in line with the way donors currently prefer to work. Donors want the partners to take
responsibility for their planning and implementation, and the donors will then verify
the quality and veracity of information provided, and on that basis accept to continue
supporting. The main decisions on how much to allocate across which partners is
driven by political agendas back in the donor HQs – but where the reporting from the
field on the quality and commitment by the partner is important for shifting resources
over time.
National Mine Authorities

The use of the LIS by national authorities varies considerably in line with the
Commitment/ Capacity dimensions discussed above. But Commitment is also a
function of how important the mine/UXO problem is in the national context. In
Mozambique, the mine problem is not included in the country's main planning and
coordination instrument, the Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper (PRSP), because there
are other issues that are of much greater concern to the authorities: rural poverty,
HIV/Aids, lack of educational facilities, etc. Expectations regarding the use of the LIS
results must therefore be realistic: they will be both a function of the relative
importance of the mine/UXO issue, but also of the absorptive capacity – many of
these societies can only address so many problems at a time.
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By and large, however, it is clear that national authorities are taking the LIS seriously.
In the cases of Thailand, Yemen and Chad the reports clearly led to shifts in resource
use – Thailand focusing a lot more on the border to Cambodia, Chad realizing they
had more of an UXO problem rather than a mine one, and Yemen identifying more
mine affected areas but also shifting resources towards MRE and victims assistance.
In Cambodia, the national MAC is using the LIS to critically assess whether demining
operators are in fact focusing on the high-impact areas (the first analysis claimed that
this was not really the case), and using the LIS as the basis for structuring the
dialogue with the MA community. In Ethiopia, it is also clear that the authorities
intend to use the LIS for their MA planning and action in accordance with the national
development program supported by the World Bank. In Mozambique, the national
MAC has developed a national five-year mine action plan – but one that is not
respected and used by other actors, including the all-important provincial governors.
Yemen seems to be the only country that so far has used the results to look at the
larger resource picture and re-direct resources away from simply demining. This is in
part a function of the fact that the restructured YEMAC both has policy planning,
budgeting and implementation responsibilities and covers all mine action areas, and
thus has a "built-in" possibility for seeing the larger picture. In the other countries, it
is difficult to see that the LIS has contributed very much to these kinds of shifts in
resource use. One reason may be that the victims data weigh so heavily in the overall
scoring system, and the logical response to high victims scoring is to remove the
mines.
Overall, however, the use of the LIS as far as national authorities are concerned must
be considered to range from satisfactory to quite good.
Local MA Actors

The third target group for the LIS outputs is the local Mine Action community. Here
the findings are more disturbing, as most of the local MA actors seem by and large to
ignore the LIS outputs.
In some countries, notably Mozambique and Cambodia, local mine action
organizations have shown disdain or even hostility to the LIS – both during its
implementation and afterwards in terms of its use. One issue that arose in both cases
was that the surveys had come about outside the SWG system, and the actors who
were awarded the contracts did not have previous mine action experience. In
Cambodia, this problem was compounded by the fact that the implementer was a
commercial company. This broke with the bond that exists within the NGO
community due to what is perceived to be the common the reason for them being
engaged in mine action.
In Chad, Ethiopia, Thailand and Yemen there are few actors outside the national
public sector engaged in mine action, so these actors are rather marginal in the context
of the overall national effort. But even here there were not strong links to the LIS as a
planning tool.
Lack of Commitment by other key actors is thus an issue. The problem of the
dialogue and ownership to the LIS from the outset has been touched upon. Another
issue is who controls resources. In a number of countries donor resources largely flow
on the outside of government channels directly to operators. The operators are thus
largely free to continue setting their own priorities, whether based on the LIS or not.
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What is difficult to fathom is that the operators are largely those NGOs that make up
the SWG where the LIS originated and is still discussed. When this issue was raised
during the SWG workshop in Copenhagen mid-October 2003, there was no real reply
to what can be done to improve this situation. This therefore remains a challenge to
the SWG and the NGOs that participate in it: what is the purpose of continuing
supporting and discussing the LIS process if it is not going to have an operational
impact? The question is on what grounds an NGO can ignore the priorities of an LIS
if those are accepted and used by the national authorities?
Conclusions/Recommendations:
Donors do not use the LIS results directly, but are interested in seeing that partner
authorities do – it provides an assurance that MA resources are being planned better.
National authorities by and large are using the LIS, and in most cases trying to shape
national MA plans based on it.
Local operators have by and large not used the LIS for their planning, which is
surprising given that they generally make up the SWG, which is the "home" of the
LIS.
 There is a need for MA actors to come together to see how the LIS can be used for
more rational sector resource allocations. National concerns and priorities should
be a major benchmark for individual organizations' priorities.
6.2

Rating System

The key to the impact analysis is the rating scheme that has been developed. It is
discussed a lot within the MA community. The TOR asked the Evaluation to test and
see if ratings would vary significantly if plausible alternative weights were used.
The largest debate is on the victims' data, where each victim during the last 24 months
is given a score of two – any victims before that is given a score of zero. Five victims
in one accident score the same as five victims in five different incidents. Two victims
in a village of 1000 people score as much as two victims in a village of 100. So there
are many ways in which the victims score can be made more "realistic": (i) Victim
within last 12 months scores two, within 12-24 months scores one, and more than 24
months zero; (ii) multiple-victim accidents get reducing weights: first victim full
score, second victim 50% score, all subsequent victims 33% score, (iii) scores could
also be reduced as a function of size of population – one victim in a large village
provides a lower probability index than one victim in a small village, and in each
country villages could be stratified as "small", "medium" or "large", for example.
An attempt was done to do some runs in Thailand, but there was not enough time
because the victims data on the electronic file did not contain enough information to
actually provide these kinds of classifications. One would have to go back to the
original files and cross-check with other data (for example on village size). But there
clearly are variations that can be tested – the question is if the added "sophistication"
in the weightings will generate a more "correct" impact picture. This is largely a
subjective consideration, but one that local stakeholders (such as the local research
community and development decisions makers) should participate in. The marginal
costs of changing the weights are small, so these kinds of changes would be easy to
build into new surveys once they have been agreed to (though trying to remember
whether an accident took place eleven or thirteen months ago becomes a complicating
factor).
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The local blockage factors have been modified in a number of countries, to be as
relevant as possible to the country-specific situations. What is not captured, however,
is the relative importance to the community of each blockage: if one of ten or the only
water point is blocked they both get a blockage point. When comparing across
communities, the blockage of a well in a village of 100 and the only well in a village
of 1000 receive the same weight when ranking the two communities in terms of
priorities.
While the LIS rating is meant as an input into larger decision making processes, this
does not always happen. In Mozambique, the national strategy built on the LIS is
ignored by governors because they have a very different political agenda, and also
overlooked by central planning authorities because they have certain national areas
that are priority. In Yemen, the LIS is clearly driving key MA decisions, though
priority tasks such as clearance of land for key investments (the Aden development
zone, new gas and oil fields, etc) take precedence over community-based ratings.
This, however, is an appropriate use of the LIS results. It has always been recognized
that the LIS Impact Scores are not the same as operational priorities for national
authorities. They simple provide decision makers with information regarding how
communities view the impact of mines/UXOs, and how a set of explicit criteria have
led to a relative ranking of these communities in terms of severity of impact. This
information is then to be analyzed in the context of other decision criteria for some
final choices regarding resource use.
In reality, however, MA is often treated like a quasi-sector: there are some resources
allocated to MA which that "sector" then prioritizes internally. So the "within-sector"
allocations ought to be in line with the LIS results – but as noted, this is not always
the case.
But LIS data could probably be used more also in other planning processes. In a
number of countries it was clear that other planning institutions were not aware of the
LIS data, and the possible implications for their own planning activities. The question
is if more work can be done to make LIS data useful to others. This means supporting
national MACs to feed the LIS into national planning processes or – through dialogue
with regional authorities – see if this may help integrate the LIS outputs more closely
into these decision making processes. Ideally this should have been discussed and
made clear doing the planning, but this is often not possible – other authorities would
not be in a position to make any commitments before the information is actually
available.
Whether this is realistic or not is not clear – it probably would vary from one country
to another, but may be a question worth exploring with national authorities.
Conclusions/Recommendations:
The weights attached to the various factors in the impact survey clearly can alter the
ranking of communities, but weightings will always remain subjective preferences –
there are no obvious "objective" weights.
The general triage of "high", "medium" and "low" impact makes sense, and the cutoff points between them are and will necessarily remain arbitrary, no matter where the
border values are set.
The key is to ensure that the weights are in accordance with the kinds of concerns
national authorities have regarding the negative impact of mines and UXO. In order
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for decision makers to see the consequences of alternative weighting schemes,
simulations could be done on a constructed case.
 What is more important is to increase the relevance of the LIS within the national
planning system by linking up to general planning priorities (such as in PRSPs),
so that the LIS ratings enter the final resource allocation decisions.
6.3

Database Usage

The main product of the LIS is the database that is generated. There are several issues
that are raised by informants concerning the database: (i) access to the data, (ii) the
user friendliness of the software, (iii) maintaining the database, (iv) the need for a
general standard.
Access to Data

Access to the LIS data is a problem in several countries because of government
policies. The SWG policy on the issue is quite clear: those governments that are not
already aware of it should be informed that the LIS data are to be put into the public
domain. What has not been specified, however, is how soon this should happen, and
in what format the data should be accessible.
In Yemen, data were released as the survey progressed, so that local authorities and
others could see the results shortly after the survey had passed through. In Cambodia,
the survey strategy was intended to be similar, so the implementer began work in the
most mine-affected areas in order to make this vital information available as quickly
as possible. In the end, however, the national MAC refused to release the data until
the entire survey was finalized and the MAC itself had had time to structure the data
release in the way it wanted – which was quite controversial, as the database was
released, slowly and reluctantly, with a three-month validity period, after which the
database was locked (Annex E). One reason given by some mine operators for not
using the LIS more actively is exactly that in such cases the release of the data is so
late that the information loses a lot of its value.
User Friendliness of Software

Another unique feature of the GLS is that the actors have come together around the
use of a common database, the Information Management System for Mine Action
(IMSMA). Funded by the Geneva International Centre for Humanitarian Demining
(GICHD), IMSMA is an integral part of the LIS, as data collection is structured such
that the information can easily be entered into the database for analysis. In the first
surveys, this in fact constrained somewhat the ability of the survey to adapt to local
circumstances as the early versions of IMSMA only permitted five user-defined
variables when describing blockages – most of the blockage variables were predefined (in function of the Protocol's definition of blockages). While this problem has
been solved with later versions of IMSMA, it points to the importance of the
relationship between the survey itself and the database that it generates.
IMSMA is today used in 36 programs, most of them written in Access, though the
most recent version of IMSMA is now using SQL Server or Microsoft Desk Top
Engine (MSDE). The views concerning the software program platform varies. For
some, Access is more user- friendly since it is the most common database in use (as
part of Microsoft Office). Finding persons who are familiar with Access and can
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manipulate tables and generate reports is thus relatively easy (though Access as a
program clearly requires experience and skills).
In the view of GICHD, moving to SQL Server is an improvement as it facilitates
back-up and restoration of data, is more stable and easier to maintain than an Access
database, and thus provides more safety and ease for the operators. In GICHD's view,
installation and maintenance is easier, and the manipulation of the database in fact
easier. While the Evaluation team heard comments to the contrary, it should be noted
that this were reactions from a few staff right after they had moved to the SQL
version. Over time, it may be that GICHD is right.
In Cambodia, a FoxPro database was used instead of IMSMA. The main reason for
this was that the national demining agency already had a FoxPro database installed,
and wanted to build on this rather than move to a different software package. A
further argument was that FoxPro was easier to handle than Access12. The IT expert
on the LIS was able to do considerable programming on the database, thus adapting it
to the needs of the survey, such as putting in a number of data-checking "traps" that
facilitated the quality verification of data.
Whether this in the end was an advantage or not is contested. From the implementers
point of view, the FoxPro meant that the distribution of data tables was easy since
FoxPro is easy for even NGOs to learn and use, so the database was immediately
accessible. Getting the IMSMA written in Access is much more difficult, and the
claim is that LIS data on SQL Server will be even less accessible for other actors than
the national database operator.
In the end, the Cambodia LIS had to be ported to IMSMA, and that transfer turned out
to be quite problematic. This points to the problem of having different databases for
the LIS data, as the transferability of data is not guaranteed. The further problem that
emerged was that the sustainability of the original FoxPro database – one of the
arguments for "keeping it simple" – was in fact poor: once the FoxPro data manager
of the implementer was not available, neither the national MAC nor other actors in the
MA community was able to maintain and update the database. Moving to IMSMA
therefore became a necessity in order to assure continued back-stopping and training
of local staff, since this is guaranteed by GICHD.
The developers of IMSMA have over the last couple of years also worked on a data
transfer protocol (called "maXML") that will allow the transfer of LIS data to other
disciplines easier. IMSMA now supports this protocol, so that an important step in
making LIS data available to other actors has been taken.
GICHD makes the point that because IMSMA is now an international standard,
individual countries and LIS teams do not (as the Cambodian team had to), spend
resources on developing and maintaining software. It simplifies training, database
updating etc since this is all centralized and the costs are fully borne by the GICHD.
While the criticisms of IMSMA were considerable, the issue is probably that there is
no easy solution to both collecting comprehensive data in an area, and being able to
easily do sophisticated data analysis without the underlying software being of some
complexity. The current solution of having one actor take responsibility for training,

12

FoxPro is two-dimensional spreadsheet-like while Access is a more complex fully relational
database.
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software updating, and responding to new needs from the field is, in an imperfect
world, probably the best solution.
What could be interesting is for GICHD to see if there are ways of making the
IMSMA more user friendly. The Evaluation realizes that there are technical limits to
simplifying the data manipulation aspects of the database – but as long as the software
is seen as a barrier to access, this is a problem that needs to be addressed.
The other issue is the concern of allowing other users more easy access to the data.
Several public agencies and NGOs claimed that for them to be able to use the data
relevant to the areas or issues they are working on, would make a big difference. If
maXML would allow for data transfer into more common formats, this issue could
perhaps be addressed.
Maintaining the Database

But the costs of maintaining and developing the database was a concern in several
countries. There are two issues – having the skills to be able to use the database, and
secondly having a policy of updating the database so that it does not become a static
one-off snapshot.
Even at the level of having the skills to simply run the database, in several countries
the only solution so far found is having UNDP-funded projects that pay the
technicians to stay on after the LIS project has formally terminated. This salarysupplement approach is clearly not sustainable, and other approaches need to be
found.
In no country had the database been transferred to a national agency that would have
better skills at handling it, such as a national statistical office, a planning department,
as university, or similar. This may or may not be a good solution, but more
imagination could have gone into looking for a solution different than maintaining a
database in an organization that historically has never had this kind of responsibility
and perhaps should not have it today. Various forms of out-sourcing or responsibilitysharing arrangements could be looked into, depending on the specific circumstances
in the various countries.
The other issue is the updating of critical variables, since the time value of
information is important. Continuing demining and population movements mean that
every day the database remains static, its value as a source of information depreciates.
If there is no longer-term plan for ensuring the database's constant updating, the
returns to the LIS investment drops dramatically over time. This shows again the need
for seeing the LIS both in a larger perspective, and a longer time horizon.
International Standards

Whether there is a need for an international standard such as IMSMA is also debated.
The argument that donors wish internationally comparable data in order for them
seems not to be valid, at least based on the information this Evaluation received from
the donors regarding how they take decisions.
The more important argument would seem to be the one put forward by GICHD: that
with a common platform software updating, staff training, ability to ensure
sustainability of databases etc. is much better.
To the Evaluation, this pragmatic cost-efficiency approach makes sense. While there
is no particular need for an international standard in order to ensure cross-country
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comparisons, the economies of scale from using the same software in many different
settings would seem to outweigh the costs – though again the idea of workshop with
users to determine costs and benefits might make sense.
Conclusions/Recommendations:
The LIS database is a key output of the process and its value needs to be ensured
through (i) easy and open access to both data and results, (ii) a program of
continued and structured updating of key variables, (iii) accessibility in terms of
low-cost and easy-to-use software platform (relative to situations in differing
countries).
Having IMSMA as the standard database for mine action makes sense from a
pragmatic efficiency point of view. The challenge is to develop it in two areas: (i)
making transfer of LIS data to other databases easier (continue the maXML
development), and (ii) make access to MA operators easier, so that data are more
directly user-friendly. GICHD might consider a workshop with key users to
identify key steps to take in this connection.
6.4

Resource Efficiency

Whether the costs of the LISs can be justified should be analyzed from three angles:
(i) the costs of the LIS in relation to annual MA expenditures, (ii) whether the LIS has
served as a good resource mobilizer for the government and MA actors in securing
more/further donor support, and (iii) if the LIS has led to decisions that have
improved efficiency of resource use.
LIS Costs as share of MA Expenditures

While the Cambodia LIS ended up costing over USD 3.5 million, the annual MA
expenditures are estimated at USD 30 million. The nearly USD 2 million spent in
Chad in a country that has an annual MA expenditures of around USD 900.000 is
clearly a lot more questionable. The need for a realistic budget based on a serious
project planning process is thus required, so that national authorities can consider
what level of resource expenditure they find reasonable.
LIS as Resource Mobilizer

While many in Cambodia criticize the LIS, is it being used aggressively to market the
need for more funds, and evidently with success. What the marginal value-added of
the LIS is, is impossible to guess at, but that a LIS has been carried out is known by
the donors, and is perceived positively by them. The fact that the Cambodian
government is using the LIS now for its own planning can only strengthen its status
and hence "marketing value". In Chad, however, the LIS – which was considered
quite good – did not lead to any serious increase in MA support. Why this is, is
difficult to gauge, but donors have made it clear that the LIS per se is not important
for resource allocation decisions. It is rather more strategic considerations that lie
behind. But the lack of a LIS may hurt a country negatively in the competition for
resource, since the LIS has achieved a certain credibility among the donors (though
not many actually read them and thus know what they say!).
LIS leading to greater Resource Efficiency

In terms of enhanced resource efficiency, Yemen is a clear-cut case of this happening,
including shifting between demining, MRE and VA. Mozambique is a country where
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nothing has happened, while Cambodia is trying to make it happen! Net gains will
thus only becoming clearer over time. The Cambodia LIS data analysis indicates that
there may be some considerable efficiency gains to be had through re-allocating
resources – but whether this analysis is accepted by all remains to be seen.
Conclusions/Recommendations:
 The relative efficiency of investing in a LIS should be related to three factors, two
of them which are speculative regarding the future. The LIS budget ceiling should
therefore be a government decision, in light of its own priorities and assessments
of expected returns to the LIS investment.
6.5

Strategic Planning

The LIS is to inform future mine action. But the LIS reports and databases are
themselves simply an informational basis for decision making. In order to carry out
the kind of strategic planning that the LIS is intended to support, many of the
countries where LISs are carried out, require additional help, in particular by the
national MACs that are responsible for national MA planning and implementation.
Two kinds of follow-on activities have so far taken place – general Strategic Planning
support by Cranfield Mine Action center (CMA), and in Bosnia a pilot project on
Task Assessment & Planning (TAP) was conducted in December 2002.
CMA support is of a more generic kind that is introduced at key stages during the LIS
(see Morete 2003b, where CMA intervenes typically at three points during an 18month LIS). It is meant to assist national authorities both understand how the LIS
results can be used, and then support in this process. As part of the support, a software
package called "Freeway" has been developed, though not a necessary component.
The approach is a fairly standard management decision approach, in line with
principles of objectives-oriented planning/results-based management.
Both the Strategic Planning and the TAP seem to be helpful extensions/complements
to the LIS. However, this Evaluation did not receive sufficient feed-back to form any
particular views on the specific value of them as practical tools.
The one issue the Evaluation would raise, however, is the use of specific tools like
"Freeway". An important precondition for the use of such tools is the local capacity
and commitment, as discussed in section 4.4. The lesson from many years of
development cooperation is that whatever tools donors introduce into partner
countries, they need to be appropriate to the needs and capacities of the partner.
Countries like Bosnia and Thailand have very different organizational and human
resource conditions than Mozambique and Angola, and that should inform the survey
structure and planning instruments used. Of greater importance, in line with what has
been stated above, is to verify what kinds of instruments and processes are already in
place, and try to use or adapt to these. This will also make the acceptance of the LIS
results much greater, as the adaptation costs to local actors are reduced. A key task for
support actors like CMA ought therefore be to facilitate this kind of linking, based on
their knowledge of strategic planning principles.
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7 General Issues
A number of more general issues regarding mine action surveys merit consideration.
7.1

Roles of SAC and SWG

The SAC has been careful to stick to the mandate that it was given when created – to
manage the GLS. Suggestions that can be considered "mission creep" – expanding the
range of activities that it engages in – have been avoided. In principle this is a
commendable policy, as there is a rational expectation that the "sunset clause"
regarding SAC's establishment will be adhered to: once the GLS is over, SAC will be
disbanded. At the same time, the SAC has performed some important roles, in
particular resource mobilization as well as the coordinating management function for
most of the LISs.
SAC's Future

This Evaluation does not want to enter into a discussion on the merits and drawbacks
of the SAC's range of activities, since it is neither in our mandate nor does the
Evaluation have any basis for any particular point of view. What should be noted,
however, is that the SAC currently lives off the overhead and the contracted tasks that
it performs in the various LISs. This provides a potentially distortionary incentive for
ensuring the continuity of LIS process, since it is neither rational nor possible to close
the SAC down if there currently are no more LISs only to revive it if there are a
number of LISs that should be carried out some years from now. What needs to be
decided fairly soon is if the SAC should be disbanded, and if so, when and how, or if
the services the SAC provides to the mine action community are seen interesting
enough to consider other options for the future.
Given the number of countries that really need a LIS, it is clear that the SAC, if it
sticks to its GLS role, needs to begin planning its termination soon. This is both to
ensure an orderly managerial and financial closure, but primarily to have a realistic
picture of what the income stream and thus what the maximum activity level can be
during the winding down period.
The issue of the activity level has to do with one area where the SAC could have done
more. This is concerning the development and maintenance of institutional memory –
collecting, structuring, storing, discussing and disseminating "lessons learned" and
"best practices" from the survey work. One of the unfortunate results of SAC leaving
the VVAF was that much of the social science and analysis skills were left behind,
weakening SAC's capacity in this area. But as the GLS winds down, this function
remains important, not only for the mine action community, but also because there are
so many "best practice" aspects of the LIS that other surveys could benefit from.
Clearly the UN system – and in particular the UNDP – could also play a much more
important role in this field. But the major onus is on SAC and the legacy it intends to
leave behind.
The alternative is for the SAC to expand its range of activities, much like VVAF has,
into related fields of management of information intensive activities. Whether this is a
smart move or not depends in large part how the SWG and the mine action
community in general feels about the importance of a body like the SAC for future
MA related activities. But clearly the GLS process as currently conceived has pretty
much run its course, and this needs to be addressed.
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Regarding the remaining LIS processes, the contractual, managerial and other formal
responsibilities between actors have been difficult to discern in some of the surveys.
SAC in particular has had different tasks and hats, making it important that the
structure be simplified and more transparent, where possible.
The Future of the SWG

Linked to this is the fate of the SWG itself. This deliberative body has also been
constituted around the Global Landmine Survey process. The question is if the MA
community has found the SWG as such a relevant and important body for policy and
implementation issues.
If the SWG intends to continue functioning after the formal GLS process has
terminated, one key issue it should address is how to include partner organizations in
the process. Having workshops/seminars in the regions where mine action is most
important and thus using SWG meetings as part of a larger capacity development
effort could be very constructive.
Conclusions/Recommendations:
 The SAC should continue its role as fund-raiser (at least unless and until there is a
MA sector program that will also fund LISs); have the coordinating and
management role for those LISs that are under its purview; prepare in
collaboration with partner authorities, the agreements necessary for a LIS,
including the TOR for the project preparation work; participate on the project
planning process; tender the LIS implementation and ensure fair and transparent
decision making in awarding the contract; and provide the training and other
support services that are agreed to.
 SAC should avoid direct management or oversight of LISs and instead focus on
more strategic management of the GLS process and its accomplishments. A key
role in this connection is collecting, analyzing, disseminating and discussing
"lessons learned" from the LISs. A key target group for this, apart from the SWG
itself, are interested stakeholders in partner countries.
 The SWG should remain an open deliberative body but where partner country
stakeholders should be invited in. Regional workshops as part of a more proactive capacity development effort could be highly constructive.
 The SAC management/board selection processes are opaque – formal
accountability seems difficult to pin down [no real conclusions or
recommendations here – just an observation for further consideration].
7.2

Survey Tools and Protocols

The SWG Protocols and Advisory Notes are by and large seen as very helpful by the
implementers. In some of the poorer countries and less mine-affected countries, they
were seen by some as excessive in their detail, and in almost all countries there have
been some adaptations, especially regarding the questionnaire (the blockage factors
have been changed, and the IMSMA database made more flexible to handle such
country-specific changes).
What is seen as a major strength is exactly the access to standards that have been
discussed, tested and agreed upon. This provides a major help to all the parties
involved in the LISs. The fact that the SWG exists as a forum for discussing new
experiences is another advantage.
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It is also clear that all LIS implementers have used the tools and tried to follow the
Protocols as far as possible. Some of the uncertainties/ambiguities of early versions of
these documents have been sorted out, making them clearer and easier to follow. The
Certification Committee discussions show that implementers have made strenuous
efforts to comply with these standards, by and large with success.
Conclusions/Recommendations:
 The SWG Protocols/Advisory Notes provide helpful standards, though there is a
need to accept flexible adaptations to country specific situations.
7.3

UN Quality Assurance and Certification

The UN agencies play a number of roles which are fairly straight forward. The one
major question the Evaluation has concerns the UN Quality Assurance Management
and the Certification process, managed by UNMAS.
Actors in the field complained that they often did not get access to the QA reports that
were sent to New York. Furthermore, if there were comments made to the report, they
were often not transmitted back to the field. The entire QA process was therefore seen
as not being very transparent. Generally the project managers were given verbal
briefings by the QAMs in the field, so they generally knew what the observations
were and could take them into consideration. But the UN QA process could be much
tighter and more transparent: reports distributed and comments/observations
communicated to all relevant stakeholders within known time limits.
The other issue is the Certification process. It is only related to the LIS process itself
(did it follow the Protocols?) and not the contents and results of the survey. But the
discussion on the Certification only takes place once the survey is finished and a
request for certification is received. This, frankly, makes no sense if the intention is to
help a process that might be going off track get back again. While this is what the QA
manager in the field is supposed to help with – and what has in fact happened on a
number of occasions – the Certification itself becomes somewhat incongruous
The management of the Certification process also needs some strengthening. The
Cambodia LIS was discussed by the Certification Committee one year after the survey
had been finalized. This was largely due to bureaucratic misunderstandings and delays
caused by the Cambodian authorities being very late finalizing their request for
Certification. But there is a strange disjuncture between a process that is run along
extremely tight timelines and then suddenly nobody has a management responsibility
for ensuring a speedy finalization.
The discussion on the Cambodia LIS also revealed how disjointed the Certification
process is. One issue that was critically assailed at the meeting was the fact that all the
Cambodian surveyors were male, which runs contrary to the Protocol, but where the
implementer was bound by an MoU negotiated between two governments. This
problem had, however, been known all along, and clearly must have been picked up
by the QAM. This Evaluation cannot see the purpose of discussing this issue, though
important, one year after the process has ended. Either the QAM is linked into an ongoing monitoring and certification process so that problems identified can be
corrected while on-going, or the entire QA/Certification loses its value in terms of
contributing to the actual quality and content of the LIS.
Lately the Certification Committee has become more critical of what is happening in
the field, requesting LIS teams to correct problems identified. If this is done in a
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timely manner and the proposals in fact lead to better LISs, the Certification may be
justified. If not, there are several arguments for discontinuing it:
By and large national authorities do not ask external quality assurance and
certification of national surveys. There is nothing inherently difficult about the
LIS that should necessitate this (agricultural and population census surveys, for
example, are much larger and more complex). If the planning of the survey has
been done properly and national authorities are happy with it (the Cambodian
authorities accepted all-male surveyors, no matter what the misgivings of others
might be), then it is their views and concerns that should matter.
The fact that national authorities now are asking for Certification probably in large
part is because expectations are that this will provide some value-added, for
example in the form of greater donor acceptance and hence more donor funding.
Whether this is a correct perception or not is unclear, but given what donors have
said, they probably are much more concerned that the survey is done than that it
receives some formal Certification later on.
If the LIS processes themselves institute Quality Management Systems along the
ISO 9000-2000 requirements (see section 5.5 above), there would seem to be no
need for any further QA system.
The invitations to tender should ask that bidders specify the QA system they
intend to put in place, and make it clear that this aspect will be given an
appropriate weight when considering the competing bids.
Conclusions/Recommendations:
 The need for external QA and a formal Certification process is questioned. If
instead LIS implementers are asked to implement a QMS according to ISO 90002000, further external verification would seem superfluous, especially if national
authorities accept this as they do for other national survey processes.
7.4

Capacity Development

Most of the mine affected countries have experienced serious armed conflict. This has
naturally affected national institutions, including the capacity of the national mine
action authorities. A key aspect of the planning for a LIS should therefore be the
capacity analysis of what are expected to be the major users of the LIS outputs. A
realistic program of capacity building should be part of what is after all a process that
stretches over at least one year, often times considerably more. The UNDP would be a
logical partner in such endeavors.
Conclusions/Recommendations:
 UNDP has supported various forms of capacity development. This focus should
be maintained but built on better principles of sustainability.
7.5

Roles of Partners/National Authorities

The role of partners has varied considerably, largely as a function of national
decisions, not because the LIS has desired any less or more involvement. In line with
what has been said earlier, more emphasis on good participatory processes during the
planning may help strengthen genuine ownership and thus involvement both during
and after the LIS. The trend is in the right direction – all means should be used to
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ensure that this continues to ensure sustainability of results and maximum impact on
local mine action.
One key issue, however, is that as much of the documentation as possible should be
available in the local languages. This is particularly important for all final reports
(including explanations about the database), but also as much of the preparatory
material as possible. Language barriers have clearly been a major blockage factor in a
number of the countries (UNDP is using the remaining funds from its project to
translate the survey report into Thai, a couple of years after the survey was done. This
has clearly made the report inaccessible to local authorities in mine-affected areas).
The LIS also needs to have a more aggressive/pro-active dissemination and training
component, to help national authorities and other potential users understand what the
database and reports actually contain, and how they can use the information for their
own purposes. While this is by and large the responsibility of national authorities, it is
clear that the follow-up and use of the LISs in most cases is rather poor, thereby
reducing significantly the value and relevance of the LIS. Including this as part of a
Capacity Development component could provide significant value-added.
Conclusions/Recommendations:
 A strong and conscious effort must be made to involve national stakeholders.
Barriers to participation, in particular due to language, needs to be planned for and
resources set aside to ensure that this is addressed.
7.6

Summing Up and Conclusions

The observations made above boil down to something rather simple and do-able:
Simplify – Streamline – Standardize (join the mainstream!)
The suggestions are largely straight-forward and in line with what is happening in the
other fields of development cooperation: mine action should join the larger
development cooperation community, taking its rightful place alongside the other
actors, bringing in a series of "best practice" models regarding large-scale surveys,
and learning from "best practice" programming of large-scale activities!
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Annex A: Terms of Reference
The GLS Evaluation should examine the many facets of the GLS process, at the same
time collecting and generating lessons learned, suggesting possible improvements to
make the process more effective, more efficient, and more useful, and identifying for
further review significant issues not fully covered in the Evaluation. The evaluation is
intended to contribute in three main ways: (a) to make the learn lessons from past LIS
to make implementation of the future ones more effective; (b) to make the results of
the LIS more useful; and (c) to consider whether and in what circumstances the results
produced by the LIS could be obtained through alternative means requiring fewer
resources and less time. It is not an evaluation of any single LIS, nor will it involve
new field survey work. It may, nonetheless, involve reanalysis of some information
collected by the LIS.
The Terms of Reference (TORs) define the aim and scope of the GLS Evaluation, and
describe the Project organization, phases, deliverables, timings, and funding. This
supporting document complements the TORs. It provides a list of issues and
questions which, together, describe the extent and range of the subjects to be
addressed by the Evaluation Team. The list is neither exhaustive nor prescriptive.
STRATEGIC DIRECTION
Was the GLS organizational structure and overall management system (i.e. roles and
relations among UN - donor - SWG - SAC - implementer - QAM - national
authorities) appropriate, effective and transparent? Were lessons learned during and
after each survey, and what was the mechanism for applying the lessons to the
organizational structure, LIS procedures and protocols? Was the selection of
countries to be surveyed logical, fair and transparent?
LIS PLANNING AND PREPARATION
Administrative set-up
Were the timeline and human resources required to undertake all tasks during the
administrative set-up phase realistically defined? Were they underestimated? Did
administrative set-up occur simultaneously to the completion of other tasks, such as
questionnaire adaptation, expert opinion collection, and coordination? Was sufficient
time allocated from the time of arrival of the international survey staff until the first
team was deployed to the field to conduct interviews? Was this planning criterion
carefully assessed during the Advance Survey Mission? Was an international
Administration/Finance Officer employed fulltime on the survey? Was equipment
procured on the international market? Were there delays associated with this? Were
there viable and economical options for procurement of that equipment from the
national market?
Stakeholder priorities
Given the reality that each stakeholder has its own unique perspectives and priorities,
were detailed common goals shared by all concerned established at the earliest stages
of planning? Were all stakeholders consulted regarding survey operational planning?
Were country specific indicators established with stakeholders and progress of the
survey regularly communicated to them? Was an effective mechanism set up to
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coordinate the participation of key stakeholders throughout the process, and especially
in its early stages? Was this coordination process facilitated by the donor, the
contractor, UNMAS/SAC representatives, the QAM?
National mine action authorities
The ability of the Survey to have the full benefit depends to a large extent on the
availability of appropriate Government resources and commitment, particularly
human resources and policy attention. Was a well-defined relationship with the
national counterpart, providing clear definition of responsibilities (including a
Memorandum of Understanding [MOU]) in place? Was the National Authority fully
and actively involved in the survey? How were the results and their use affected by
this? Was the survey team co-located with the national mine action centre and/or a
UN technical assistance project? Were local staff, particularly data entry operators
and key management staff of national mine action centers included in training and
implementation of the survey?
Geodata
Were the existence of a comprehensive national gazetteer and national maps
confirmed before decisions-in-principle were made about the feasibility of conducting
the survey? If yes, were they factored into budget estimates and timetables? Were the
identification of datasets and their availability negotiated at early as possible? Was it
done during the Advance Survey Mission? Did the Survey team obtain basic
electronic map information, such as an official gazetteer, detailed up-to-date census
information and secondary data from the national authorities and other interested
partners? Was it difficult? Were the results incomplete? Was a timeline for
acquisition of map information and datasets established with specific terms and
conditions defined with partners? Did the survey team make full use of existing data
and knowledge in the preparation phase? Did the survey team seek assistance in
obtaining GIS and other data from their national government and other national
institutions with programs in the area of interest? If yes, were they available and
readily accessible? Did SAC support efforts to access existing maps and GIS
information from other sources?
Local staff - selection and training
Were candidates carefully screened and was training extensive enough? Assuming
that local survey and data management skills are limited in most mine-affected
countries, did the project obtain the best-qualified candidates, either from the local
market or staff of the national mine action authority? Was the relation of survey local
staff to communities important in the selection process? Were data management staff
selected with a clear understanding that they were committed and able to continue
work with the national mine action authorities when the survey was complete? Were
sufficient time and financial resources allocated to address training needs and specific
conditions of the survey? For example, in cases where staggered start times were
used, was more than one enumerator-training course conducted and was overall
training time for enumerators longer than normal? Should SAC develop a common
training curriculum, specifying desired outputs, but allowing flexibility to preserve
local cultural sensitivity needs?
IMPLEMENTATION
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Review the various protocols and the Certification Guidelines, and the various steps
in the model timeline. Were they carried through as intended, with the expected
results, or were there deviations?
How was the Advanced Survey Mission requested and conducted? What expectations
were raised and agreements achieved? How was the LIS implementer chosen and
was this a contentious process? Was it an appropriate organization? Was it
appropriately staffed? How did the training of the implementing agency take place
(training on how to conduct the survey and how to use the tools used in the survey)
and how could it have been improved, how were surveys carried out (schedules, steps,
etc.), in particular how did the actual experience differ from the originally planned
approach? Were the LIS Protocols easy to understand and to apply; were they
universally applied; were they amended and refined as a result of experience? What
changes were made to the planning process? What changes were made to the process
of negotiation with Government and other parties? How (if at all) was existing data
taken into account in the preparation phase of the survey, what existing data was used
and was existing data imported into the information management system as a working
base for the survey. If data existed and was not incorporated – why was this the case?
How did the field trial and pre-test process change, if at all? How useful was the
collection of expert opinion; did it provide a nearly complete reference, or simply a
starting point and political contact? Was a standard questionnaire used for data
collection? Were coding sheets used? Was data entered in the field or at HQ? How
did the sampling for false negatives (positives) vary from the original plan? How was
the result of the sampling analyzed? How many error cases were found? Was it a
cost effective means of improving the results of the Survey? Did any of the protocols
require effort beyond a reasonable point of diminishing returns, in the judgment of
those involved in the survey? What internal quality management procedures were
used, in the survey as a whole, and in the data collection and entry processes
specifically?
SURVEY METHODOLOGY
SWG protocols
Were SWG protocols generally used and approved of by the survey teams? Should
SAC develop additional protocols? (e.g. – for nomadic communities). Were the
protocols appropriate in all countries and if not, how were adaptations carried out and
were they successful.
Questionnaire
Did the survey team make all possible effort to fully understand the SAC survey
questionnaire? Did the survey team attempt to review and adapt the SAC survey
questionnaire to local conditions? If yes, what changes were made and were key
information dropped from the survey questionnaire for the specific country?
Language and translation
Were the survey documents and questionnaire developed in the most accepted
language of the country (for example Portuguese in Mozambique)? Did the translation
of protocol documents and the questionnaire begin early in the survey, using
professional translators? Was re-translation of the questionnaire into English (as a
quality control measure required by SAC protocols) completed by an independent
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translator? If not practicable, was a small committee of bilingual personnel employed
to review the survey questionnaire translation? Were other alternatives found to
provide useful information and feedback for translation of the survey questionnaire,
training, and operational planning? Was the local language used in interviews
different from the language adopted for the survey questionnaire? If yes, was the
translation of terms used in the survey questionnaire standardized?
Expert opinion
Did expert opinion collection begin early in the survey, before the recruitment and
training of field staff? What was the quality/accuracy of the information collected
through expert opinion? Did the number and location of communities impacted
adequately determine the composition and selection of survey teams? Were
enumerators recruited from areas suspected of being mine impacted and did the
recruitment ensure appropriate language skills and familiarity with the areas? Were
the extent and location of mine-affected communities well known at the national
capital level? Did the survey indicate that better expert opinion was collected at the
local level? Did the survey adequately assess where quality expert opinion was
available? Did expert opinion collection result in extended timelines (i.e. for false
negative sampling)?
IMSMA availability
Was the IMSMA database fully functional for the pre-test and pilot survey? In
situations where mine action programs already existed, were efforts to use data from
existing databases made in order to minimize duplication of data collection? Was a
field check of accuracy of existing databases conducted?
Time constraints
Did the survey determine timing of the community interview and proximity
verification early during pre-test and pilot survey? Was operational planning driven
by the time required to complete surveys? Specifically, to what extent did travel to
and from affected communities affect the surveys? Were productivity assumptions
carefully assessed at the early stage?
Significance of zero impact
Did the survey find landmine/UXO contaminated areas that presented no impact upon
communities? If yes, did the survey track non-impacting landmine/UXO
contaminated areas through the IMSMA database?
Did surveys encounter single items of unexploded ordnance without direct impact
upon communities? If yes, were locations of such items registered and reported so that
existing mine action teams can respond?
False-negative sampling
Did false negative sampling raise questions regarding cost, time and applicability in
survey countries? Was a local adaptation considered while abiding by the general
requirements of the protocol to obtain a valid coverage estimate? Did surveys
generally adapt the protocol to what was practical and practicable in terms of time,
budgets and logistics? Did the survey complete false negative sampling before village
level interviews? Did the survey implement community interviews and false negative
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sampling concurrently through the enumerator teams? Was the SAC protocol
understood and applicable? If not, did the surveys find acceptable alternatives to cope
with this issue?
Re-survey
Did re-survey cover one percent of the affected communities as per the SWG
protocol? If not, why?
Delineation of contaminated areas
In those countries where the shape (polygon) of contaminated areas could be
determined with no danger to field staff, no significant impact upon the operational
timeline and the level of detail collected for the mined area was thought important for
national authorities, were additional efforts made toward defining the polygon area?
Were boundaries and areas precisely measured by means of GPS, compasses, etc.?
How did the estimated areas produced by the LIS compare to previous estimates?
District mapping
Was district mapping developed by enumerator teams under the supervision of a Field
Supervisor? Was the district level picture of the degree of mine contamination found
useful (during data collection) through provision of better-defined problems and
survey coverage?
Weighting
The LIS impact methodology relies to a significant extent on the collection and
analysis of victim data. Did the survey produce data on a significant number of
victims not otherwise known? Are there other less expensive ways to obtain that
information? Is the victim data a good proxy for High or High/Medium impact
communities? Is the detail of victim data too much / too little / about right to make
the data useful to victim assistance organizations? (Suggest to re-analyze data pools
for this purpose.)
Is the GLS weighting system valid? Many other criteria may also be important. Is
there enough subtlety in adjustment of this weighting system? Is this explained
adequately to the end users? Were alternative weighting systems considered, and if so
did they lead to distinct understandings of the landmine problem in the country? Did
they produce significantly different results, and, if so, in what way? What alternate
weighting systems should be considered, and what implications might they have? Did
the survey use country-specific impact factors while abiding by a common weighting
protocol to keep surveys internationally comparable? By its emphasis on recent
victims, the survey assigns a very high percentage of landmine affected communities
to the low-impact category other than in exceptional circumstances. Did planners
express the need for indices that would allow them to establish priorities among
communities within the low-impact category? Was there concern about the weighting
systems “blindness” to the size of contaminated areas and the size of the associated
population? (Reanalyze existing data with alternative weights.)
SURVEY OUTPUTS
Survey products
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Did the survey reveal and convey technically correct information concerning the
Mine/UXO problem and associated factors? Was the survey database considered
useful? Were the layout, tables and graphs in the LIS report user friendly and cost
appropriate?
Should other tables or analyses have been provided?
Were
arrangements made to translate the document into the appropriate national language?
Were the results of the LIS made publicly available? How was this done? Are they
known? Have the results of the LIS changed the ways in which the landmine problem
is defined and addressed, by national authorities and donors?
Effective use of results
Was the entire process aimed at giving the government a clear means of prioritization,
to develop a logical, politically acceptable, affordable, achievable mine action plan?
Did the Survey results modify/clarify the understanding of the landmine/UXO
problem in the country? Was an overall mine action strategy developed on the basis
of the survey results? Was a yearly work plan produced on the basis of the strategic
plan? Is works planning and prioritization based upon the survey results? If so, how
are they linked? Are the results of the ongoing activities compared with the yearly
work plan and the strategic plan? Are the plans adapted according to the results of the
ongoing operations? Have the results of the survey been useful in resource
mobilization for the national program? If so, how have they been useful? Are the
electronic add on products being generated necessary or could more extensive training
in use of the survey (IMSMA) preclude the need for these? What doubts remain
about the survey products and the landmine situation? Does the general survey
process carried out in the country now incorporate the concept of socio-economic
impact and related questions?
The Survey has several possible products (and some indirect benefits), as suggested
below. What is their relative importance? To what extent have they been achieved in
each case? Could they be achieved with a lower investment of resources and time?
They include:
Comprehensive snapshot of the impact of landmines in the country
Comprehensive database that can be updated
Strengthening national MA institutions
IMSMA database
Trained IMSMA operators
Increased information management awareness by country MAP personnel
Trained community surveyors
Focus on “socio-economic impact” as basis for priority setting
National mine action strategy, including time frame and costs
Annual works planning
Government commitment
Donor commitment
Basic understanding of location and characteristics of hazardous areas
Sufficient information on hazards to priorities sites for technical surveys
Survey utility
Did the survey serve the practical information needs of the National Authorities and
international community? To which extent did the survey serve a plurality of
stakeholders? Was the utility of Survey well understood and not questioned by the
Scan Team LIS Eval Draft Final Report v 2 0 03 11 17

Page 49

24.02.2010

Scanteam:
Evaluation of the Global Landmine Survey Process: Draft Final Report

stakeholders involved in the project? Did the survey team coordinate and plan toward
conducting a survey that provided data suited to guide resource and effort
prioritization to all Mine Action actors? Was the national authority offered the
opportunity to draw upon the knowledge gained by the contractor when preparing the
national mine-action work plan? Was training provided to the end user on exactly
how the survey might be utilized in a planning/prioritization process? If not should
there be? Did the national mine action authorities move quickly to develop a
comprehensive national mine-action work plan? Is there any possible utility in using
the results (with perhaps extended TOR) to other sectors? Can data gathered be of
use to other sectors?
Survey information transfer and reporting
Was information conveyed and transferred in an accurate, complete and usable
manner to the National Authorities and international community? Was the transfer of
data between mine-action centre data pools rapid (if applicable)? Did the national
mine action authorities evaluate the benefits of extending the survey to the areas and
communities that were inaccessible to the implementation partner? If so, did they use
the same methodology as that employed by the implementation partner? Was the data
collected entered into the IMSMA database? Did the IMSMA database achieve its
full potential? Did the survey incorporate any mechanisms to improve information
transfer and reporting process? Did the survey team consider that the data collected
and stored through the survey also had numerous potential applications in sectors
outside mine-action? Did the national mine action authorities take steps to inform the
wider government, NGO, commercial, and academic communities of the existence
and relevance of those data and did they encourage and facilitate broad access to
them? Were the national mine action authorities given competence to establish the
systems, means and resources to exchange data on a regular basis with all mine-action
operators active throughout the country? Were appropriate quality assurance
measures and channels of communication implemented to control the entry and
accuracy of data processed, and to ensure their transmission on a timely basis to
planners and decision-makers? Was there a continued emphasis on national capacitybuilding in the areas of data-manipulation and analysis plus the effective utilization of
complementary planning tools? Did a technical Assistance Program assist in the
development of indigenous capacity and the preparation of the mine action plan?
Data release
Was survey data immediately available to national authorities and organizations for
operational planning, instead of waiting for certification by the United Nations
Certification Committee at the end of the project? Was the release frequency
determined by negotiations between the survey team and national authorities? Were
clearance assets redeployed as a result of information released during the LIS? Was
the national authority a key part of this data release if appropriate?
CERTIFICATION PROCEDURE
How was the QAM selected? Was the QAM appointed on or before the date of
selection of the contractor? Was the QAM an appropriate person? Was the QAM
available at the appropriate times? Did the QAM provide useful feedback during the
survey process that improved the quality of the survey? What contribution did the
QAM provide to the certification process? Did the interventions of the QAM increase
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confidence in the product produced? Did the QAM ensure the satisfactory frequency
and quality of communications among all parties, including the donor, the contractor,
the national authority, the UNMAS, and the SAC? Is the utility of a part-time (versus
full-time) quality assurance monitoring questioned? Were issues raised early by the
Quality Assurance Monitor for discussion with the Survey Team Leader, SAC, the
national mine action authority and other interested partners to allow quick resolution?
Did advance or pre-planning missions involve, in some way, the participation of the
QAM, the contractor, and the national mine-action authority? Is there any merit in
having the QAM involved in certain facets of the survey from its earliest stages?
What was the methodology of the certification process? Would it be helpful to have
tools to assess the completeness and consistency of the data in the IMSMA database
to support the quality assurance and the certification? What questions would the
above mentioned tool have to answer? Did the QAM work directly with the IMSMA
system as part of the QA process and did he use the already existing tools to assess
the completeness of the collected data? Did the QAM possess sufficient knowledge of
the IMSMA system to perform his role? What was the usefulness and validity of the
Final Certification? How could these be more useful? Should the TORs of the QAM
and/or the Certification Committee be modified?
GENERAL ISSUES
What factors limited the effectiveness, efficiency and usefulness of the survey? How
can the survey process be made more efficient? What qualifications should be
required of an implementing partner? How can the effectiveness/usefulness of the
results be increased? Were sufficient resources made available for the LIS? Could
the process have been conducted less expensively, or benefited from more resources?
The LIS does not provide a 100% complete and accurate list of communities and
impact. Is the degree of accuracy obtained sufficient? Is it worthwhile to spend more
to improve the remaining coverage? Or, would it be appropriate to spend less to get a
reduced coverage?
What is the importance of SAC (or other) training and backstopping in conduct of the
LIS? Is the “survey package” now sufficiently clear that a good LIS can be conducted
by any qualified institution, with only limited further support? What training materials
should be developed to complete the survey package? Has the LIS proven to be a
one-shot process, or has it been institutionalized? What support would a motivated
national mine action authority require to carry out a LIS? Should such support be
provided by a single specialized entity? Can it be supplied by any experienced social
research entity?
The evaluation is not intended to include direct technical assistance to Districts in
order to establish or to increase their financial and technical management capability.
That type of assistance has already been provided or made available by the Asia
Development Bank and other donors working on devolution. For the purpose of this
program, while a grant to a District may include costs related to its financial and
technical management of the project, the District must already meet the second
precept in order to be eligible for award of the grant.
Normative and Informative References
Evaluation of the GLS Process - Issues paper prepared by the Project SC.
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Protocol 1 – Principles/Standards
Protocol 2 – Survey Mechanism
Protocol 3 – Overview of GLS Process
Protocol 4 – Advance Survey Mission (ASM) Requirements
Protocol 5 – Certification Guidelines
Protocol 6 – Socio-Economic Indicators
Protocol 7 – Expert Opinion Collection
Protocol 8 – Field Organization and Flow Chart
Protocol 9 – Survey Interviewers
Protocol 10 – Questionnaire/ Coding Sheets
Protocol 11 – Sample for False Negatives
Protocol 12 – Sampling Survey Component
Protocol 13 – Proximity Verification
Protocol 14 – Retrofit Protocol [Draft]
Protocol 15 – Impact Scoring & Community Classification
Protocol 16 – Data Analysis
Protocol 17 – Monitoring Progress
Protocol 18 – Survey Integration [in drafting stage]
SAC Model Timeline for Landmine Impact Survey
TORs and mandate of SWG
TORs and mandate of SAC
Informative References
World Bank/SWG Conference report and transcripts 1998
Institutional Mechanisms Brussels 1998
Oslo Meeting February 1999
SAC April 1999 meeting
Summary of Operational Review 2000
Global Landmine Survey Initiative, SAC, Washington DC, dated August 2001
Oslo Training January 2001
GLS Final reports for Yemen, Thailand, Chad, Mozambique and Cambodia.
Advance Survey Mission reports
Narrative progress reports
Project descriptions and financial reports and budgets
SAC Trip Reports
Quality Assurance Monitor reports
UN Certification Committee Reports
SWG Survey Protocols
Comparison of Socio-Economic Survey and emergency survey in Kosovo March
2000
Survey Action Center website: www.sac-na.org
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Discussion, VVAF, 27 August.
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SAC (2002), “SAC Partner Selection”. Poll of the Board of Directors, ref. SAC-BD02-003 Partner Selection, 22 May
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Version 3, draft 20 Jan 2003, 16 pp.
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Scan Team LIS Eval Draft Final Report v 2 0 03 11 17

Page 54

24.02.2010

Scanteam:
Evaluation of the Global Landmine Survey Process: Draft Final Report

SAC (2003j): "Advisory 1: Brussels Principles and Standards". Revised 13 Jan 2003.
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Terms of references, Quality Assurance Monitor for Landmine Impact Survey,
UNMAS
Trip Report, Bosnia-Herzegovina, 17-22 March 2003

Cambodia Survey
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Cambodia: Mine/UXO Victim Information System 2000”. Phnom Penh,
November.
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UN QA Monitor Monthly and Certification Report: Survey Level 1 Cambodia, AprilMay 2001
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April 2000
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Project Evaluation, Chad Undated

Eritrea Survey
Benini, Aldo (2001): “Eritrea LIS – Review of tyhe Preparatory Mission Report”,
SAC, 1 November
EC Contracting Authority: Eritrea Landmine Impact Survey, Grant Application Form,
draft
Eritrea LIS: Senior staff training and pretest report
Eritrea LIS:Senior Staff Training
SA Generic Training Outline (Part-1), Saeptember 2002
SAC, UNOPS: Project Progress Report, July –August 2002
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SAC: Statement of Work 0206 07
SAC Eritrea LIS Interviewer Training Report
UNMEE MACC Training Cadre: Preparation Training Course. LIS, October 2002
UNMAS Eritrea Landmine Impact Survey Project:Project document, draft (No date)

Ethiopia Survey
Ethiopian Mine Action Office (EMAO), Survey Action Center (SAC), and Norwegian
People´s Aid, Memory of Understanding (MoU), July 17, 2002
Federal Negarit Gazeta, No. 16, 5th February, 2001, Council Ministers regulations
No. 70/2001, Ethiopian Mine Action Office Establishment Council of Ministers
Regulations.
Fleisher, Michael L.: Field Assessment Mission to North Wollo Zone, Amhara
Region, Ethiopia, April 23 – May 9, 2002, Final report
Jørgensen, Nils Erik: Field Assessment Mission to North Wollo Zone, Amhara
Region, Ethiopia, April 23 – May 9, 2002, Final report
Landmine Monitor Report 2002, p. 548 – 556
Survey Action Center and Norwegian People´s Aid: Advance Survey Mission to
Ethiopia, Landmine Impact Survey, 24 November to 7 December 2001
Syrvey Action Center and UNDP: Ethiopia Landmine Impact Survey, Project
Document, 01 12 10
Survey Action Center and Norwegian People´s Aid: Contract, CSA-0203-ETH-NPA
Survey Action Center and Norwegian People´s Aid: Contract, CSA-0203-ETH-NPA,
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Tigray Victim Record
Valetta, Damien d´Osia: Ethiopia Landmine Impact Survey, Quality Assurance
Monitor´s First report, December 2002

Iraq (Northern) Survey
UNOPS, Landmine Impact Survey Analysis on The Three Northern Governorates of
Iraq, UNOPS Mine Action Programme, Northern Iraq, March 2003.

Kosovo Survey
SACMACC, Kosovo, SACMACC Final Report, 2000-03-31.
SACMACC, Kosovo, SACMACC Final Report, Executive, 2000-04-12.
UNMAS: Inter-Agency Assessment Mission Report. Kosovo (FRY), June 04.1999
The HALO Trust: Initial Kosovo Minefield Survey, 13 June – 24 August 1999

Mozambique Survey
CIDC (2000): "Lessons Learned", Mozambique, Presentation + text, 2000-12-18
CIDC (2001), “Landmine Impact Survey, Republic of Mozambique”, September
CIDC/ David Horton (2003), Submission to Scanteam, Document, June
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Demex (2002): "Danida evaluation of the Humanitarian Mine Action Program in
Mozambique". Copenhagen.
IND (2001), “National Demining Strategy for Mozambique 2001-2006”
Landmine Impact Assessment Survey Mozambique - Final QA and Certification
Report, June 2001
Scanteam (2003): "Review of Norwegian People's Aid Mine Action Program in
Mozambique". Oslo, March.
Wilkinson, Paul F. and Brigitte Masella (2003), “MLIS: Optimising Mine Action”,
Montreal, Canada.

Somaliland Survey
UNMAS QUAM Final Report by John C. Brown (No date)

Thailand Survey
General Chatichai Choonhavan Foundation (2002): “The Final Report for the United
Nations Development Programme”. Report on UNDP funded Mine Risk Education
activities. Bangkok.
NPA, SAC DC Meeting, Presentation+ docs, NPA, Thailand, Dec 2000.
NPA, Lesson’s Learned Survey Data, Utilization – Liaison Officers - NPA, Thailand,
2000-12-19.
NPA, Lessons Learned Survey Data,Utilization, Polygons, Thailand, Dec 2000.
NPA, Lessons Learned Survey Data, Utilization, Provincial Report, Thailand, 200012-19.
NPA, Lessons Learned Survey Data, Utilization, Spot Task, Thailand, 2000 Dec.
NPA, Lessons Learned Survey Data, Utilization – Villagers in Trial - NPA, Thailand,
2000-12-19.
SAC and Norwegian People's Aid (XXX?): "Landmine Impact Survey. Kingdom of
Thailand". Certified by the United Nations Certification Committee, New York.
SAC, Trip Report, Thailand and Japan, December 7-16th (2000?).
SAC/Richard Kidd, Mission Report Thailand, SAC, 01/02/00.
Level 1 Impact Survey, Thailand: Monthly QA and Certification Report, August 2000
Level 1 Impact Survey, Thailand: Monthly QA and Certification Report, September
2000
Level 1 Impact Survey, Thailand: Interim QA and Certification Report, November
2000
Level 1 Impact Survey, Thailand: QA and Certification Report, February 2001
Landmine Impact Survey, Thailand: Final QA and Certification Report, August 2001

Yemen Survey
Holly, Jack (20901): “Yemen Humanitarian Demining Program”, Journal of Mine
Action, Issue 5.3, Fall 2001.
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Lardner, Tim and Matt Craig (2001): “Strategic Planning in Yemen”, Journal of Mine
Action, Issue 5.3, Fall 2001.
MCPA, Lessons Learned, MCPA, Yemen, Presentation, 2000-12-19
MCPA (Yemen), Presentation, Short-part 1, 2000-12-16
MCPA (Yemen), Presentation, Short-part 2, 2000-12-16
Ministry of Legal Affairs & parliamentary Affairs, “Law no. (4) of 2000 Concerning
the Local Authority, August 2000.
Nalya, Aisha Saeed (2001): “Mine Awareness Education in the Republic of Yemen”,
Journal of Mine Action, Issue 5.3, Fall 2001.
Ruberry, Mary (2001): “The Effects of Landmines on Woman in the Middle East”,
Journal of Mine Action, Issue 5.3, Fall 2001.
SAC and Mine Clearance Planning Agency (2000): "Landmine Impact Survey.
Republic of Yemen". Certified by the United Nations Certification Committee,
New York, including annexes.
SAC, Yemen, Mozambique Coordinating Meeting Dec 99.
Tariq, Qadeem Khan (2001): “Landmine Impact Survey in the Republic of yemen”,
Journal of Mine Action, Issue 5.3, Fall 2001.
UNDP Yemen Mine Action Support Programme (YMAP), “Annual Project Report
(APR), January 2002-December 2002”.
YEMAC, “Yemen Mine Action Programme, Annex E, Annual Work Plan 2003”.
YEMAC, “Strategic Mine Action Plan for Yemen (2001-2005)”.
YEMAC, Mr. Faiz Mohammad, “Mine Action Strategy” (2001-2005), including
Strengthening National Capacity for Mine Action Phase 2, Support and
Reintegration of Landmine Survivors, and Mine Risk Education in Mine Afffected
Villages in Ebb, Al Dhala and Hadramout.
YEMAC, “Yemen National Mine Action Programme, Work Plan March – September
2003” (Executing Agency: UNOPS, Implementing Agency: YEMAC).
YEMAC/Executive Mine Action Center, “Monthly Consolidated Activities Report”,
June 2003.
26/07/2000 Fax from UNMAS re Certification of Level 1 Impact Survey - Yemen
30/09/1999 Fax from UNOPS to Survey Action Centre, Washington D.C. - revised
TOR, QA Yemen
9-10/12/1999 LIS Yemen, Notes for Mozambique-Yemen Team Co-ordination
Meeting
Undated

Yemen End of Year Report for 1999

Undated

Draft TOR UNOPS QA Monitor Yemen Level 1 Survey

Undated

Project Description, Level One Survey, Yemen

Undated
Yemen

Interim QA and Certification Report Level One Landmine Survey,
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Annex C: Persons Interviewed
1. INFORMANTS IN LIS COUNTRIES VISITED
Bosnia-Herzegovina
Mr. Emmanuel Sauvage, Project Manager HI LIS
Ms. Almedina Komic, National Operation Co-ordinater, HI LIS
Mr. Dusam Gavran, Director of BHMAC
Mr. Tarik Serak, BHMAC
Mr. Jusuf Jasarevic, BH MAC Regional Manager
Ms. Kimeta Diberovic, HI LIS Regional Co-ordinator, Regional Office Mostar
Mr. Marinko Bosnjak, Civil Defence Gorni Vakuf
Mr. Asmir Begovic, Civil Defence, Gorni Vakuf
Mr. Mirza Agic, HI LIS, QMS Manager
Mr. Neven Rediz, HI LIS GIS Assistant
Mr. Abdulah, HI LIS, Regional Manager, Regional Office Sarajevo
Mr. Knezevic Goran, HI LIS, Regional Manager, Regional Office Pale

Cambodia
H.E. Sam Sotha, Secretary General, Cambodian Mine Action and Victim Assistance
Authority (CMAA), Phnom Penh
Mr. Chea Eang, Director of Database, Assistant to the Secretary General, CMAA
Lt.Gen. Khem Sophoan, Director-General, Cambodian Mine Action Center (CMAC)
Mr. Tong Try, Director of Operation and Planning, CMAC
Mr. Ith Loeur, Director, Provincial Department of Rural Development, Banteay
Meanchey province, Sisophon
Mr. Hoeung Kim Soeung, Director, Khmer Farmer Development, Banteay Meanchey
province, Sisophon
Mr. Sam Sereywathana, Director, Rural Community and Environment Development
Organization (RCEDO), Banteay Meanchey province
Mr. Kham Sereyrith, Chief of Operation, CMAC/Siem Reap province
Mr. Michael Simmons, Vice President, GeoSpatial, Vancouver
Ms. Valerie Warmington, Team leader, GeoSpatial Survey Team, Vancouver
Mr. Ade Riddout, QAsia (former Project Manager, GeoSpatial Survey Team), Phnom
Penh
Mr. Mao Vanna, General Manager, GeoSpatial International, Phnom Penh
Mr. Michael Sheinkman, Geographer, Evaluator on Level 1 Survey training program,
CIDA, (former UN Mine Clearing Advisor), M&M Technology Co., Ltd.
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Ms. Beate Tränkmann, Team leader, Governance Cluster, UNDP, Phnom Penh
Mr. Brian Lund, Assistant Country Director, CARE, Phnom Penh
Mr. Michael McDonnell, Project Manager, Mine/UXO Risk Reduction, HI Belgium,
Phnom Penh – former Quality Assurance manager, GeoSpatial survey team.
Mr. Christian Provoost, Coordinator, Mines and Disability Prevention Department, HI
Belgium, Phnom Penh
Mr. Chhiv Lim, Project Manager, Cambodia Mine/UXO Victim Information System,
HI Belgium, Phnom Penh
Mr. Ray Worner, Project Advisor, Cambodia Mine/UXO Victim Information System,
HI Belgium, Phnom Penh
Mr. David Gauthier, Project Manager, LUPU Support project, HI, Siem Reap
province (telephone)
Mr. Felipe Atkins, Programme Manager, Norwegian People’s Aid (NPA), Banteay
Meanchey province
Ms. Ruth Bottomley, Researcher, NPA, Battambong province (telephone)
Mr. Vinh Loeub, Field Liason and Monitoring Officer, NPA, Banteay Meanchey
province
Mr. Khiev Sakhet, Field Liason and Monitoring Officer, NPA, Banteay Meanchey
province
Ms. Kim Leang, Lutheran World Federation, Banteay Meanchey province
Mr. Chab Vibol, World Vision, Battambang province
Mr. Chhan Sokha, World Vision, Battambang province
Mr. Phiep Mono, MAG, Battambang province
Ms.Thong Monyly, MAG, Battambang province
Ms. Eoun Saroy, MAG, Battambang province
Mr. Keo Chhunly, LUP-Mapping & Demining Liason Officer, CARE, Battambang
province
Ms. Krisna Uk, Assistant Project Development and Support, NPA, Phnom Penh
Mr. Andy Leigh, Senior Operations Manager, World Vision Cambodia, Phnom Penh
Mr. David Hayter, Country Programme Manager, Mine Action Group (MAG), Phnom
Penh
Mr. Stephen Bradley, Senior Technical Adviser, MAG, Phnom Penh
Mr. Ricard Boulter, Programme Manager, Halo Trust, Siem Reap province
Colonel (ret) Jean Pierre Billault, Adviser, CMAC, Siem Reap province
Mr. Soun Chear, Director, Land Use Planning Unit, LUPO, Battambang.
Ms. Clare Brazend, Advisor (Australian Vollunteer Programme), Land Use Planning
Unit, LUPO, Battambang.
Ms. So Carita, Project Manager, Integrated Demining Development Project, IDDP,
CARE Cambodia, Battambang.
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Mr. Keo Chhunly, Land Use Planning – Mapping and Demining Liason Officer,
IDDP, CARE Cambodia, Battambang.
Mr. Pheap Mono, Regional Manager, Mines Advisory Group, MAG, Batambang
Province.
Ms. Sarah Bearup, Mines & Disabilities Program Manager, World Vision Cambodia,
Battambang.
Mr. Chap Vibol, Intergrated Mine Action Planning, IMAP Manager, World Vision
Cambodia, Battambang.
Mr. Chham Sokha, Mine Awareness/Land Tenure facilitator, World Vision
Cambodia, Battambang.
Ms. Kim Kim Leang, Project Coordinator, Integrated Rural Development through
Empowerment Project Battambang, Lutheran World Federation Cambodia
Program, Battambang.
Ms. Denise Coghlan r.sm., Consultant to ICBL, Landmine Monitor Report, Jesuit
Service – Cambodia, Phnom Penh.

Chad
Mr. Beat Schock, Technical Advisor, UNDP
Mr. Jürgen Bauer, Programme Coordinator, HELP Germany
Mr. Mahamoud Adam Béchir, Coordinator, Haut Commissariat National deminage
(HCND)
Mr. Michael Balima, Representative, Resident, Joint Programme, UNDP
Mr. Michael Verreault, Principal Technical Advisor, UNDP
Mr. Moussa Ali Sountali, Administrator of Programe, HCND
Mr. Tadjadin Douda Askanit, Head of Operations, HCND
Mr. Tony Allen, Operations Officer, HCND
Mr. Marc Lucet, Team Leader, Chad Landmine Impact Survey (now
UNICEF/Yemen)

Ethiopia
Mr. Adam Combs, Head of Administration, Norwegian People´s Aid
Mr. Ato Abebaw Alemayehu, Operations Officer, Emergency Recovery Project,
World Bank
Mr. Ato Ambachewa Negus, National mine coordintor, Rehabilitation and
Development Organisation (RADO)
Mr. Ato Assefa Ashengo, Head, Rehabilitation Appairs Department, Ministry of
Labour % Social Affairs (MoLSA)
Mr. Ato Teklewold, Director of EMAO
Mr. Ato Yiberta Tadess, Executive Director, Rehabilitation and Development
Organisation (RADO)
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Mr. Ato Wendwosen Feleke, Head, Emergency Recovery Program Management Unit
(ERPMU), Ministry of Fiance and Economis Development (MoFeed)
Mr. Damien Valette d´Osia, Quality Control Manager, UNMAS
Mr. Gerhard Westerveen, Assistant Representative for Protection, UNHCR
Mr. Jonas Zackrisson, Team Leader, Ethiopia Landmine Impact Survey, Norwegian
People's Aid, Addis Ababa
Mr. Marc Rubin, Head Emergency Section, UNICEF, Addis Abeba
Ms. Maria Strintzos, Head, Fund Raising department, Relief Society of Tigray
(REST)
Mr. Vic Thackwray, Mine Action Advisory Team, Operations Advisor, UNDP,
Ethiopia
Mr. Zelatem, District Leader, HI, Aksum

Mozambique
Mr. David Horton, Executive Director, Canadian International Demining Corps,
Sydney, Nova Scotia
Mr. Alberto N Mourato da Silva, Programme Manager, CIDA, Maputo
Ms. Clarisse Barbosa, Programme Officer, Norwegian Embassy, Maputo
Mr. Felipe Muzima, Programme Manager Mine Action Programme, NPA, Tete
Mr. Jacky D`Almeida, National Programme Director, Accelerated Demining
Programme, Maputo
General Fundoe, Mozambique Mine Group, Maputo
Mr. Florencio Chongo, Deputy Director, Accelerated Demining Programme, Maputo
Mr. Augusto Chiridza, Oficial do Plano, Acceleated Demining Program, Maputo
Mr. Felisberto Joao Nuvunga, Deputy Director, IND
Mr. Tomàs, Head of Planning, IND
Mr. Hugh Lawrence, Technical Advisor Operations, UNDP/IND
Mr. Olaf Juergensen, Chief Technical Advisor, UNDP/IND
Mr. Jim Nightingale, Technical Advisor GIS, UNDP/IND
Mr. Augusto Nogueira, Technical Advisor GIS, IND
Mr. Jose Maria David, Head of IMSMA database, IND
Mr. Carlos Mucapera, UNDP Mine Action Programme Manager
Mrs. Margarida A. Matsinhe, Administradora, Namaacha district, Maputo province

Thailand Survey
General Vasu Chanarat, Adviser, Prime Minister’s office (former TMAC Director
General)
General Ronnachai-Pannipa Srisuworanan, Office of Chief of Joint Staff, Supreme
Command Headquarters (former TMAC Deputy Director General)
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Major General Gitti Suksomstarn, Director General, TMAC
Major General Somsak Skultong, Deputy Director General, TMAC
Major Saranyu Viriyavejakul , Head, Humanitarian Mine Action Unit number One
Group Captain (Ms.) Sopa Boonprasop, TMAC
Mr Ruangdech Poungprom, Database manager, IMSMA Database, TMAC
Ms Narudee Leardphonsuttirat, GIS Database service officer, IMSMA Database,
TMAC
Mr Tat Glinsorn, Network administrator, IMSMA Database, TMAC
Dr. Amara Pongsapich, Dean, Faculty of Political Science, Chulalongkorn University
Ms. Sirisupa Kulthanen, Assistant Resident Representative, UNDP
Ms. Emilie Ketudat, Thailand Campaign to Ban Landmines
Mr. Suthikiet Sopanik, Director, General Chatichai Choonhavan Foundation
Ms. Duangkamol Ponchamni, Country Director, Handicap International
Fr. Vichai Phokthavi, Catholic Commission for Justice and Peace
Mr. Michael Sheinkman, Geographer, (former UN Mine Clearing Advisor and
advisor to TMAC on LIS), M&M Technology Co., Ltd.
Dr. Rune Engeseth, Norway’s Energy and Water Regulatory Authority, Oslo
Mr. Apichat Taweerpora, Deputy District Govenor, King A. Khok Sung district, Sa
Kaeo province.
Mr. Boonkurt Gunmann, Deputy Village Headmann, Ban Nhong Ya Kaew village,
King A. Khok Sung district, Sa Kaeo province.
Mr. Peng Sawaengsuk, Villager, Ban Nhong Ya Kaew village, King A. Khok Sung
district, Sa Kaeo province.

Yemen
H.E., Mr. Hisham Sharaf Abdalla, Deputy Minister for International Cooperation,
Ministry for Planning and International Cooperation
H.E., Eng. Abdulmaklik M. Alama, Deputy Minister, Ministry of Oil and Minerals
Mr. Saleh M. N. Al-Beshi, Assistant Deputy Minister, Agricultural Affairs, Ministry
of Agriculture and Irrigation
Mr. Amin M. Al-Maktari, Deputy Assistant Minister, Financial and Local Control,
Ministry of Local Administration
Mr. Gamal M. Al-Haimy, Director-General, Control and Inspection Director General,
Ministry of Education
Dr. Naseeb Maljam, Director-General, Medical and Health Services, Ministry for
Public Health
Mr. (Col) Mansour M. Al-Ali, Director, Executive Mine Action Center/EMAC
Mr. Yahya Y. Al-Mutawakel, Adviser to Head, Poverty Reduction Strategy and
Follow-up Monitoring Unit, Ministry of Planning and International Cooperation
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Ms. Rashida Ali Al-Hamdani, Director, Department for Administration and Labor,
Prime Minister's office/Chair, Yemen Women National Committee/Rapporteur,
National Mine Action Committee, Prime Minister's office
Ms. Huda Ali Ahmed, Director of Rehabilitation, Ministry of Insurance and Social
Affairs
Mr. James W. Rawley, Resident Representative, UNDP
Mr. Moin Karim, Deputy Resident Representative, UNDP
Mr. Ghulam M. Isaczai, Assistant Resident Representative, UNDP
Mr. Jamal Jarallah, Programme Officer, UNDP
Mr. Marc Lucet, Project Officer, Area Based Programme, UNICEF
Ms. Jacqueline Isakov, Program Director, Handicap International
Mr. Tawfiq Radman, Acting Country Director, Adventist Development and Relief
Agency
Mr. Dieter Windeler, Project Manager, GTZ Demining Project
Mr. Ahmed Alawi, Manager, Information Systems Department, EMAC
Mr. Mohammed Ahmed, Deputy Manager, Information Systems Department, EMAC
Mr. Amin Al-Haraxi, Data Analyst, Information Systems Department, EMAC
Mr. Hartmut Thoms, Operations Adviser, EMAC
Mr. Faiz Mohammed, Adviser, EMAC
Ms. Cveta Dermendjeva, Adviser, Victims Assistance Department, EMAC

2. INFORMANTS OUTSIDE LIS COUNTRIES
Non-Governmental Organizations, Universities
Mr. Alastair McAslan, Director, Cranfield Mine Action, Cranfield University
Mr. Hemi Morete, Programme Officer, Cranfield Mine Action, Cranfield University
Mr. S.A.M. Christensen, Mine Action Coordinator, Danish Church Aid
Mr. Steven Olejas, Program Coordinator, Operative Emergency Unit, Mine Action
Team, Danish Church Aid, Copenhagen
Mr. Bo Bischoff, Programme Manager, Danish Demining Group
Mr. Paul Mackintosh, Program Manager, Somaliland Impact Survey, Danish
Demining Group, Somaliland
Mr. Guy Willoughby, Director, HALO Trust, Dunfries
Mr. Nick Bateman, Desk Officer, Small Arms and Light Weapons Disposal Program,
HALO Trust, Dunfries
Mr. Simon Conway, HALO Trust, Dunfries
Mr. Andrew Finister, HALO Trust, Dunfries
Mr. Jean-Baptiste Richardier, Director, Handicap International France, Lyon
Ms. Taz Khaliq, Head, Mine Action Unit, Handicap International Belgium, Brussels
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Mr. Mark Russell, Mine Action Unit, Handicap International Belgium, Brussels
Ms. Mary Wareham, Coordinator, Landmine Monitor, Human Rights Watch,
Washington DC
Ms. Elizabeth Bernstein, Coordinator, International Campaign to Ban Landmines
(ICBL), Washington DC
Mr. Stefano Calabretta, Mine Action Unit Director, InterSOS, Rome
Mr. Tim Carstairs, Director for Policy, Mine Advisory Group, Manchester
Ms. Lydia Good, International Partnerships Coordinator, Mine Advisory Group,
Manchester
Mr. Per Nergaard, Head, Demining Program, Norwegian People's Aid
Mr. Robert Eaton, Director, Survey Action Center, Washington DC
Mr. Mike Kendellen, Director for Survey, Survey Action Center, Washington DC
Ms. Nelly Schneider, Chief Administration Officer, Survey Action Center,
Washington DC
Mr. Justin T. Brady, Senior Technical Adviser, Eritrea Landmine Impact Survey, UN
Joint Mine Action Center, Asmara
Mr. William E. Barron, Operations Manager, Information Management and Mine
Action Program, Vietnam Veterans of America Foundation, Washington DC
Mr. Aldo Benini, Socioeconomic Analyst, Mine Action Program, Vietnam Veterans
of America Foundation, Washington DC
Mr. Joseph Donohue, Mine Action Program, Vietnam Veterans of America
Foundation, Washington DC
Mr. Matthew Wood, Information Management Officer, Information Management and
Mine Action Programs, Vietnam Veterans of America Foundation, Washington
DC

United Nations Agencies
Mr. Martin Barber, Director, United Nations Mine Action Services, New York
Mr. Noel Mulliner, Deputy Chief, Operations, United Nations Mine Action Services,
New York
Mr. Martin Donoghue, United Nations Mine Action Services, New York
Mr. Sebastian Kasack, Mine Risk Education Officer, United Nations Mine Action
Services, New York
Mr. Patrick Tillet, Program Officer, United Nations Mine Action Services, New York
Mr. Richard Kollodge, Information Officer, United Nations Mine Action Services,
New York
Ms. Ameerah Haq, Deputy Assistant Administrator and Deputy Director, Bureau for
Crisis Prevention and Recovery, UN Development Programme, New York
Mr. Sayed Aqa, Head, Mine Action Unit, Bureau for Crisis Prevention and Recovery,
UNDP, New York
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Mr. Oren Schlein, Mine Action Specialist, Min Action Unit, Bureau for Crisis
Prevention and Recovery, UNDP, New York
Mr. Charles Downs, Division Chief, Mine Action Unit, UN Office for Project
Services, New York
Ms. Polly Brennan, Coordinator, Landmines and Small Arms, Humanitarian Policy
and Advocacy Unit, Office of Emergency Programs, UNICEF, New York
Mr. Reuben McCarthy, Project Officer, Landmines and Small Arms, Humanitarian
Policy and Advocacy Unit, Office of Emergency Programs, UNICEF, New York
Ambassador Martin Dahinden, Director, Geneva International Centre for
Humanitarian Demining (GICHD), Geneva
Mr. Ian Mansfield, Operations Director, GICHD, Geneva
Mr. Alan Arnold, Head, IMSMA Team, GICHD, Geneva
Mr. Eric Filippino, Head, Socio-economic Section, GICHD, Geneva
Mr. Håvard Bach, Head of Operational Methods, GICHD, Geneva
Ms. Ananda Millard, IMSMA Training Coordinator, GICHD, Geneva

Donor Representatives
Canada
Mr. Earl Turcotte, Chief, Mine Action Unit, UN and Commonwealth Division,
Multilateral Programs Branch, Canadian International Development Agency
Mr. Andrew Shore, Coordinator, Mine Action Team (ILX), Department of Foreign
Affairs and International Trade
Denmark
Ms. Hanne Elmelund Gam, Adviser, Third section, Office for Humanitarian
Assistance, Ministry of Foreign Affairs
Norway
Ms. May Eli Stener, Adviser, Department for Human Rights, Humanitarian
Assistance and Democracy, Ministry of Foreign Affairs
United States
Mr. Richard G. Kidd, IV, Foreign Affairs Officer, Office of Plans, Policy and
Analysis, Bureau of Political-Military Affairs, Department of State
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Annex D: Bosnia Country Annex
A. Introduction and Background
The Bosnia and Herzegovina Mine Action Center (BHMAC) has described Bosnia
and Herzegovina (BiH) as probably the most heavily mined country in Europe
following the extensive use of landmines, especially anti-personnel mines during the
1991-95 conflict. A considerable quantity of unexploded ordnance (UXO) also affects
the country. The total mine contaminated area is estimated to be 2,145 km2 (+/- 50
%), which is approximately 4.2 % of the total area of BiH. According to BHMAC it is
estimated that there are about 10,000 locations with some 670,000 mines and 650,000
units of UXO.
According to BHMAC, there has been no complete national survey, and these records
refer only to known minefields. However, there has been a systematic survey
conducted in the Federation in 2002 and recently a smaller-scale survey in the
Serbska Republic. More minefields are being discovered from better reporting and
from clearance activity. In the middle and southern part of BiH, most mines were
randomly laid by soldiers not trained in the orderly laying of mines and accurate
record-keeping; many of the minefield records are therefore non-existent or useless.
BHMAC has received no minefield reports from the Serbian army for the areas
around Sarajevo and Gorazde. The upshot is that the mine threat in BiH is
widespread, in a low-density random pattern.
Until 1998 the UN was in charge of the MAC, and many problems relate to this
period, because mines and UXO continue to be found in areas that had been released
as cleared areas (i.e. areas that were claimed to be free of mines and UXO).
Mine action began in 1995, with the UN Mine Action Centre (UNMAC) started in
1996. In 1998, the national authorities of BiH took over the responsibilities for mine
action, with financial support from the international community. The Demining Law
in Bosnia1 was adopted in early 2002, thus creating a legal frame for mine action. The
BiH Demining Commission, located within and responsible to the Ministry of Civil
Affairs and Communication, is the central body for demining activities. The former
three MACs have been merged into one - BHMAC - which operates in accordance
with international standards (IMAS). BHMAC is the technical service of the
Demining Commission
At the international level, the board of Donors has the function of supporting the work
of the Demining Commission. The Demining Law allows the Board of Donors to
consist of UNDP, the Office of the High Representative (OHR), and other donor
representatives and to exist as long as the donors deem necessary. BHMAC is
managing the Mine Action issues, and UNICEF supports MRE. It is unclear whether
the LIS will result in changed priorities when it comes to the disbursement of funds
for mine clearance, MRE and VA respectively. The first priority of the government is
the resettlement of displaced persons, and the LIS is expected to make a substantial
contribution to this. A draft Demining Strategy Plan for BiH to the year 2010 was
presented to the Board of Donors on 20th March 2002 and approved by the
Committee of Development in mid-2003.
1

Demining should be understood as Mine Action. The Demining Law also covers Mine Risk
Education (MRE) and Victims Assistance (VA).
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The Strategy Plan comprises a concept for operations of mine action in BiH including
a mine action operational plan and a number of strategic projects. The aim of the
Strategy is to set BiH free of the negative impact of mines and other contaminants
resulting from war by 2010, as well as to protect the population and to develop the
economy and natural resources. The grand total of financial means required for mine
action is about EUR 335 million2.
In addition to the Strategy Plan, BHMAC has prepared a Mine Action Plan for BiH
for the year 2003, comprising an operational plan for demining and other mine-related
activities to be carried out through 2003. The scale of the work and resources applied
are impressive: 14 Non-governmental and 20 commercial demining organizations
plus five BiH governmental demining organizations with altogether approximately
1200 demining personnel.

B. Planning the LIS
The Survey Action Center (SAC) made a trip to BiH in June 2000 and recommended
major revisions to information management systems, a Landmine Impact Survey
(LIS), and conversion to the Information Management System for Mine Action
(IMSMA)3. However, BHMAC did not recognize the proposal as a top priority at that
point because the Demining Act was not completed yet. After some discussion, it was
agreed at the donor meeting on 20 March 2002 to fund a LIS, using the SAC as
implementing partner.
SAC carried out an Advance Survey Mission (ASM) early in 2002 4. It was intended
that the survey should be started in November 2002 and be completed within eight to
ten months.
In a Statement of Interest, June 2002, Handicap International (HI) presented an
outline plan of action based on the experience of HI LIS in Chad. HI proposed
alternative options for the performance of the survey, and expressed concerns with
respect to the quantity and quality of data gathered because of difficulties of
communication with the local authorities, risk of delays and other problems.
In its Project Proposal, HI states that it was named by SAC in July 2002 as
implementer of the LIS for BiH5. The Project Proposal does not refer to any ASM
report or project document issued by SAC. According to SAC´s new policy for
partner selection6, procedures for the transparent methods of selecting the
implementing partners for SAC-executed surveys were introduced in May 2002.
Another bidder, CIDC, did not find the selection transparent, however.
In the Project Proposal the partners are presented as being BHMAC, SAC and the UN
Mine Action Centre (UNMAS). BHMAC as the official mine action state body had to
facilitate the HI intervention in the country based on a Memorandum of
2

Demining Strategy for BiH by the year of 2010, p. 15

3

Trip Report: SAC Visit to Bosnia, June 2000. The SAC Team consisted of Richard Kidd and Mathew
Wood
4

Statement according to Landmine Monitor 2002. However, no report of the ASM or confirmation of
the performance of the ASM has been identified.
5

Handicap International, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Landmine Impact Survey, Project Proposal,
October 1st, 2002 – October 31st, 2003, p. 3.
6

SAC-BD-02-003 Poll of the Board of Directors, 14 May 2002
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Understanding (MoU) between BHMAC and HI on co-operation during the
implementation of the LIS. The MoU was signed on 9th December 2002.
SAC, as the primary contractor, provides HI with the technical expertise required for
the survey methodology, operational implementation etc. SAC will organize a training
session for HI senior staff involved in the survey operation Plan. The Evaluation finds
this somewhat strange if the main argument for asking HI to implement the Bosnia
LIS was its Chad experience. There seems to be no carry-over of this experience into
the Bosnia LIS. UNMAS provided a Quality Assurance Monitor (QAM) through
UNOPS in connection with the Certification, as a UN Certification Committee would
be called by UNMAS to review the survey process and provide the UN certification if
acceptable standards were maintained throughout the process.
The Project Proposal was based on a time schedule of 13 months from October 1st
2002 to October 31st 2003, with a total budget of USD 676,906 funded by the
European Commission and the United States Department of State through the
International Trust Fund. The budget has been extended to USD 993,602 because of
the increase in the number of communities to survey as a result of the EOC.
The contract between SAC and HI was signed on 24th September 2002, and the LIS
Project was started as planned by 1st October 2002.
Objectives of the LIS
With reference to the HI Project Proposal the immediate objective is to conduct a LIS
to internationally recognized standards, and assist in planning a strategy for
minimizing the impact of mines on communities in BiH. The preamble of the MoU
states that the LIS aims to:
Define the problem in terms of scale, type, location, hazards and social and
economic impact experiences by affected communities.
Improve national planning efforts that support clear prioritization of resources.
Foster development of national plans with well-defined immediate, intermediate,
and end objectives.
Establish baseline data for measuring the performance of mine action programs.
The MoU preamble and provisions contain a much more differentiated vision of the
objectives than the objectives of the HI Project proposals. It is the opinion of the
Evaluation that the objectives of the LIS should have been analyzed and discussed in
more detail and in light of the actual situation and needs of BiH. Mine action has
taken place in BiH since the Dayton agreement in November 1995. Many surveys and
mine clearing projects have been carried out. BHMAC has started a systematic
technical survey and impact analysis, which is to go on as a continual process. HI’s
Chad LIS experience is thus in many ways not relevant to Bosnia. Chad needed the
LIS to identify the mine problem. In Bosnia, BHMAC has the information and
training for the prioritization. The major difficulty is the scale of the problem and the
50-60% of unknown minefields.
The two mine action scenarios are quite different. Therefore, the objective of the LIS
BiH as described in the HI Proposal is not entirely satisfactory to BiH. This was also a
major reason that BHMAC was not convinced that a complete LIS according to the
SAC Protocols was the most important input to mine action in BiH.
LIS Methodology
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During the early initiative on a general landmine survey of BiH in 2000, the need for
a LIS and transfer of the existing BiH data base to IMSMA was discussed with
BHMAC7. There are no records or other evidence to be found of any discussion of the
LIS methodology between SAC or HI and BHMAC during the actual planning of the
HI LIS to be started by the end of 2002. However, the MoU expresses explicit mutual
understanding of the use and implementation of the LIS methodology and the
IMSMA to be used by BHMAC. Therefore, it is assumed that the LIS methodology
and the IMSMA must have been discussed in detail during the planning of the LIS,
but BHMAC has not made any commitment with respect to the implementation of the
LIS and IMSMA procedures. Currently BiH expects to be used for the trial of an
updated IMSMA so it can be presumed that BiH is not adverse to such a move8.
Links
The Demining Strategy for BiH 2010 and the Mine Action Plan of BiH 2003 focus on
mine action issues and objectives. Referring to the Demining Strategy, BHMAC
along with the Ministry for Human Rights and Refugees shall create a project for
demining agricultural areas, which will be co-coordinated with other activities of
State Bodies. However, the Demining Strategy does not reflect the issue of mine
action as an integrated part of the economic development of BiH, because there was
no Development Plan at the time the mine action element was written. There is no
evidence of links between LIS, regional planning of mine action and national
planning of development. However, the BHMAC Deputy Director (Operations) is
now a standing member of the group which forms the National Development Plan
The general structure of mine action and relations between the various ministries and
other public stakeholders with respect to co-ordination of the development and
rehabilitation of Bosnian society was discussed with BHMAC, which explained that
there is a gap between BHMAC and other ministries/agencies. However, there were
no principal parallel mine action structures. It is the hope of BHMAC that the LIS will
bridge the gaps.

C. LIS Implementation
Survey Management and Process
The HI LIS started with Expert Opinion Collection among seven
experts/organizations, including three national and four international major
stakeholders of mine action in BiH:
BHMAC – Official Mine Action State Body that dispenses the main and global
information regarding landmines and UXO.
Civil Defense – Centralized governmental organizations active in mine action.
Municipal Mine Action Co-coordinators - Individuals that play the main role in
the prioritization of minefield processes.
Office of the High Representative – International administrator.
International Committee of the Red Cross – International NGO
Landmine Survivor Network – International NGO.
7

Trip Report: SAC visit to Bosnia, June 2000

8

According to comment of Mr. David Rowe
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Norwegian People's Aid – International NGO.
The military units of SFOR and its predecessors have conducted mine clearance in the
initial post war period and collected mine information, which has been handed over to
BHMAC. HI LIS has access to the military mine information via BHMAC.
UNICEF and UNDP were not been mentioned in connection with EOC, but it is
understood that information from UN organizations is collected via BHMAC.
During the Advance Survey Mission an estimate of 830 mine-affected communities
was made, but the EOC process identified 2641 populated places possibly affected.
The EOC was completed by the end of January 2003.
The unexpectedly high number of affected places resulted in a proposed extension of
the budget by USD 316,696, approximately 50 % of the original approved budget,
based on a discussion of the time needed for interviews and data collection per
Suspected Hazardous Area (SHA)9.
The BiH LIS senior staff training process was conducted in January 2003 by SAC
representatives. The formal training was held from January 27th to January 31st.
A pre-test of interviews and data collection started on February 2nd 2003. Following
the survey training stage, a Pilot Test of the entire survey process itself was conducted
from March 17th until April 13th with positive results.
HI did not receive the IMSMA software until March 16th 2003, at which time the GIS
Assistant returned from IMSMA training in Albania. This significantly delayed the
IMSMA implementation and the subsequent entry of the Pilot Test data. By the end of
June 2003 the HI LIS had a total of 55 staff, organized as follows:
Central office in Sarajevo, 10 staff, including three expatriates.
Regional Office Mostar: 8 staff, including three teams
Regional Office Bihac: 6 staff, including three teams
Regional Office Banja Luka: 6 staff, including three teams,
Regional Office Sarajevo: 10 staff, including four teams
Regional Office Pale: 12 staff, including three teams
Data Entry Unit, collocated with BHMA; three staff
By the end of June 2003, the survey had covered 59% of the total number of
Populated Places with SHAs, which is satisfactory. HI had by then increased the
number of surveys of Populated Places from 5 to 8 surveys per week per team.
With respect to the increased number of Populated Places, HI has made a proposal for
the extension of the contract in order to complete the LIS before the end of 2003. The
Evaluation Team asked for alternative, flexible, quicker survey processes in case a
budget extension could not be obtained. The HI Team Leader explained that the work
would stop if the budget was not extended. There was no room for alternative
solutions if the protocols were followed.

9

E-mail correspondence Mike Kendellen, Tom Haythornthwaite – Emmanuel Sauvage, January –
February 2003.
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The Evaluation Team has interviewed HI staff from the Mostar Regional Office and
attended interviews in the Mostar region. It was very clear to the Team that the HI
staff worked very effectively and that the individual staff members were highly
motivated and dedicated to their jobs.
Quality Assurance
With reference to the Quality Assurance Monitoring Plan 2002 – 2003, the first QAM
intervention was planned for November/December 2002. However, the funding of the
QAM budget, USD 96,000, had not been decided at that point, which delayed the
QAM process. Therefore, the QAM missed the planning and the training part of the
project. The Quality Assurance Monitor (QAM) conducted the first mission from 15th
February 2003 to 13th March 2003, resulting in the first report, March 2003. The
QAM found that there was a lack of interaction and co-ordination between BHMAC
and HI. The QAM recommended strongly co-locating the survey staff with the
BHMAC staff, and to coordinate certain activities of BHMAC and HI, especially in
the different regions.
The second QAM mission was conducted from 23rd April to 31st May 2003. The
QAM noted
that the interaction with BHMAC had improved,
that the survey field activities were executed to a very high standard, in an
enthusiastic manner and were following the protocols,
that the methodology of false negative sampling developed and implemented is
based upon the SAC protocols,
that the major threat in the opinion of the QAM was that no formal data entry on
field documents had started, and
that an initiative had been taken to introduce an internal quality assurance system
based on the ISO approach.
Generally, the QAM found the survey progress satisfactory.
When the Evaluation Team visited HI in July the internal Quality Management
System (QMS) was discussed. The contract was signed on May 6, 2003. QMS was
effective at that time and approved by QAM, according to HI. However, no Quality
Management Plan was presented to the Evaluating Team.
Concerning the former draft SAC protocol on certification, the Evaluation finds that
the certification process is rather complicated and does not comply with certification
processes as they are understood internationally (ISO 9000-2000). The task of the
QAM is a mix of coaching, advising and quality control, which is not in line with
basic principles of Quality Management, as there is a mixing of roles, taking on both
“internal” (coaching, advisory) and “external” (quality assurance, monitoring) tasks.
The overall Quality Management of the LIS processes should to be discussed and
streamlined. For instance the flow of documents is not controlled. Many documents
do not contain the most basic identification information on author, date, revision
number etc. The application of the LIS process to the ISO 9000-2000 systems should
be considered.
Use of tools
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Generally the HI LIS conducts the procedures according to the protocols. The
Evaluation Team did not find that there was any co-ordination between the HI LIS
and the BHMAC technical survey with respect to the methodology and performance
of the survey processes, however. It is the Evaluation Team's perception that BHMAC
does not intend to make any changes in the planning and prioritization of surveys until
the HI LIS was completed, evaluated and accepted by BHMAC. However, referring
to the Third QAM´s report, June 2003, the co-operation between HI and BHMAC has
improved, and BHMAC has shown interest in the LIS. There are still problems
concerning the different information systems, because BHMAC uses FoxPro. After
installing the IMSMA at the BHMAC site, the Team finds that it should be possible
for BHMAC to exploit the data collected by HI LIS. The major problem might be the
understanding that the HI LIS is not a Level 1 survey, and therefore the results of the
HI LIS are not for the immediate operational use of the demining teams. The LIS
process must be followed up by technical surveys and prioritization processes
according to the principles of the proposed Task Assessment Planning (TAP).
HI explained that the functionality of the generic scoring systems was good, and that
HI was satisfied with this scoring system in general. However, the Evaluation Team
does not see any evidence of links to Bosnia’s development plans and discussion of
the outcome of the scoring system with the authorities.
Cooperation and Consultation
Both parties have expressed their willingness to co-operate in the MoU. However, it is
the opinion of the Evaluation Team that no serious cooperation had taken take place
until recently, when HI and BHMAC entered into an agreement on improvement of
cooperation. Regular meetings have recently been established between the two
parties, to be held every 14 days, where all problems are discussed and solved.
According to the general Director of BHMAC there are no outstanding problems. On
the other hand, the Team did not find any concrete evidence on mutual exploitation of
the generated survey results among the two parties. During the interviews of the
regional LIS, representatives and BHMAC representatives could not answer the
questions on what the other party was doing in their region at the moment.
With reference to interviews of several persons during the trip to Sarajevo and
Mostar, the Evaluation Team finds that co-operation between BHMAC and HI LIS
was poor.
During the field data collection work and interviews, the HI teams work together with
the Municipal Mine Action Co-coordinator and the Civil Defense. The Evaluation
Team had the opportunity to observe the co-operation at the municipal level, which
was very convincing.
It was advised that HI LIS has contact with UNICEF concerning Mine Risk Education
(MRE). HI LIS also has contact with UNDP, which supports BHMAC as the Mine
Action technical adviser.

D. LIS Outputs and Impact
Survey report
The survey will be completed by the end of 2003. Based on observations during the
mission, the Evaluation Team is strongly convinced that the final survey report will be
of satisfactory quality for most stakeholders of mine action in BiH.
Scan Team LIS Eval Draft Final Report v 2 0 03 11 17

Page 77

24.02.2010

Scanteam:
Evaluation of the Global Landmine Survey Process: Draft Final Report

However, the major question is whether BHMAC will accept the report and
implement the LIS methodology in its future survey work, for instance as basis for the
proposed TAP and Strategic Planning processes. It is anticipated that the results of the
LIS and the collected socio-economic information will be of great value to other
authorities of BiH.
IMSMA Database
The data unit has been installed within BHMAC compounds in Tito Barracks, which
opens the possibilities for closer communication between HI LIS and BHMAC.
Unfortunately, the IMSMA software and training of the IMSMA operator has been
delayed by three months. The HI LIS GIS Assistant explained that there were
difficulties in providing the programs and lack of training. Therefore, it has not been
possible for the Evaluation Team to assess the opportunities of BHMAC using the
IMSMA system.
Practical Results of LIS Outputs
During the visit concrete survey results were presented to the Evaluation Team.
However, it is too early to discuss the possible value of the practical results to the
community of BiH and BHMAC.
With reference to the Demining Strategy for BiH by the year of 2010, BHMAC has
planned a systematic survey of BiH (Objective 1.6). The revision of the Demining
Strategy for BiH is planned to take place in 2004 after the completion of the impact
survey research. The Evaluation was informed that the results of LIS will be a
fundamental input to the revised strategy. But the risk is that the results of the LIS
will not be used unless much effort is put into convincing the BHMAC of the value of
the LIS results, both technical and socio-economic. Even if BHMAC does not fully
exploit the results of LIS, it is expected that the IMSMA database will be valuable to
BHMAC, and that BHMAC will be able to exploit the IMSMA database10.

E. Conclusions, Findings, Recommendations
Conclusions
The HI LIS is very well managed and conducted. The quality of the work is very good
and convincing. When completed, it is expected that the results of the LIS will be of
high quality and value. The major problem is that BHMAC is far ahead in its own
planning and structures of mine surveys. The interest and the ownership of BHMAC
were not clear from the start of the project.
Findings
Key findings, LIS planning:
There is no evidence of an Advanced Survey Mission as no mission report has
been presented. However, an ASM is mentioned in connection with an estimation
of 830 places possibly affected by mines as a basis for the EOC. The QAM report
also mentions the ASM, but no reference is specified.

10

In comments to this Annex draft, the UNDP advisor to BHMAC stated that there is no reason to
suggest that BiH will not use the findings of LIS. However, the Evaluation did not find a unanimous
appreciation of the LIS among the interviewed BHMAC staff.
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The objectives of the LIS are not clear. The objective of the Project Proposal
prepared by HI does not correspond with the preambles of the MoU. The
Evaluation Team does not find evidence of any serious discussion of the LIS
objectives.
HI has been selected for implementation of the LIS in BiH. No statement on the
selection process or reference to the SAC Partner Selection Policy has been found.
A MoU was signed by HI and BHMAC on 9th December 2002, two months later
than the start of the LIS. The Evaluation Team finds that an MoU should be
signed before signing and starting the LIS, as a basic precondition of the LIS
engagement. Furthermore, the Team finds that the MoU should have been signed
by SAC as the primary contractor.
There is no evidence of involvement of BHMAC in the planning process. The
ASM has a key role to play in planning the different LIS projects. The Evaluation
Team has not found any evidence of national participation in the planning of LIS.
If stakeholders are not involved at this stage the national role and ownership may
be weakened or lost.
No relations between BHMAC and SAC are described in the contract documents
and the MoU. SAC´s role in the LIS process as prime contractor is not clear, both
in the planning and the implementation of the LIS.
No evidence of discussion of the LIS methodology between SAC, HI and
BHMAC has been identified. The Team finds that a discussion of the application
of the LIS methodology and results to BiH mine action and development would
have been useful.
No links between LIS, regional planning of mine action and national planning of
development are identified.
Key findings, LIS Implementation:
The results of the EOC vary very much from the estimated number of polluted
communities, which leads to serious impact on the project with respect to time and
funds.
The Evaluation Team finds that SAC has not been very visible in the discussion of
co-operation between HI LIS and BHMAC.
BHMAC and HI LIS conduct technical surveys and LIS at the same time in the
same region without any co-ordination. Neither of the two parties knows on what
or where the other party is working.
It is very positive that the IMSMA Data Unit is placed inside BHMAC compound,
which opens possibilities for closer contact.
The QAM has been delayed, possibly because of a lack of funding, and missed the
planning process.
Generally the Evaluation Team finds that the Quality Management of the LIS does
not comply with international principles of Quality Management.
The strong point of the LIS is the uniform methodology of the survey in
accordance with the protocols.
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The weak point is lack of flexibility and capability to meet project changes and
risk from lack of funds, shortage of resources etc. The scoring system of LIS
might contain weak points with respect to the application to BiH development.
Another weak point is that the supposed number of communities (SHA) has not
been estimated properly. The initial number of communities to survey has been
estimated at 830. According to EOC the number of Populated Places has been
estimated at 2641, which means that the work of HI LIS is much greater than
expected.
The HI LIS regional offices have established good contacts with the local
authorities and civil defense at a municipal level. The collection of information on
municipal level was very positive.
Key Findings, LIS Outputs and Impact:
The value of the LIS depends on the BHMAC evaluation of the results and the
need for the results.
The Evaluation Team finds that there is a serious risk of losing the efforts of the
LIS work if HI does not provide successful and convincing results, which can be
accepted by BHMAC. The start of IMSMA and co-location of IMSMA with the
headquarters of BHMAC is very promising, and the Evaluation team finds that the
IMSMA might be an important vehicle to reach the participation and ownership of
BHMAC.
The main lesson learned from the HI LIS is that it is very problematic to start and
implement the LIS procedure in a country where co-coordinated and well managed
mine actions have been conducted for many years. The LIS is not ultimately
necessary for the demining strategies of BiH.
It is the opinion of the Evaluation Team that the planning of the LIS process has taken
place without the full participation of BHMAC. The LIS has been implemented too
late in relation to the ongoing Mine Action in BiH and there is a high risk of losing
the results if they are not implemented by BHMAC.
Recommendations
With respect to the completion of the ongoing HI LIS in BiH it is recommended:
That all stakeholders take proactive measures in order to improve the co-operation
between HI LIS and BHMAC and secure the mutual understanding and success of
the LIS.
That such measures could be workshops, informal meetings, establishment of
working groups to solve technical problems, sports competitions (e.g. football
matches, bicycle races), social events etc.
That SAC presents ownership as the prime contractor, and shows more visibility
in the project and support to HI.
With respect to future LIS projects the findings of the HI LIS lead to the following
recommendations:
Before the start of the LIS the ownership of the national MAC must be ensured
through a carefully conducted ASM with explicit criteria for success.
The objectives of the LIS must be discussed and clarified.
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The role and responsibility of all key stakeholders, especially SAC and the
implementing partner, must be clarified.
The scoring system should be adjusted in accordance with the specific context.
All necessary funds for the LIS and the QAM must be identified and approved
before signing any contracts and the start of project.
SAC must take ownership and responsibility for the project and must also
proactively attempt to counteract the risk of a lack of co-operation and interest
from the local counterpart.
Finally, it is recommended that the entire integrated process from project
identification to the implementation of results should be considered and discussed in
detail. It is very much recommended that the project management should be
conducted in a very professional way in accordance with the principle of project
management among the donor communities.
Postscript
The Evaluation Team thanks Mr. David Rowe, UNDP, and Mr. Emmanuel Sauvage,
HI LIS, for their valuable comments. The comments indicate some disagreement with
our evaluation of the co-operation between HI LIS and BHMAC and the
implementation of the LIS results in the BiH MAC Mine Action strategy.
The Evaluation Team would like to underline that the above assessment was based on
the background document review and the field visit to Bosnia that took place JuneJuly 2003. The documents and the interviews conducted clearly noted that until spring
2003 there was a lack of interaction and co-operation between BHMAC and the HI
management of the LIS.
The comments on this Country Annex reflect a positive development and the actual
stage reached by the LIS in October 2003. The joint BHMAC and HI LIS presentation
in Copenhagen on 16th October 2003 and the dialogue between the Evaluation Team
and the Bosnian parties regarding this Annex show that the progress on the LIS is
very promising, and that solid co-operation has been established between the parties.
Furthermore, the statement by Mr. David Rowe that the BiH Demining Strategy will
be revised based significantly on LIS indicates that BHMAC is prepared to take full
ownership of the LIS.
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Annex E: Cambodia Country Study
A. Introduction and Background
Humanitarian demining in Cambodia began already in 1991, and the Cambodia Mine
Action Centre (CMAC) was established in 1992. A first rough landmine survey was
done by the UN military administration in 1993, to identify areas of danger to UN
personnel. This, however, was of little use for planning more systematic and nationwide mine action activities. In 1998, therefore, the EU began funding a more
comprehensive survey carried out by CMAC. It was completed in three of the
southern provinces and was to continue in two northern ones when an agreement was
reached between Cambodia and Canada to fund a national survey.
A Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) was signed between the two countries in
April 2000 for the funding of a national Landmine Impact Survey1. The MoU states
that the purpose of the project "is to provide to Cambodian authorities a National
Level 1 Survey of mine-affected areas" (Article III). The original Cambodian party to
the MoU was CMAC, but with the establishment of the Cambodian Mine Action and
Victim Assistance Authority (CMAA), the CMAA became the responsible
Cambodian partner.
CIDA had requested UNMAS assistance for selecting the agency to carry out the
work. The contract was awarded to GeoSpatial International (GSI), a firm with
considerable experience in large-scale natural resource-use surveying, and with
expertise in using GIS technology to record vast amounts of map-based data, but with
no previous mine action history. The contracting of GSI took place at the same time
as the negotiations on the MoU were concluded, so that GSI's Inception Mission
(similar to Advance Survey Mission in SAC terminology) took place already in AprilMay 2000. During this Inception Mission, fairly extensive discussions were held with
the mine action community in the country. A management plan, some of the Standard
Operating Procedures etc were prepared, and the work on selecting the surveyors was
initiated.
The preparatory work was begun in June 2000, the survey initiated in August 2000
and terminated in April 2002. The final survey database was handed over to the
CMAA at the conclusion of the database work in May 2002, and the final report a
couple of months later. The UN certification of the process was approved in June
2003, with some comments.
The original budget had been set at CND 2 million, but the complete survey ended up
costing CND 3.9 million. This does not include the Canadian funding of the UN
Quality Assurance Manager (QAM), nor the follow-up technical assistance that CIDA
has been providing to the CMAA and other Cambodian authorities to enable them to
use the survey database.

B. Planning the LIS
1

The MoU uses the term "National Level 1 Survey", which is not the same thing as a Landmine Impact
Survey. A Level 1 survey focuses on the landmine identification, whereas the purpose of the LIS is
exactly to move towards identifying the impact of landmines and thus generate priorities based on
this. The survey carried out was in fact an LIS, so it is simply the term in the MoU that does not
reflect this reality.
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The Cambodia survey was managed in a somewhat different manner than the majority
of the surveys since Canada took a direct role in setting parameters and tracking
performance. This meant that the MoU was signed directly between the two
governments. The one concrete problem that emanated from this was that CIDA had
agreed that all the surveyors were to be hired from CMAC staff.
A more general problem was the line of communications between GSI and the
international mine action community. CIDA wanted to manage parts of this, which at
times was perceived as blocking a more open and direct link to the UN and SAC. GSI
staff participated in the introductory training provided by SAC in Washington, and
SAC's social scientist Aldo Benini visited Cambodia once, and GSI found these
interactions helpful and constructive. While informal contacts were maintained, the
formal communication was at times strained both with SAC and UN bodies due to
CIDA "sitting on" the contact flow.
Protocols
In planning the survey, GSI relied to a great extent on the SAC Protocols. This was in
part because this was mandated by their contract. The MoU notes that "The survey
will adhere to international standards for such work" (Art III, Section 3.01), and
Annex B gives several references to UNMAS protocols. CIDA and GSI were
concerned that the survey be certified by the UN, and this of course required
adherence to these. But GSI also felt that the Protocols were of considerable help to
them. They provided a good synthesis of what the mine action community considered
to be "best practice" approaches in a number of key areas, and for a firm that was new
to the field, this was of great assistance. It was also felt that the Protocols by and large
were appropriate in their level of detail: they provided guidelines in terms of what
needed to be done, but not necessarily how – that could be defined in each case
through the specific Standard Operating Procedures produced by the implementing
agency, for example.
Questionnaire
Regarding the survey itself, the key instrument was the questionnaire. GSI reviewed
the SAC questionnaire as well as the one CMAC had used for the EU-funded surveys.
They ended up largely using the CMAC one, both because it was more reasonable in
length, but also seen as more appropriate in the Cambodian context. It had been field
tested and thus already through a series of modifications based on the Cambodian
reality.
GSI refined it through requesting comments from the local mine action community,
and while most of the suggestions were for including more questions, they led to
improvements in the final survey instrument. The modified questionnaire was pretested as part of the training of the surveyors, and a revised version was then
submitted to a more formal pre-test. Using the CMAC rather than the SAC
questionnaire as the model provoked a temporary halt in operations as UNMAS was
concerned standards were not being followed, though the issue was solved within a
couple of weeks.
While the questionnaire used was similar to the one used during the survey of the
three southern provinces, the actual information generated was not used. The main
concern was that the quality assurance on the data collection and data entry had not
been good enough to ensure that they would fulfill the UN certification standards.
Victims Information Database
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A key existing information source was the Cambodia Mine Victims Information
System (CMVIS). It had been developed over a number of years by Handicap
International in collaboration with the local Red Cross society. While GSI spent
considerable time reviewing the data with the intention of basing their own victims'
data on that, they ended up deciding that this was not possible, primarily because the
site identification of the accident was too poor2. Since the impact scoring is primarily
driven by the accident data, this was a serious draw-back. The conclusion the parties
came to was that the LIS ended up with better site data while the CMVIS had better
victims information, thus reflecting the somewhat different uses that the data were to
be put to. An attempt has been made to merge the two data sets, but so far this has not
been successful. Instead, the CMVIS has continued to develop, learning some lessons
from the LIS in terms of site location, but by and large being driven by the needs as
expressed by the users of the CMVIS (see last section, "Survey Follow-up").
Another important source of information was of course the national gazetteer, housed
in the Ministry of Land Management, Urban Planning and Construction (MLMUPC)
National Census Survey
Another critical decision was that the survey had to be a national census exercise,
visiting all the known villages, rather than just the 50% or so that had originally been
expected. The original assumption was that the eastern part of the country was
relatively mine-free, and that using standard sampling techniques, including the False
Negative Sampling (FNS) approach, would permit the more focused survey. The US
bombing of the "Ho Chi Minh trail" had created a fairly wide-spread UXO (clusterbombs) problem in the eastern parts of the country, however. A team went to three
southeastern provinces and tested using the FNS there. The conclusion was that there
was no savings to be obtained by using sampling rather than census. The LIS
therefore ended up visiting every one but two of the nearly 14.000 villages in the
country. This made both the budget and timeline situation quite different from what
had been planned for during the Inception Mission.
Social Science Skills
GSI hired a senior social scientist from a local university as a social science adviser.
But the total time allocated for her work was 20 hours during the preparatory phase,
and about three days for observing the training that was being carried out of the
surveyors. No further local social science skills were hired to monitor or follow-up the
actual fieldwork.
Dialogue with National Actors
The dialogue between parts of the mine action community and GSI was the most
contested issue that came up during the Evaluation. The MA community consists of
2

There were several error sources. The first is that the CMVIS focuses on victims information and thus
registers incidents by victim home site rather than accident site, though the latter is also registered. But
site registration was less accurate than in the LIS in terms of map location since the LIS used their
GPS locators for this. On the other hand, defining where village boundaries go for allocation of
accident sites to a particular village is often quite contentious, and where neither LIS nor CMVIS can
claim to be more "right". The CMVIS, however, used the old official gazetteer, which first of all was
inaccurate in some location definitions, but also did not have nearly 500 new villages that the LIS
picked up. The LIS used the more accurate GPS-based locators, and thus could relate accidents more
correctly to villages. On the other hand, CMVIS has full-time data collectors so their information is
more accurate and timely – the LIS had to rely on memories of accidents up to two years back in time
by informants under time pressure, so this could generate highly inaccurate information.
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two sets of actors – the NGOs, and the national mine actors CMAC and later also
CMAA. The NGO community and GSI have very different views on how the
dialogue was carried out both during the planning and follow-up phases. Some of the
controversy is undoubtedly tied to the somewhat different interests of the actors.
From the beginning, GSI felt that it was looked at with considerable skepticism by the
NGOs. GSI, as a commercial firm, was seen as an intruder into what was a fairly
closed milieu, and where the self-image of humanitarian mine action was not seen as
compatible with for-profit actors. This created barriers to communication from the
beginning. The approach of the two sets of actors was also quite different in that the
NGOs are primarily community based and thus have more localized concerns and
approaches whereas GSI necessarily had to take a top-down perspective on the
upcoming LIS. The way communication took place was also perceived differently by
the actors. GSI spent – in their view – considerable time going around and talking
with NGOs and other key stakeholders, informing about and wanting feed-back to the
LIS planning. Most NGOs felt that they were being talked to rather than invited into a
dialogue – a perception that perhaps was in part shaped by their pre-conceived notions
about GSI. But it is striking that the recollections from these conversations are so
different: GSI strongly convinced it made a serious and strenuous effort to reach out
to other mine action entities, and the NGOs just as clear in their views that GSI had a
narrow and utilitarian intention behind the meetings that did not listen seriously to
NGO views. But there were also misconceptions regarding the LIS on the side of
some NGO representatives, who were mostly interested in a more technical (Level 2)
survey. The more general impact survey was of less interest.
Concerning national actors, CMAC/CMAA were heavily involved and engaged, so
the key national stakeholders were fully in the picture. National authorities provided
the necessary support in terms of providing written authorizations for the exercise,
ensuring that provincial governors were informed and supportive, and that the public
administration in general provided the necessary information. This included access to
all available maps, census data, etc (though some of it was some time in coming, in
the Cambodian context GSI in fact received an unusually open access to government
data).
Regarding links to other national authorities, these generally were poor. GSI only
became aware of the Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper process (PRSP) towards the
end of the survey. The failure to ensure horizontal linkages lie more with national
authorities as the Cambodian Government had signed the MoU and thus had every
opportunity to involve other parts of government in the LIS if it had wished. This is
being addressed now through the board of the CMAA having a wider representation.
On the other hand, the relations to the MLMUPC and its the cadastral surveying
department was good, GSI both getting access to the gazetteer and maps up front, and
providing the Ministry with the improved maps and gazetteer information with their
GPS readings later.
Surveyors
The hiring of surveyors became an issue, because of the MoU that limited GSI to
hiring CMAC employees. This meant all the surveyors were men, since CMAC did
not hire women as deminers. It meant that all were experienced field staff with a good
mine action background, so the training in map drawing, using survey instruments
such as compasses and handheld GPS instruments was fairly straight forward. They
furthermore came from a para-military organization where structure, hierarchy and
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discipline were familiar concepts, and the implementation of an extremely tight and
disciplined field schedule was thus feasible.
On the other hand it meant that GSI was not able to get staff with much academic,
social science or interviewing background, leading to a lack in critically assessing
validity of information provided. GSI was aware of these issues, so training was given
considerable attention. Issues like interview techniques, body language, how to
interview women and in minority areas were topics in the course and at refresher
courses that were offered throughout the survey period. Particular attention was paid
to the gender dimension, as GSI was conscious of the biases their all-male survey
teams represented. They claim that this was overcome, however, in part due to the
training, in part due to the fact that there are few cultural barriers to communication
between men and women in Cambodia. In the annex to their report on gender issues,
however, they point to other organizations' experience that does not support this line
of reasoning3. In general, it is clear that gender is an issue, and was raised as such
during the UN Certification discussion as well.

C. Implementing the LIS
An operational plan was designed for the various two-men teams where overnight
staging areas, travel schedules etc. were carefully laid out, where daily radio-based
communication ensured a very close and tight management of each team, and where
the various quality assurance tasks were strictly adhered to. The implementation of
the survey, including the expansion that had to take place once it became clear that a
national census effort was required, the data collection, entry and verification, etc., is
nothing short of impressive. The dedication of the field surveyors, the logistics of the
operation, the overall management of the total team effort, the willingness and ability
to "walk the extra mile" to reach each and every village in the country was a
momentous undertaking, yet executed almost without incident.
Time Use
The surveyors were to interview at least three informants in each village, where the
primary informant was to be the village leader. Instructions were to try to include
respondents of different gender, age and socio-economic class. The other informants
were to be geographically distant from where the village leader lived, to ensure
geographic spread. In some villages, cluster meetings were held, and some villages
were visited four or five times.
On average it would take about 45-60 minutes to record information in noncontaminated villages, while in contaminated villages it would normally take a full
3

The World Food Programme has about 40% female surveyors, including at supervision levels,
without having encountered problems in this area. In terms of information collection, the experience
of MAG, according to the report, is that "Women never hold positions of formal authority within the
village (e.g. village leader, deputy village leader, religious leader…) and so their views will be
overlooked if figures of authority are solely relied on for information. Male authorities seldom
identify and direct surveyors to speak with (particularly mine vulnerable or mine knowledgeable)
women within the village. Women will attend meetings but in general will not contribute to
discussions if 'authorities' are present. Women will offer their views if they are specifically sought or
if participatory processes (such as community mapping techniques) are used. Old women are
particularly good sources of village information. There are indications that women are less likely than
men to provide fabricated data when asked a question to which they do not know the answer. Women
are particularly sensitive/cognizant of socio-economic impacts related to their children and families
overall (e.g. safe play environments, access to amenities such as markets, health centers, schools…)."
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day. In the easier cases (for example only one easily located mine field) half a day
might be sufficient, whereas in other cases up to three days were used.
The original plan called for the survey work to be done in 15 months, but once it
became clear that a full census survey had to be carried out, this timeline was
extended to 20 months. The field work began in August 2000 and was to have been
completed by October 2001, but in fact was ended in April 2002 (this takes into
account the fact that survey work was stopped for a couple of weeks due to the
disagreements between GSI/CIDA and UNMAS on some operational aspects of the
survey early in the process).
Quality Assurance
The quality assurance (QA) system was a very strong aspect of the survey. GSI
introduced internal quality assurance procedures that were closely adhered to. The
position of Field Editors were added to help the Field Managers handle the work load,
and in particular the verification of the data. A Quality Assurance unit was set up
which re-visited about 3% of the villages – a total of 486 – as per the UN standards. It
systematically visited all provinces and teams, different parts of the questionnaire
were verified at each visit so that the entire questionnaire ended up being thoroughly
checked. Finally a number of data entry check points were programmed into the
database to ensure consistency and correctness of the data. Data identified as not
being right were sent back down to the field for correction, though most of the errors
detected were transcription errors, often of GPS readings (geographic locations). The
first part of the QA unit's work addressed the quality and availability of equipment,
training and procedures, and after the field work began, the data entry. What was
verified was that the informants listed had in fact been spoken with, that what they
had said was what had been recorded. On average each survey team was checked over
13 times, so this aspect of the survey was unusually rigorous.
The GSI team believes the reliability of the data is exceptional: anybody can go back
and verify that the information registered is in fact that which was provided by the
informants. This Evaluation, when taking the LIS information back to villages and
checked, verified that this is, in the cases that were carried out, in fact correct. The
question is thus more on the validity side – if the LIS collected the right information
on the issues they were asked to.
The external UN QAM posed some problems. While CIDA paid the UN for this from
a fund separate from the GSI contract, the QAM visited the project for the first time
for three weeks in February 2001, when operations had been underway for almost
seven months. The two subsequent visits were in April and June 2001, and the last
one seven months later, in March-April 2002. GSI felt that it could have benefited
considerably from an experienced QAM in place and available for consultation
already during the preparatory and training phase.
Information Biases
Yet according to many of the informants spoken with during this Evaluation, the LIS
information basis was biased, in a number of ways, which had an impact on the final
quality of the survey – the database, the maps and the report.
Both villages visited and field-based NGOs felt that the time period in each village
was too short, and that therefore too few informants were interviewed. GSI disputes
this, saying that the interviews would typically produce a spontaneous grouping of
village residents and often, when memories conflicted, other older or more
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knowledgeable residents would be summoned to provide their opinion. At the same
time, however, the decision by GSI not to use village meetings for information
collection was also criticized by a number of NGOs. GSI made this choice based on
field experience from Cambodia, which was that such larger meetings did not in fact
lead to more open and participatory information collection and discussions around the
quality of the data provided, but rather were dominated by the few persons in
authority. The presence of others, including women, did not provide value added,
according to GSI. GSI notes that this decision was in fact recommended by several
(other) NGOs, and was in their opinion a correct one.
A larger village meeting during the day would also have been problematic since most
adults would be busy with their economic activities away from the house. NGOs
comment that if the survey was indeed only to take place during working hours of one
day, this would be a problem. But if the survey had taken place over several days, the
scenario would have been different, based on the trust that could be established
between the surveyors and the villagers. GSI comments that in most contaminated
villages the survey took more than one day, and that there therefore was trust between
the villagers and the surveyors, and no distortion in information can be attributed to
this.
Using the village leader as the primary information entry point is also seen as
problematic. One thing is that many village leaders were quite recent and thus not
good informants. Another problem was that they were often used to identify other
informants, and the tendency – as noted in footnote 3 – is that this would create a bias
against women. There was also the concern that village leaders are more likely to
provide information based on rent-seeking strategies. That is, they would see
advantages in claiming that the mine problem is greater than it actually was in the
hope that the village would benefit from faster or greater mine clearance efforts by
demining NGOs or CMAC. GSI was aware of this, and comments that this was tested
for when developing the questionnaire. It believes that the QA captured this issue
well, and as a result there very few, if any, such erroneous reports in the survey.
GSI further believes that there was no serious gender bias, as around 30% of
respondents were women, and that sufficient effort and training had been invested to
ensure information gathering from women by the LIS teams.
The Evaluation is not convinced. In the six communities in two heavily mined
provinces visited by the Evaluation, less than a handful of registered respondents were
females, despite one village having a female acting village chief4. The development
NGOs talked with were concerned for the reasons mentioned by MAG (footnote 3):
women tend to have a different impact analysis regarding the overall household
situation, and less likely to make up information if they do not know, so more reliable
informants. The overall impression that the Evaluation was left with is that the rapid
survey techniques combined with homogeneous male (ex-deminer) teams created a
structural bias into the information collection exercise. The teams usually returned at
night to their base. The ex-deminers/ex-military teams also clearly dialogued
differently with the villagers than NGO teams do. The fact that the teams did not find
4

GSI very correctly points out that this is a very small and non-random sample, so that its validity as a
reflection of the survey is faulty. None the less, the visits were done with staff who have many years
experience in talking with rural populations, and thus had a very different set of “listening skills” than
the LIS teams. Both the NGOs and the local communities claimed that the issues raised by the
Evaluation are correct
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any value-added of having women present indicates more about the lack of genderskills in the overall survey, since also in industrialized societies it has been shown that
women and men communicate differently and will relate to surveys differently. The
experience from participatory rural planning – whether rapid appraisals or detailed
project planning – is also that women prioritize differently than do men. Claiming, as
GSI does both in the LIS report and in its comments to this Annex, that the gender
dimension has been addressed satisfactorily, is not in line either with what most of the
NGOs claimed, nor with the extensive evaluation experience that the evaluators have
from development situations, including in Southeast Asia. The key concern, though,
was that with such a rushed effort, there were few possibilities to verify validity and
accuracy of information provided. The surveyors would spend considerable effort in
recording carefully what was being said, but not on going back and challenging the
information by systematic confrontation with other sources that might have a different
starting point for their information.
GSI believes this to be an absolutely incorrect conclusion, yet the Evaluation is very
concerned that no systematic social science skills were used to verify and test this out.
The internal quality assurance was headed by ex-military, the project manager who
was put forward as the one with the most social science skills background is a natural
scientist. There are good reasons why most surveys are careful to test for gender and
“halo” effects (respondents answering back what they think the surveyors want to
hear), and other possible sources of biases that may affect validity and reliability. The
Evaluation has no way of knowing in what ways such possible biases may have
affected or distorted the final picture that the LIS produced – if at all – since it was in
no position of carrying out such an analysis itself. But it is noteworthy that the NGO
criticism on this account was rather unanimous.
Complementary Information Sources
There are also strong disagreements concerning the degree to which the LIS identified
important informants in the villages, such as ex-soldiers and local deminers who often
have particular knowledge of the local battlefields or more specifically the minefields.
Demining NGOs said that they often come across informants in this category who
have either old mine maps or have drawn their own, which can be quite accurate.
Talking with the older inhabitants of a village is also important, because the historical
memory of where mines were laid or where fighting took place disappears quickly in
areas with high mobility – a characteristic of several of the more mine-affected areas
in the north and west. Talking with people who have recently moved in, even if they
were village leaders, would be of less help.
GSI believes that it was able to identify and talked with these kinds of informants,
whereas once again development NGOs claim the opposite – that the teams came in
and were more random in who was interviewed. The Evaluation met several
informants who showed maps they had and who had not been talked with by the LIS
teams – though once again the representativity of this set of informants is clearly not
known.
Another claim that was made by several informants is that the survey registered a
number of cleared areas as suspected hazardous areas (SHAs), even though the local
community knew very well that it had been cleared – sometimes several years ago.
The reason supposedly was that the survey did not specify that it wanted information
about current SHAs – not an identification of all areas that at one point or another had
been mined. – It is difficult to understand from the questionnaire how such a
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misunderstanding could arise, but it is clear from the result of the survey that a
number of cleared areas have been identified as SHAs.
GSI believes that some cleared areas were only partially cleared and some were later
discovered to still contain mines, so that in fact these SHAs were not mistakes. Once
again, the factual statements are clearly contradictory, but strongly held by those who
put them forward.
A further complaint is that the survey did not use the other major sources of
information in the mine action field, namely the NGOs and local authorities. Here
again the points of view are very opposed. GSI feels it did inform when the survey
moved into a new province and invited local actors to contribute, while NGOS are
adamant that there was never any serious interaction at provincial, district or village
level with their offices or their staff. Some NGOs recall being invited to an
information meeting, but most recall the survey as a blur of motorcycles rushing by
without time for any information exchange – the surveyors were so stretched for time
that they had to adhere to their timetable and could not deviate from that. The
surveyors also were not instructed to seek out other informants than the ones to be
found in each village.
GSI again disagrees with this description, believing that survey staff went to
considerable lengths to identify all available sources, and that in particular all local
authorities were consulted, sometimes on more than one occasion. They were asked
for information – some were obviously embarrassed as they did not have available
information that it was their responsibility to collect and maintain. Yet local and
provincial authorities visited by this Evaluation also claimed that they were not
consulted, but simply informed – first about the survey coming and its purpose and
what they expected from them in order to implement it, and later on there were some
debriefings about what had been found. Key actors such as Land Use Planning Units
(LUPUs) were not invited to become involved, even though GSI states that all five
LUPUs in existence at the time of the survey were contacted.
Again perceptions differ. One argument GSI makes is that it had to ensure that the
data collection exercise was uniform throughout the country. It could therefore not
permit ad hoc information sources that might provide data that were in conflict with
what was systematically gathered on the ground – it would have made the quality
assurance and data verification process impossible. GSI also wonders why, if NGOs
and others were so concerned that their information be included, they were not more
pro-active when the survey took place in their area, since GSI claims they had a very
outspoken and well-known "open door"-policy – which other actors never took
advantage of.
The Cambodia survey has clearly generated very strong opinions regarding the data
basis. GSI believes that it went the extra mile in being comprehensive and careful on
the data collection exercise, yet other informed actors – NGOs, local authorities,
regional advisers to public demining agencies – paint a different picture. While the
information collection exercise itself was impressive in its range and
comprehensiveness, the issue of the validity/reliability remains, because the quality
assurance, as far as this Evaluation is able to ascertain, did not put sufficient resources
into this area.

D. LIS Outputs and Impact

Scan Team LIS Eval Draft Final Report v 2 0 03 11 17

Page 90

24.02.2010

Scanteam:
Evaluation of the Global Landmine Survey Process: Draft Final Report

The LIS process produced a number of outputs. It generated a database with
considerable information, including demographic, on land use, on economic activities,
etc. by village with GPS-based geographical locators, in addition to the strictly minerelated data. It provided updated information on the geographic distribution of the
population, including identifying a considerable number of new villages, correcting
the locations and names of a number of others, and thus made a major contribution to
the national gazetteer. It provided information in digital format and map based, so that
much of the strategic information could be presented visually and spatially allocated.
A key piece of information was the SHAs that were presented as polygons on maps
from location/village up to higher levels And it presented a final report that reviewed
the process and its key achievements.
The report was produced in English, and was made available on a CD. The report CD
is very well designed, easy to read and to find information. A summary of the main
findings were produced in Khmer.
The other major output was the database, made available in FoxPro. This was handed
over to the national authorities, as per the MoU, and the accessibility has later on
become a contentious issue (see below).
Key Findings
The basic findings were that of the 13,908 villages surveyed, 6,422 (46.2%) were
registered as contaminated, where therefore 45.3% of the total population was
estimated to be at risk.
The contaminated area was estimated at about 4,500 km25, however, which
represents only about 2.5% of the land area. A total of about 1,800 victims had been
registered during the previous two years, of which around 1,400 were due to mines
and cluster bomb areas, while the remaining 400 were due to spot UXOs. This is
equivalent to 7.9 accidents per 100,000 population over a two-year period.
The fact that Cambodia is considered a heavily mine-affected country is reflected in
the high percentage of contaminated villages that were considered to be "high
impact". About 29% of the villages fell into this category, 24% were "medium
impact", and the remaining 47% were "low impact". The other country LIS studies
report much lower percentages in the “high impact” category. As with other country
surveys, it was the victims data that largely determined whether a village would be
classified as "high" rather than "medium" or "low" impact, and here is one area where
the uniformity of the methodology does permit some cross-country comparisons: the
cut-off points between the three categories are similar in the different countries.
LIS Database
When setting up the database, GSI had to decide whether it wished to use the IMSMA
system, or use the database that CMAC already had in place, and which was based on
FoxPro (IMSMA till recently was an Access-based system). The key reason for this
was that CMAC did not want to change its own system and database, since
considerable resources has been spent building up the skills base and ability to work
with FoxPro. Since FoxPro is a two-dimensional database while Access is a fully
5

Given the standard cost of USD 10,000 to clear one hectare of land, this means that complete
clearance would cost USD 4.5 billion. It is estimated that total annual expenditures on all
humanitarian mine action in the country today – demining, victims' assistance etc – is currently about
USD 30 million.
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functional relational database, it is also much easier to use, though of course more
limiting in the kinds of queries it can handle. Another reason was that at the time,
IMSMA only permitted five data fields that were not pre-defined to be used. This
limited the possibilities for adapting the questionnaire to the local conditions.
On the other hand, the UN demanded that IMSMA be used as a condition for
certification of the LIS, which put considerable pressure on the Cambodians to agree
to move to IMSMA. The short-term compromise was to continue using the FoxPro,
and then later ensure that the data be ported to IMSMA so that it would be available
in this database as well.
The views on the database is – once again! – quite different across actors. An
additional reason that GSI decided to stick with FoxPro was that the NGOs felt
comfortable with it and claimed that they would not consider changing to IMSMA.
The Geneva International Center on Humanitarian Demining (GICHD), which
handles IMSMA and the training for it, sees the issue quite differently. One thing was
that it turned out to be much more difficult (and costly) to port the LIS database from
FoxPro to IMSMA than expected, so the compatibility issue was a serious one. The
other thing is that they believe GSI had to spend considerable resources programming
FoxPro for it to function as the LIS database. Once the GSI contract ended, the
national authorities were not able to continue developing the FoxPro database and
wanted to move to IMSMA, since the continued back-stopping that goes with
IMSMA made them more confident that they could maintain it as a continuous
database.
Access to Data
While the NGOs were happy with FoxPro as a database, they have been very
dissatisfied with the dissemination of the LIS results. The dissemination, however,
was a Cambodian policy decision, and one that frustrated both the donors, GSI and
the mine action community.
GSI, on advice from CMAC and much of the mine action community, took the
strategy of surveying the most mine-affected provinces first, in part to ensure that the
most important parts of the country would be covered in case funding later on might
turn out to be insufficient for the entire exercise6. But the other intention was to make
the LIS information available as the survey progressed, so that the most valuable
information – data on the most mine-affected areas – would be available as early as
possible for action by the mine clearing community. In this way, the impact of the
survey in terms of reducing future victims could be maximized.
This intention of providing data as the process evolved was not permitted by the
national authorities, however. CMAA insisted that the entire survey had to be
finalized and the results approved by them before information was let out. The official
reason given was a concern with the integrity of the data, but also of course the
political responsibility that it is national authorities that should release these kinds of
sensitive information to the public, not a commercial firm operating under contract to
them.
6

There was a time gap between the realization that the LIS would have to be a national exercise rather
than the more limited survey originally envisaged, and the funding for this expanded exercise being
in place. During this "window of uncertainty", efforts were made to cover strategic areas in case of
funding shortfalls.
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But once the full database had been handed over, access to it remained extremely
difficult. In Annex B to the MoU – which was considered an integral part of the MoU
– it is made clear that "the RGOC commits to provide a copy of all records and data
resulting from the Project to interested international agencies and to make results
available to the general public". The MoU says nothing about how soon this should
happen, though.
What happened was that the CMAA "sat on" the database for over six months before
the first official copies were made available to outside actors. The main reason for this
was that the CMAA was being established and did not have a real organization and
offices from which to work and manage the distribution of the data. But clearly this
issue could have been addressed if there had been a political will to do so.
What has created most controversy, though, is that database was released with a threemonth access-period. After 90 days the database was locked and could not be used.
CMAA management was unapologetic about this policy, stating flatly that this was a
way of ensuring that the mine action community would always have to come to it for
renewal of the data. It then added that since it was going to continuously update the
database, this would ensure that users always had the most recent and thus most
useful database.
In principle anybody who wanted to could simply request a copy from the CMAA.
But most actors spoken with by this Evaluation claimed it was difficult to get a copy,
and that the “suicide date” reduced the value of the database dramatically since it
could not be counted on as a continuously available information platform. While GSI,
with the support of the CMAA, in the end did distribute a fair number of the CDs,
their utility was thus seen as diminished.
SHA Maps ("polygons")
In addition to the actual database, the map-based information on Suspected Hazardous
Areas (SHAs) has generated a lot of reactions. The first is that the polygons in general
are seen as exaggerating the areas that can be considered contaminated. The concern
is that this has made the work of the deminers much more difficult, because
stakeholders outside the demining community tend to interpret the maps as showing
the actual perimeters of dangerous areas, and the certification for mine free areas thus
has to cover the full polygon. The other is that a number of areas registered as SHAs
include those that were certifiably cleared years ago. There is also the claim that a
number of known mined areas were not included.
A strong conclusion drawn by some informants is that the survey was done so quickly
and therefore superficially that it contains serious inaccuracies. This renders it, in their
opinion, of little use for planning purposes, whether for national, local/regional
authorities or the mine action community itself.
Several informants went further, believing that the SHA-maps did Cambodia positive
harm. Two examples typify this argument. One was where a general polygon had
been drawn as a square 10 by 10 km area – obviously a very general indication.
Within that area, the roads and river banks had been cleared, and this – according to
the local CMAC team – were the only areas that probably had been mined, but in any
case were the only important areas because the rest was unused forest. The area was
important locally, though, for tourism, since they had traditionally taken tourists along
the rivers, and now were trying to rehabilitate the tourism industry. Two major
donors, however, were not willing to invest till the total area could be guaranteed
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mine-free, since they had seen the map and saw the entire 100 km2 as mined. Another
case was where an area of 3 km2 had been indicated as SHA, and which an NGO had
been asked to demine for resettlement purposes. The area ran 1 km along a road, with
a known mined bridge at the center, and then 3 km inland. A demining agency was
hired by the NGO to clear the area, and it quickly demined the bridge and the road
shoulders. Once it began the technical surveys beyond the road shoulders they found
nothing. When they tried to find out why the area had been declared SHA 3 km away
from the road – which seemed highly unlikely since it had not been a battle zone –
nobody could give an explanation. But because the entire area was shaded as an SHA
on the LIS map, the international NGO demanded that the entire field be demined so
that they could provide certification of it being totally mine-free. So the demining
agency had no choice but to waste the time and money to go over the remaining 90%
or so of the area they knew to be as mine free as anywhere else in Cambodia would
be, at a very high opportunity cost: other critical areas could have been cleared during
this period.
The problem here is not so much one of the Cambodia survey per se, but rather how
to register and use the LIS information. The survey has recorded the information
provided by the communities, and if there are uncertainties about the outer
boundaries, the survey has no choice but to provide the full uncertain area, such as
with the 100 km2 area, or the full 3 km in from the road. Once this has been plotted on
a map, however, the maps tend to take on a "life of their own – which is eternal", in
the words of one informant. External (not well-informed) actors like donors or
investors believe the maps depict actual known hazard areas. Since the maps are not
updated, they continue to be used as a reference.
GSI also points out that the total area “over-reported” clearly cannot be that serious
since total contaminated areas represent only about 2.5% of the land area.
Furthermore, most of the polygons are quite small, though a few are of the largegeneral-area kind. These few larger polygons visually dominate the map but they are
not the main finding of the survey.
The LIS, not being a technical (Level 2) survey, never attempted to provide accurate
SHA border markings – it simply recorded what the communities believed to be
hazardous areas. CMAC recently completed a technical survey in one village in Pailin
that took over 40 deminers three months to complete, so the difference in effort
between the two kinds of surveys is dramatic – and hence the accuracy of information
necessarily as well.
The situation in Cambodia is very dynamic. A lot of demining is taking place. New
roads are also constantly being opened, and people move rapidly into these new areas
being opened up by the road construction – including into areas that are mined but
were not populated before and therefore not caught by the LIS. The CMAA is now
working to update the database, and therefore expects also to be producing new maps
– one of the few countries where this kind of information updating seems to be taking
place.
Scoring and Rating
A key function of the LIS is to use the information collected to identify those areas
most affected by mines and UXOs. The standard classification scheme developed by
SAC was used, with "high impact", "medium impact" and "low impact" communities.
The scoring is done by allocating a weight to the various socio-economic factors that
reflect the impact of mines and UXOs on the community, in particular blockages to
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various common resources, and accident victims. The rating is then done based on
grouping the resultant scores into the three categories based on pre-defined upper and
lower boundaries for each category.
The scoring system is debated but while a number of actors believe the accident
victims score is exaggerated in terms of its importance, there were few who had
suggestions regarding how this could be improved. GSI did provide an alternative
scoring system that is user controlled. They provided the SAC system and the
alternative in which the “weights” are user specified. At least three users seem to have
tested this – CMAC, CMAA and HALO. Along with an updated database, this more
flexible scoring may contribute to better MA planning, in the view of GSI.
One area that is being addressed, is the victims' data. The CMVIS intends to collect
better information on the accident site, but there are also discussions about collecting
more information about why the accident happened. A key reason is that there is a lot
of mobility in the border regions with Thailand, which are heavily mine infested.
Many of the accidents are therefore by recent arrivals who do not have good enough
information about the minefields, and thus walk unawares into them. From a mine
action point of view it makes a big difference whether mine accidents are due to
ignorance or calculated risk – new arrivals taking big risks because they do not know
better, or farmers taking risks because they feel compelled to for livelihoods reasons.
The response that is required in these two cases is different, yet the rating scheme may
in both cases simply record "high impact" with a resultant focus on demining,
whereas mine risk education may be more relevant and cost-effective. What this says,
essentially, is that the LIS needs to be a fairly dynamic instrument if it is going to
capture these kinds of issues and continuously provide guidance to national
authorities.
The rating scheme in itself does not necessarily correspond to how national authorities
will prioritize mine action. National decisions may be that particular regions are high
priority for reasons unrelated to mine action. In the case of Cambodia, however, this
kind of political process does not seem to have interfered, so mine action has been
authorized to move ahead and prioritize actions based on the LIS results.
Survey Follow-up
A key concern raised by almost all actors is the follow-up to the survey. While most
of those who had seen the survey recognized that it had generated a lot of new and
potentially useful information, the concern was that it needs to be continuously
updated, since otherwise it will quickly become outdated and hence of not much use.
The example the NGOs point to is the CMVIS. In some areas the CMVIS does not
have as good data as the LIS (in particular the geographic locator of the incident), but
the CMVIS is both a live database that is constantly being updated, and is also easily
and openly accessible by all. Somebody sitting out in a province can call in and ask
about the victims situation in an area, and without she or he having to manipulate the
database themselves (most NGO staff in the field cannot work with databases), the
CMVIS will provide the actual data in a user-friendly format. And this is exactly what
users want!
On the national side, the Department of Cadastre and Geography in the Ministry of
Land Management, Urban Planning and Construction some time ago adopted the LIS
list of villages and issued it to all who use the gazetteer – though a number of the
NGOs were not aware of this and thus were still using the old (incorrect) gazetteer.
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NGOs by and large said that to the extent they had access to the LIS information, it
was used as second-order verification: they would cross-check their own data with the
LIS to identify potential information gaps or conflicts – but by and large their
planning was based on internally generated information.
As of the first part of 2003, the CMAA has begun updating the database. UXO
information is being entered (it was not entered before since UXO per se has no
socio-economic impact and thus does not contribute to the scoring system except if
there has been an accident). The annual work plans of demining actors are being
entered, as is information on demined areas so that SHAs that have been cleared are
eliminated from the database, and revised databases will over time be distributed to
the MA community.
UN Certification
While the survey was finalized in April 2002 and the final report handed over to the
Cambodian authorities in July 2002, the UN Certification Committee only held its
meeting on 28 May 2003. This long delay was evidently due to (i) the Cambodian
authorities spending time finalizing their comments and forwarding their request for
certification, (ii) delays in CIDA of forwarding this request to the United Nations,
evidently based on the misconception that the UN had already received full
documentation and the certification request.
The meeting discussed the issues that had been raised around the survey: the gender
imbalance in the survey team; the fact that the FoxPro database was not easily
compatible with IMSMA, so GICHD had to spend considerably more time on porting
the data than had been expected; the complaints about the exaggerated polygons; the
fact that such a high percentage of villages were considered "high impact" compared
with other countries; and the issue that the CMVIS had not been used but that a
separate victims database had been created.
In the end, most of the issues were considered to have been addressed well enough
that the process could be certified, though GSI was expected to provide more
information on why CMVIS had not been used.
Usefulness of Results
The main national actors – CMAA and CMAC – both strongly defend the LIS as very
useful. For CMAA, the LIS provides a much more accurate national picture than
anything else they had before then. In their discussions with national decision makers
and donors engaged in mine action, this provides the justification for the resource
requests and the concrete activities that are to be undertaken. It justifies the continued
national attention to the problem, forcing the national authorities to become more
involved, coordinate, quality assure through approval process and setting national
standards, etc. It also provides a key instrument for the overall dialogue within the
demining community in terms of prioritization, the various work plans that each
organization puts forward, etc.
Based on the LIS, and with UNDP assistance, the CMAA is now analyzing the actual
activities being carried out by deminers and others, and the preliminary findings are
striking. The areas that are being demined by the NGOs have much fewer of the "high
impact" areas than the areas being cleared by CMAC, for example. If the picture that
is being drawn from comparing the organizations' work plans with the LIS picture is
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correct, there is considerable potential for much greater impact by re-allocating
demining efforts to the higher impact areas7.
During the finalization process, GSI experienced a lot of interest in the results, from
both the mine action community as well as more general development and
commercial actors. More update and reliable data on the landmine situation was
clearly considered valuable. GSI thus spent considerable time developing various
kinds of reports and feed-back to such queries, and felt that a considerable share of its
management time towards the end of the process was devoted to dissemination and
orientation. This also includes dialogue with local representatives of NGOs, who have
been in the forefront of the criticism of the LIS. GSI had a number of NGO
representatives go through the database with them to check for inconsistencies with
their own data, and as far as GSI could ascertain, they walked away happy with what
they had seen and where their comments on what they felt were incorrect data were
taken into account.
Several actors mentioned that they wanted a database that was not read-only, but
where they could enter their own data and use the LIS as the basis for own planning –
and then perhaps even provide easily transferable data for updating the LIS back to
CMAA. The fact is, however, that the FoxPro can be exported to Excel or Access, so
for those actors who want to, it is possible to use it as a base an then add on whatever
new information they want.
Informants' Conclusions
A number of conclusions have been drawn by different local actors. Some believe that
the entire LIS was unnecessary. Cambodia had nearly ten years of mine action, so the
key mined areas were known. The authorities could therefore do the kind of overall
planning necessary for rational use of limited mine clearance activities.
Others felt that if a national LIS were to be carried out, it should have been a
differentiated survey by region. In regions that were heavily mined, the LIS could
have been close to technical surveys, helping to map out more accurately the extent
and shape of mine fields, working closely with local communities to ensure that more
accurate polygons could be drawn. In lightly mined or UXO-affected areas, a "quick
'n dirty" survey could be done since what is required there is mine risk education and
assistance to UXO-tampering victims. This sentiment seems to be shared by GSI
itself, with some staff noting that the probability of something happening due to
mines/UXOs in a number of provinces is much less than falling off a truck or being
killed by accidental gunshots.
Some of the NGOs felt that such a survey should have been much more participatory,
so that the communities themselves were assisted in drawing up more accurate maps,
ensuring that the knowledge generated by the survey remained with the communities.
But in terms of such feed-back to the communities there are again conflicting views.
GSI maintains that the SHA maps were shared with and reviewed by the

7

This work has just begun, and at the time the Evaluation visited Cambodia, it was not clear what the
deminers response would be to the CMAA analysis. It is not clear if for example the NGOs would
agree with the accuracy of the "high impact" areas, the link to their own work, etc. But at the same time
it is clear that this kind of analysis is important as it is exactly to clarify resource efficiency that the LIS
is undertaken.
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communities. Exactly how this process was done and to what extent the villages use
the maps is not known8.

E. Findings, Conclusions and Recommendations
Main Findings and Conclusions
The Cambodia LIS is a national census survey and thus unusually comprehensive in
its coverage. It was carried out within an extremely tight time schedule, and the
overall management of the process as well as the implementation of the survey was
exemplary in its execution. The QA was given prominence, taking as much as 10% of
total resources, and ensured that data received was correctly recorded and entered in
the database. Despite this, the LIS suffers from a series of problems, some due to the
process, some due to the surrounding framework conditions.
The need for a national census LIS is debatable. Given Cambodia's mine action
history, a more focused survey on key mine-affected areas would have been more
cost effective.
The time constraints imposed were unnecessary and forced the survey to spend far
too little time in key areas. This undermined the quality of the data, and in
particular the identification of SHAs, including the size, shape and severity of
suspected areas9.
The questionnaire format of the survey ensured consistency and coherence across
the country but at the expense of more participatory approaches that could have
generated much better data though requiring more time though not necessarily
much more money. This would also have ensured more relevance and usefulness
to local communities10.
The survey did not take full advantage of available information, both coming from
and leading to a LIS that many actors feel no ownership to. This situation is
caused by a series of factors, however. Some of the NGOs clearly were not
interested in working with GSI, which was seen as an “intruder” since it was a
commercial company. A number of the NGOs never accepted that the LIS was an
impact survey and not a quasi-technical survey (they wanted information to help
them directly in defining their demining tasks). But the GSI and the NGOs also
8

The feed-back from the NGOs and in the villages visited was that they did not have the maps,
whereas GSI, in their comments to the annex, say that these maps were provided. At that point the
Evaluation did not have an opportunity to go back and verify what in fact happened, because a number
of alternatives are possible: (i) the maps were discussed but not left behind, (ii) maps were left behind
but nobody uses them and has forgotten about them, (iii) maps were left behind but with village leaders
so others do not have access to them. The reality is probably that all different versions – as well as
others – happened in different locations, but since there has been no systematic process for using and
developing the maps from the side of the authorities, there is no systematic answer to how the LIS
information has been used at village level.
9

GSI believes this is an incorrect conclusion, because the time available was seen as sufficient for what
the LIS was supposed to do – collect the communities’ information on the known mine/UXO problem,
and how this impacted on them.
10

Again GSI disagrees, believing that the questionnaire-based survey generated the information that
was available and necessary for the rating to be valid. On this point, however, the opinion among
virtually all other actors is pretty much uniform: the survey is not the best way to get a good picture of
socio-economic impact in the more mine-affected areas, because this requires more time for views to
be heard and concerns to be aired.
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seem to have spoken quite different languages: what GSI felt was an open and
inviting approach the NGOs felt was superficial, and thus the dialogue never
developed as intended.
The quality assurance on the third-order question of whether the information
recorded was the information provided was outstanding. Quality assurance on the
second-order question would have been whether the information provided was
valid (were the correct blockage factors identified? Did everybody agree on the
rating of severity?) and reliable (were the mine fields identified the only ones?
Were the victims data correct?). The first-order questions would have been if the
information being asked for was relevant (were the variables being collected the
best ones for answering the impact question) and valid (did they in fact measure
what the survey wanted to measure). While the first order questions were
addressed during the pre-testing and the third-order tested for a series of times, the
second-order questions required the kind of in-depth study in villages that the
NGOs felt were never undertaken11. The overall impression of the Evaluation is
that this level was not quality assured as it should have, and that too many
resources went into the third-level issue.
The FoxPro database has proven much more user-friendly than IMSMA, raising
questions about the need to insist on a particular technological platform for the
survey data. The key considerations should be utility to local users.
The local adaptation of the questionnaire was one of the strong suits of the survey,
as it was adjusted for local conditions as far as blockage factors were concerned.
A number of actors, including GSI, question the weighting scheme used for the
scoring and subsequent rating. One thing is that the victims’ data are of varying
quality (which village should an incident be attributed to given unclear
boundaries? Were two-year old recall data reliable? Should all victims receive the
same weighting – five separate incidents versus five victims in the same
incidence; an accident from ignorance by new entrants to an area versus chosen
risky behavior for livelihoods reasons; UXO handling versus stepping on unseen
mines, etc). Another is that blockage data do not weight by impact – how many
families, or what share of families, or how severe is the blockage (are all water
sources blocked or just one out of five?).
The data collection was done as a stand-alone exercise and not linked to other data
collection/planning exercises. Cambodia was engaged in a PRSP exercise and had
LUPUs in five of the most mine-affected provinces, so designing an LIS that
could complement and enrich these larger development exercises might have
proven useful.
The use of the national survey has been much less than hoped for, among other
things because national authorities did not have a clear plan for actively using the
data as soon as they became available. The mine action community and donors
should have and still ought to insist on much more user-friendly access to data.
While CMAA now has a five-year strategic plan, the LIS data could have been
used more pro-actively to design it. There seems to have been too little analysis of
11

GSI once again disagrees, but since there were no social science skills employed, it is difficult to see
on what grounds and with what methodology this was done. None of the documentation seen or
information collected point to systematic work at this second-order level.
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the LIS data, for example in terms of identifying more appropriate response
packages to different kinds of mine and UXO threats. Only now are some of the
NGOs looking at the experiences from mine risk education and discovering that
many of the actions taken so far have little impact. The LIS could have provided a
stronger platform for such analysis, and in general the dialogue between MA
actors in-country regarding "lessons learned" is very weak.
The UN Certification process was poor. Nobody really managed the process and
ensured that a reasonable timetable was upheld. The more important question is
what the value-added of the certification is. Raising issues about the gender quota
of the survey teams one year after the survey is concluded is useless. The UN
recognized that not having the QAM in place at the onset of the process was
unfortunate, but it is exactly the issues raised at the certification committee
meeting that a good QAM and good QAM process could address. This would also
be in line with "best practice" assessments made by the World Bank on how to
achieve better results, where "quality at entry"-dimensions are seen are more
important than intensive monitoring during implementation, for example. So it
may be more important that a good QAM process is defined and in place rather
than an ex post facto certification which by definition cannot improve the process
or its products.
Recommendations:
Based on the above, the Evaluation team
Recommendations:

would make the

following

The main criterion for carrying out an LIS should be that national authorities both
need such a survey and have demonstrated that they will in fact use it actively to
manage mine action resources better.
Surveys need to be based on more local consultation and driven by the need for
quality and relevance of data rather than time limits. Consultation needs to be
more thorough, with increased representation of females and other key local
stakeholders, both quantitative and qualitative.
The survey "information loop" should be much tighter, with feed-back built into
the process at all levels, where a main objective should be to ensure that
information is provided both as quickly as possible, but also in a form that is userfriendly at the different levels of the user-hierarchy: local community, regional
and national authorities. The contract for a LIS should ensure that national
authorities are in agreement with this dissemination strategy so that this
information is put into the public domain as quickly as possible.
The external QAM should be in place as soon as an operator/implementing agency
ahs been identified. The QAM should focus on key strategic issues, and be both a
conveyor of "best practice" lessons from the international mine action community,
but also an adviser to the national authorities on how to maximize the future
benefits from an LIS. As long as national authorities feel that the LIS has
addressed their concerns it is not obvious that a UN certification has any further
value-added.
A mechanism is needed for ensuring that the process is adequately addresses
important issues, including gender and cultural issues, local consultation, and
representation of stakeholders. An external resource or reference group should
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perhaps become part of the LIS. Local social science skills, mine action
stakeholders and national authorities would function as both a sounding board and
provider of inputs to the LIS. The social scientists could for example be used to
carry out some in-depth surveys to verify the survey results. Such a
resource/reference group could perhaps by chaired by the QAM.

Scan Team LIS Eval Draft Final Report v 2 0 03 11 17

Page 101

24.02.2010

Scanteam:
Evaluation of the Global Landmine Survey Process: Draft Final Report

Annex F: Chad Country Annex
A. Introduction and Background
The Landmine Impact Survey (LIS) in the Republic of Chad began in 1999 when
United Nation Mine Action Service (UNMAS) made a request to SAC to undertake
this effort. UNMAS designated the Haut Commissariat National au Déminage
(HCND) as the primary beneficiary of the findings of the LIS. An Advanced Survey
Mission was conducted in July of 1999 and Handicap International of France (HI)
was chosen by SAC to be the executing agent or survey operator.
The LIS, conducted in Chad from December 1999 until May 2001, conclusively
identified 249 mine-impacted communities, containing 417 areas contaminated by
landmines and/or unexploded ordnance (UXO). The affected areas cover 1,081 square
kilometers of land. This contamination directly interferes with the livelihood and
safety of at least 285,000 persons.
HI established an office in Chad in January 2000 and completed the fieldwork and
data collection by May 2001. The survey was conducted in accordance with the
principles and protocols established by the Survey Working Group (SWG), as well as
the UNMAS Certification Guidelines.
The survey confirmed that there are communities affected by landmines both in the
central and eastern regions, but that the problem is especially severe in the northern
regions. Based on the findings the survey drew the following major conclusions:
In Chad, a greater proportion of communities are severely impacted than
initially projected, and their geographic distribution is unexpectedly wide. The
North region contains 91 impacted communities, 37 of which are highly
impacted. The East region has 51 impacted communities, 12 of which are
rated as highly impacted.
A small number of parameters exert a strong influence on the probability that
a mine incident will occur. Thus, it is possible to predict which communities
are most likely to have incidents.
The deadly effects of UXO in Chad are much higher than expected.
Based on these findings, users of the Landmine Impact Survey can reduce the
current hazard most effectively if they concentrate mine action efforts on a
small number of areas.
Mine Action in Chad is structured in the following way: The national authority,
HCND, is managed by a national coordinator and includes both national staff and
technical expertise seconded by UNOPS and the Swiss government.
The only international operator in the MA-field, HELP Germany, is running the actual
mine clearance work conducted, while HCND is responsible for the planning,
monitoring and certification of all MA-activities in Chad. Mine action is mainly
conducted in the northern parts of the country, where the LIS showed that the impact
is severe.
When the evaluation team visited Chad in August 2003, it was found that nine
projects programs have been completed. However, none have been released by
HCND because of lack of quality control and documentation. The cooperation
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between the technical advisors of HCND and HELP is not very good, because HELP
does not comply with the international standards of mine action and the
documentation from HELP to HCND is often incomplete. This leads to problems
when it comes to the certification process, which again leads to difficulties in
planning and prioritizing resources.
The LIS in Chad was originally budgeted at approximately USD 1.5 million, but
ended up costing almost USD 2 million. By comparison, Mine Action (MA) in Chad
has an annual budget of only around USD 800.000, which is both insufficient to
address the problems the country faces in this field but also reflects the fact that the
country has not received much donor support, even after the LIS had been completed
and the scope of the problem could be documented. results were ready. As for the
timeline the LIS in Chad took approximately 17 months to complete.

B. Planning the LIS
An advance survey mission was conducted in July of 1999. The governments of the
United States and the United Kingdom, as well as the United Nations Foundation,
provided funding for the survey. HI and the Vietnam Veterans of America Foundation
(VVAF) also contributed funding to the survey. A portion of these funds was made
available through a contracting mechanism managed by the United Nations Office for
Project Services (UNOPS).
Informants stated that they found the process to be satisfactory with regards to
participation of national MA stakeholders. When it comes to inclusion of other
stakeholders, notably from the different development sectors, this was less
satisfactory. Despite this, MA is included in the national poverty reduction strategy
(PRSP).

C. Implementing the LIS
The LIS visited all 28 departments and 98 sub-prefectures in Chad. The only area not
addressed was Tibesti in the north where security concerns prevented the LIS
operations. Although the security concerns were real ones, this fact means that the
LIS unfortunately is not a complete national survey. This has implications for
understanding the scope of Chad’s landmine problem and, subsequently, possibly for
international involvement and for national prioritization. The Evaluation was told that
Chad expected more international support for the mine/UXO problem after the LIS
was completed, but despite the LIS showing that the landmine-problem is a real and
widespread one, the international donors have shown little interest in the country.
Chad is a very poor country which affects all activities. There is lack of funds, and
very poor infrastructure and services such as electricity, water and in particular fuel.
The country has weak communication lines, complicated logistical planning and
implementation and an extreme climate, especially in the northern and eastern
regions. The LIS in Chad therefore faced severe challenges when it came to the
practical problems and logistics of implementation. Given these problems, the
impression by the Evaluation is that HI and HCND did an excellent job.
Despite these problems, the project followed the standard LIS -process beginning with
the Expert Opinion Collection (EOC) and then the visits to the Suspected Hazardous
Areas (SHAs) with a verification of all suspected impacted communities.
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HI executed the survey using four international staff members and more than 60
Chadian nationals recruited from all of Chad’s regions and major ethnic groups. Four
field survey teams worked throughout the country, often for weeks at a time, with
their movements coordinated through high frequency radio. This Evaluation was not
able to re-trace the interview processes that were used, but the information seems to
show that the project followed the standard LIS-procedures, with village interviews
conducted in all impacted communities. French was chosen as the main survey and
questionnaire language, but eleven local languages were used in the interviewprocesses. The data collected was verified in the field by the field editors and then rechecked before being entered into the IMSMA database.
Data collected were entered into the Information Management System for Mine
Action database (IMSMA). The data in turn are analyzed and used in strategic
planning processes.
The questionnaire that was used followed the standards laid out by the SWG. These
were not fully relevant to the situation in Chad, nor necessarily addressing issues that
were of concern to the national plan of development.
Once the LIS results were available, the decision was taken to focus demining
resources in the Northern region, not just because the LIS had identified a problem
there that was more serious than previously thought, but also because from a national
planning perspective it was seen that the people of the Northern regions have few
options when it comes to utilizing other areas than the ones that are impacted.

D. LIS Outputs and Impact
The main outputs from the LIS was the IMSMA database with the survey results, and
the report which was produced on a CD-ROM which lays out the survey background,
methodology and results.
The LIS has been used as the basic document for the National Strategy Plan for Mine
Action (Bilan des Chantiers de Deminage et de Depollution), which is part of the
National Strategy Plan for Poverty Reduction (Document Strategique National de
Reduction de la Pauvreté). The LIS has been and is being used by HCND as a
planning tool and basis for prioritization.
The LIS has not, according to key informants, been useful to the implementing units
and HELP Germany as a tool for detailed planning and conducting mine and UXO
clearance. HELP does not find the information of Chad LIS reliable and complete.
The informants complain about the lack of useful technical information in the LISdata.
The Evaluation does not agree with this view, since the LIS never intended to be a
technical survey. Clearly the communication with the actors beforehand about the
nature and objectives of the LIS should have made this clear, but it also is quite clear
that there was some frustration because of these distorted expectations.
The withdrawal of HI immediately after completion of the LIS, including the handing
over of the IMSMA database to HCND, has created problems with respect to the use
of the LIS-data. Pro-active follow up is a general problem with a number of LISs in
countries where the local capacity is limited. When the Evaluation team visited Chad,
the IMSMA database had been “dead” for almost two years: it had not been used nor
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had it been updated. The reason for this was lack of competent personnel to use the
database. At present the Swiss government has seconded a GIS/IT-specialist to
HCND and he will attempt to restore the database so that it again can be useful for
Chad. But clearly the same problem will arise as soon as the technical assistance
expert leaves the country and his assignment.
The results of the LIS, as displayed in the GIS-part of IMSMA, shows some of the
serious problems Chad faces when attempting to use the IMSMA. Lack of
coordination between the survey groups and the enumerators, and the lack of
competence in technical areas, led for instance to five villages being defined as “High
Impact” because they all defined the same (major) mine-field as the main source of
blockage. The mine-field can only be defined as a real and geographically close threat
to one or two of the villages in question. There were other similar documented
problems that came about because of the problems with the insufficient technical
background of staff.

E. Findings, Conclusions and Recommendations
Main Findings:
The key findings are the following:
The LIS is being used as a planning and prioritization tool at a national level in
Chad. The HCND has used the LIS-results to develop a national mine action
strategy.
The capacity and resources of the MA-sector in Chad, both the HCND and the
international operator, are below what one could have hoped for after the LISprocess. The annual mine action funding levels of USD 800.000 is way below
what is needed given the gravity of the mine/UXO problem in the country.
The capacity of the HCND is still very dependent on international technical
advisers.
The lack of technical training, especially when it comes to measuring and defining
distances and geographical coordinates, has led to a number of factual mistakes in
the IMSMA database. This will lead to problems when using IMSMA as a
technical tool for prioritization.
Conclusions:
The major lessons learned from this LIS exercise are:
LIS has been important to HCND, but it is unclear whether the LIS has improved
the mine action in the country. This is due to lack of funding, and donor-driven
projects that may not comply with the national strategy developed by HCND1.
Better transfer of knowledge and training combined with pro-active follow up
after the LIS was completed would have improved the value of LIS.
There is a question of whether a full-scale LIS was required in Chad. Given that
the demining budget had been miniscule till then, it is difficult to justify spending
nearly USD 2 million for rationalizing annual expenditures of USD 800,000.
1

This refers to the German NGO, HELP Germany, which is supported by a number of donors.
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The Advanced Survey Mission remains a question in Chad. The Evaluation team
was not able to find a report from the ASM, and none of the current employees
could shed much light on this particular process. This underlines the problem that
arises due to lack of, or at least weak, planning processes in the LIS. The
planning/appraisal is important to projects as large as a LIS, but the evidence
indicates that this aspect is treated too lightly.
The enumerators and the field editors should have had more technical training to
fully utilize the potential of the LIS-methodology.
Recommendations:
The main recommendations based on the Chad LIS are the following:
More training of people in the use of LIS results and IMSMA is needed. To
utilize the potential that lies in the LIS-data, both the landmine-related and the
socio-economic, it is of outmost importance that capacity building becomes a
much larger and integral part of the LIS.
In Chad it is clear that a smaller, quicker and more flexible survey would have
been sufficient – it is difficult to justify a USD 2 million survey in a relatively
lightly mine-impact country like Chad.
The weak capacity identified in countries like Chad means that pro-active
follow-up (capacity development) to the LIS should be part of the overall
planning and perhaps part of the implementation of the LIS. Furthermore, the
more medium-term follow-up needs to be defined, and perhaps become part of
the final phase of the LIS: ensuring that there is funding and capacity to follow
up and use the LIS results in-country.
LIS results also need to be more fully disseminated, so that the rich
information source that the LIS represents is known and can be used by as
wide a range as actors as possible.
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Annex G: Ethiopia Country Annex

Abbreviations
ASM

Advance Survey Mission

CMA

Cranfield University Mine Action Management Program

CSA

Central Statistical Authority

ELIS

Ethiopian Landmine Impact Survey

EMAO

Ethiopian Mine Action Office

EOC

Expert Opinion Collection

ERPMU

Emergency Recovery Program Management Unit

GHAMAN

Greater Horn of Africa Mine Action Network

IDP

Internally Displaced Person/s

IMSMA

Information Management System for Mine Action

MOFED

Ministry of Finance and Economic Development

MoU

Memorandum of Understanding

NPA

Norwegian People’s Aid

QAM

Quality Assurance Monitor / Management

RaDO

(Ethiopian) Rehabilitation and Development Organization

REST

Relief Society of Tigray
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A. Introduction and Background
Ethiopia has had a landmine problem for the last 60 years as a consequence of war
activities, starting with the Italian invasion in 1936 followed by World War II. During
civil wars in 1971, 1975-1991 and border conflicts with Somalia, Sudan and Eritrea
mines were extensively used in Ethiopia, especially in the Northern Border region,
Tigray and Afar. Since 1995 landmines have killed 172 civilians and injured 113. 182
mine fields have been recorded in the Northern regions of Ethiopia.
Just after the end of the war a preliminary mine survey was carried out by HALO in
co-operation with the Ministry of Defense of Ethiopia along the border with Eritrea.
The survey was not completed and the results of the survey remain undisclosed1.
The Ethiopian Mine Action Office (EMAO) was established in February 2001 and
took responsibility for all mine action activities in Ethiopia. EMAO reports to the
Emergency Recovery Program Management Unit (ERPMU) under the Ministry of
Finance and Economic Development (MoFED). The capacity building of EMAO and
training of staff was supported by UNDP, the US State Department and RONCHO, a
private US company. Capacity building of Mine Risk Education (MRE) is supported
by UNICEF and implemented by the Ethiopian Rehabilitation and Development
Organization (RaDO). RaDO has operated in the Tigray and Afar regions since 1999
mainly engaged in physical rehabilitation and mine risk education. RaDO collaborates
with EMAO.
The Mine Action Program, with a budget of USD 30 million, is one of six programs
being funded under the ERPMU, which has a total budget of USD 230 million. This is
being financed through a soft loan from the World Bank2. The Mine Action Program
supports the rehabilitation of families recovering from the effects of the war, where
clearing mines buried around water points is one of the prioritized objectives. The
budget has now been reduced to USD 15 million due to the low expenditures to date3.
In 2001 the United Nations Mine Action Service (UNMAS) identified Ethiopia as a
potential recipient of a LIS. A joint Survey Action Center (SAC) and Norwegian
People's Aid (NPA) Advance Survey Mission (ASM) was launched from 24
November to 1 December 2001. UNDP and SAC prepared a project document as a
basis for the request of funds for the LIS. It was expected to start January 2002 and to
end 30 June 2003. The total budget was about USD 2,430,000, excluding Quality
Assurance Management (QAM), which had a budget of around USD 90,000.
The project goal was to conduct a LIS to internationally recognized standards,
facilitating the planning of a strategy for minimizing the impact of landmines upon
affected communities in Ethiopia. In April 2002, the Ethiopian LIS (ELIS) was
launched, and it is expected to be completed by the end of 2003. The original budget
of the LIS carried out by NPA was approximately USD 1.7 million.
1

Landmine Monitor 2002 and meeting with Mr. Teklewold on July 30, 2003.

2

This is a standard 40-year interest free loan with a minimal annual handling fee of 0.75%, funded
through the so-called International Development Association window of the World Bank. In reality,
these loans have a grant component of 75-80%, depending on inflation rates.
3

The World Bank’s Operations officer for the ERPMU noted that no more than USD 3 million has
been spent so far, which is of some concern to the World Bank.
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B. Planning the LIS
Planning and Design of the Survey
The planning process of the ELIS before entering into a contract with NPA comprised
the ASM and the preparation of the NPA-SAC Project Document. The operations
described in the Project Document are based on the operational plan outline proposed
in the ASM report. The proposed survey operations were split up into three elements:
1) Expert Opinion Collection (EOC), 2) Community Interview of Affected
Communities, and 3) Analysis and Planning.
Because of the high number of affected communities anticipated it was suggested that
a rapid assessment of about 14,000 Kabelas (the lowest administrative unit in
Ethiopia) should be carried out instead of an Expert Opinion Collection in accordance
with the LIS Operational Protocol No. 2 EOC. According to the ASM report and the
Project Document the rapid assessment would identify with high precision all the
assumed affected communities. It was intended to carry out the rapid assessment
using 90 persons visiting the above-mentioned 14,000 Kebelas and communities in 60
working days. It was also intended to subcontract the rapid assessment to the
Ethiopian Central Statistical Authority (CSA).
It was assumed that about 1,500 Kabelas were affected and that the second component
would require interviews performed by 28 survey teams organized into seven groups
in 100 working days.
The Project Document lists the following constraints and risks:
Seasonal weather conditions will restrict access to certain areas of the country
during the rainy season from June to September.
The community interviews will take place in four of the major national languages.
The administrative structure and unit boundaries have changed considerably over
the last decade. No up-to-date records exist. Incomplete administrative
information and geographical data must be expected.
Because of the size of the country, which does not have a developed infrastructure
or transport facilities, serious logistical problems must be faced.
Security could be a problem, and an armed conflict between Ethiopia and Eritrea
was a major risk to the LIS.
The risk deriving from poor planning because of the complex nature of the project
and the poor information base. To mitigate against the risk, the survey team will
conduct very extensive research during the first few months in the country, as well
as use the built-in mechanisms of the survey process to continually refine and
update both operational plans and associated budgets.
The Project Document does not mention the time schedule as an uncertainty issue. In
the light of the overall context of the mine action in Ethiopia, time is a crucial factor.
Referring to the goal of the ELIS, the planning of the LIS process should also have
considered the important issues of (i) the urgent need for an overview of the landmine
problem in order to establish the governmental strategy for mine action, and (ii) the
urgent need for planning mine action as USD 30 million was already allocated by the
Government from the World Bank loan.
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The ASM report and the Project Document refer to previous survey experiences and
country-specific considerations. No documentation is mentioned. However, it is
assumed that it is the previously mentioned survey made by HALO trust that has not
been completed or disclosed. The number of communities programmed for interviews
is assumed to be 1,500, but there is no documentation or explanation for this. NPA
has explained that interviewing 2,950 communities was planned. Later on, the number
was reduced to 2,0004. The calculation of required work power for rapid assessment
and community survey is not supported by analyses or discussions.
At the time of the start of planning the LIS in 2001-2002 very little information on the
landmine situation in Ethiopia was available. There were very few experts on mines in
the country, so the proposal of the ASM to conduct a rapid assessment instead of an
EOC to get an initial overview made sense. However, SAC and EMAO should have
discussed the opportunities of performing the rapid assessment followed up by a
statistical analysis as an individual pre-survey in order to create a more robust and
precise basis for the LIS contract with the implementing organizations. In April –
May 2002, NPA launched a field assessment mission to the North Wollo Zone, to
provide information on the mine situation. This mission could have been performed as
part of the detailed planning before contract signing.
In fact, the planning process should include a detailed analysis of the main objective:
facilitating the planning of a strategy for minimizing the impact upon the affected
communities of Ethiopia5. This analysis should comprise the assessment of the
necessary and satisfactory information and how to provide the information in due time
for the strategic planning. The analysis should have been performed in close cooperation with EMAO.
Methodology and Protocols
The Evaluation has noted that the Advisory 01 “Brussels Principles and Standards”
contains a suggested survey process from the definition of the aim to the final report.
Issues of planning, design and preparation of project documentation are missing in the
LIS protocol and advisory complex.
The delay in signing the MoU had a severe impact on time and finances of the ELIS.
According to the Project Document, UNDP was the implementing agency, SAC was
the managing agency and NPA was the executing agency. The institutional
arrangements and roles of stakeholders: EMAO, UNDP, UNMAS, NPA, SAC and
Cranfield University Mine Action Management Program (CMA), were defined in the
document. SAC subsequently contracted NPA to work with EMAO to carry out the
national survey. The contract was signed and entered into force on April 15, 2002.
NPA then began recruitment and mobilization. However the LIS work could not start
before final agreement with EMAO. Three months later a Memorandum of
Understanding (MoU) between EMAO, SAC and NPA was signed, and the LIS could
start. The relatively late signing of the MoU caused serious delays to the project and
affected the cost6. SAC and NPA underestimated the time for the administrative
treatment of the agreement. Furthermore, there were political and financial problems
4

Interview with Adam Combs on August 1, 2003

5

SAC-NPD Project Document, page 4, section 2.2.

6

According to the QAM´s first report, December 2002”The establishment of operational capacity was
delayed by nearly seven months”
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concerning the funding of the project, and discussion of the prioritization of the LIS
work7, as discussed below. It is not understood why SAC has signed a contract with
NPA and started the project before signing the MoU with EMAO. This cannot be in
accordance with the context of the Brussels Principles and Standards.
The choice of NPA as the implementing partner is based on NPA's earlier presence in
the country and contact with EMAO and other organizations in Ethiopia. For instance
it should be mentioned that the planning of the LIS conducted by NPA was also
facilitated by the Fund raising Department Relief Society of Tigray (REST). In 1999,
while the war was still on-going, REST prepared and submitted a demining proposal
to more than sixty different donors. The only organization that responded positively
was NPA. NPA came up with the idea of LIS and it was accepted and supported by
REST. When NPA started the establishment of its office in Ethiopia REST played a
significant role in obtaining a permit for the NPA staff who had to come from the
Ministry of Defense and facilitated field visits and meetings with officials for NPA
staff.
It is not clear to the Evaluation if the SAC policy on a transparent method of selecting
the implementing partner8 for the ELIS has been followed. However, the choice of
NPA as the implementing partner was reasonable and justified.
The institutional set-up and role of stakeholders of the ELIS as described on the first
page of the Project Document is not clear with respect to the terminology in the LIS
Advisory 2 – Institutional Mechanism Advisory.
It is the opinion of the Evaluation that the ASM was performed according to the LIS
Operational Protocol No. 1 with some minor deviations with respect to editorial
issues. The Evaluation has noted the following:
Referring to the Protocol section 2, the ASM is only undertaken when SAC is
confident of general donor support. At the time of launching the ASM the donor
support might have been identified, but the Evaluation has noted that the funding
of the LIS was one of the problems which caused a delay in signing the
Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) between SAC, NPA and EMAO.
The ASM has focused on the local commitment and ownership of EMAO, and the
commitment of all Ethiopian stakeholders. There is no doubt about the role of
EMAO, and the Director of EMAO has clearly expressed that EMAO needs the
LIS and is responsible for the project. It is understood that EMAO has participated
actively in the planning process and that other local counterparts have been
involved more or less in the planning work, including the Central Statistical
Authority, Ethiopian Mapping Authority, Journal of Modern African Studies,
Forum for Social Studies, Disaster Preparedness and Prevention Commission and
the University of Addis Ababa.
According to the ASM report NPA would establish its office on the same
premises as EMAO in Addis Ababa. The co-location with EMAO would ensure
that the Information Management System for Mine Action (IMSMA) database and
NPA expatriate staff are located at EMAO from day one and it would contribute
to a fruitful co-operation between the two organizations.
7

Meeting Mr. Teklewold, Director of EMAO, July 30, 2003

8

SAC-BD-02-003 Partner Selection of 14 May 2002
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Apparently, the ASM has not got the necessary understanding of the Ethiopian
administrative culture, which has led to an all too optimistic time schedule with
respect to the negotiation and signing of MoU.
The idea of replacing the Expert Opinion Collection model as prescribed in the LIS
Operational Protocol No. 2 EOC with a Rapid Assessment and Community
Interviews as described in the ASM report and the Project Document was fostered
because of the scale of the LIS works. The Evaluation agrees with the ASM Team that
under the present condition and context of the mine action in Ethiopia, where initial
survey results of a very large area are urgently needed, the EOC protocol is not useful.
This points to the question of the applicability of the EOC protocol in general terms.
The EOC Protocol describes a very simple process of collecting initial information,
e.g. starting with interviewing high level staff. However, it presupposes the presence
of some “Experts”. Realizing that, the picture of the mine impact in Ethiopia in 20012002 was complicated, and it was very difficult to get reliable information for a
country overview. Therefore, the ASM proposal for a rapid assessment was
appropriate.
Hence, the Evaluation finds that the EOC Protocol, which is largely based on the LIS
experiences in Thailand, Yemen, Chad and Cambodia, did not fit the landmine
situation and the context of mine action in Ethiopia.
Budget
Also the financial arrangements of the LIS were discussed. According to the Project
Document, the total cost of the project was estimated at approximately USD 2.4
million in December 2001 (NPA USD 1,929,500, SAC USD 435,400, and CMA USD
72,500). It was assumed that “UNDP will receive the majority of the funds required
and subcontract SAC with these funds”9. In the SAC-NPA contract of April 2002, the
original budget was set to USD 1,309,800, which was increased to USD 1,71,514 in
March 2003.
The financial arrangements listed in the MoU show that funds falling outside the
framework of UNDP will be managed by SAC/NPA, totaling a balance of USD
1,243,000. Thus, SAC and NPA had to provide funds for the project a long time after
the project started.
The possible lack of funding represents one of the most critical risks to the project,
including the serious risk to LIS, NPA and SAC of losing credibility.
Timing and Agreements
The LIS initiative was started very early after ending the war activities and the timing
is very favorable in relation to the national requirement for a survey in order to make
plans and strategies for mine actions. Furthermore, it is important to note that the
World Bank has financed a USD 230 million development project including mine
actions, which created an urgent need for the LIS.
The negotiation with EMAO and late signing of the MoU are a cause for concern.
According to EMAO, there were many administrative and political barriers inside the
Ethiopian organizations. Not all politicians were convinced of the need for the LIS,
and considerable "leg-work" had to be finished before the signing of MoU. On the
other hand, EMAO and ERPMU/MoFED urgently needed the LIS for the strategy
9

UNDP-SAC Project Document, p. 5, section 3.1.2
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planning in order to speed up the mine action that was foreseen, and for which
considerable funding had been allocated. If it turned out that these funds could not be
spent as foreseen, there would be problems in terms of the commitment made to the
World Bank when signing for the loan.
Therefore the start of the LIS in April 2002 before all agreements and financial
arrangements were settled must be considered as premature.
A serious consequence of the delay was that the interviews now had to take place in
the rainy season, which led to many logistical problems and further delay because of
poor accessibility to many of the communities. Both the ASM Report and Project
Document mention the weather conditions as a critical issue, but the very important
issues of funding and timing have not been mentioned.
Mine Risk Education and Mine Victim Data Collection
With reference to REST an initiative was taken by a multi-agency Land Mine Group
established in 1998-1999 named Greater Horn of Africa Mine Action Network
(GHAMAN), to create awareness among different groups. REST together with
CARE, Save the Children, UNDP and other organizations met regularly to exchange
information
Today MRE is conducted by RaDO and funded by UNICEF. MRE is performed using
a community-based model to create awareness at different group levels and ages for
children and adults. The MRE component has three focus areas, i.e. practical MRE,
Mine Victim Data Collection, and physio-social counseling, including mine victim
support. The MRE budget is approximately USD 2 million per year.
The co-operation with NPA during the LIS in the two Northern regions has been
discussed with EMAO. However, no formal agreement has been entered between
NPA and RaDO. All victim data is given to EMAO and fed into the IMSMA. RaDO
communicates with EMAO via UNICEF. At the moment RaDO and NPA are
operating independently. According to information from RaDO, RaDO agents are
living in the community and operating in collaboration with district/sub-district level
government bodies. RaDO's agents are selected from the community so they have
more reliable information i.e. information that is not biased.
It is the impression of the Evaluation that RaDO is very interested in the LIS survey
and expects to have access to the survey results. Currently RaDO is working on
strategic planning with a focus on social and economic assistance. To this effect
RaDO hopes that the LIS results will be beneficial to the organization in terms of
planning and prioritization activities.
The Evaluation finds that insufficient advantage has been taken of the opportunities of
co-operation between NPA and RaDO on the exploitation of the results of the MRE
and the LIS work respectively.

C. LIS Implementation
Just after the start of the project a field mission was launched to the North Wollo
Zone, Amhara Region from April 23 to May 9, 2002. The Mission had two
objectives: 1) to acquire first-hand knowledge of the magnitude of the mine/UXO
problems in an area that the ASM had identified as one of the most heavily suspect in
Ethiopia; and 2) to evaluate the reliability and specificity of information concerning
the mine/UXO situation at the regional levels of Ethiopian governmental
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administration. The overall conclusion of the mission was that the true magnitude of
the mine/UXO problem in Amhara region is almost certainly far lower than worstcase estimates have suggested.
On this basis the Rapid Assessment (RA) and surveys were planned and completed by
the end of February 2003 by the Miz-Hasab Research Center instead of CSA, because
NPA found the price of CSA was too high. With reference to the QAM first report the
RA would require 32 researchers to complete the task within 4-5 months, starting
November 1 2002.
The operational set-up of the survey was established early in 2003; interview and data
collection started in March 2003. The overall delay of the LIS was about seven
months.
According to the weekly status report, by the end of June NPA had fielded 28 teams
in the three main areas of Ethiopia. A total of 508 communities had been surveyed out
of a total planned number of 1,260 – that is, just over 40%. At the same time,
however, by that time, around 75% of the budget had been spent.
The survey is moving ahead, but the data collection is proceeding more slowly than
anticipated. The reasons mentioned are: lack of transport capacity, difficulty in
accessing communities during the rainy season, and villagers being fully occupied
with agricultural activities and having therefore little time for community interviews.
Weekly reports from weeks 23, 24 and 25, for instance, tell of security incidents
owing to fighting between different clans.
Based on the visit to Axum it is the overall impression of the Evaluation that the data
collection and the work of the teams is very well planned and performed with good
results and high quality. The Evaluation noted the following:
Each team performed one community interview per day. At the time there were
many holidays, saints’ days and other days on which interviews were not possible.
The interviews took 50 % of the time. The interviews were normally finished
before noon, and the rest of the day was spent on preparation for the next
interviews, transportation and editing of the information collected.
In the area five different languages were used; the interviews took place in the
local language, the written report was prepared in the “national” language
Amharic, after which the report was translated into English.
30-40 % of the interviewers were female.
Traveling often took 1-1.5 hours each way, often along very bad and muddy
tracks.
It was often complicated to come into contact with the local head of the
community in order to collect people for interviews, typically 10 persons.
In the region there were many nomadic pastoralists, who needed special
interviews.
All survey leaders underwent a month’s training in Addis.
30 % of the interviewers were recruited from the Central Statistic Authority
(CSA), and it was revealed that there was a good link between LIS and CSA.
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The speed of the fieldwork was discussed. NPA advised that the average rate of
interviews was 1.09, and it was explained that the supervisor had changed
procedures on communication with the authorities in order to save time.
There was no specific co-operation with the authorities on district level, but the
authorities were informed by the letter from EMAO giving the official legislation
to perform the LIS work.
A Kabele approximately 20 km west of Axum and 50 km south of the Eritrean border
was visited. The head of the community was familiar with the ongoing LIS and the
aim of the LIS because the authorities had informed him. He said that three persons
had been killed in recent years and that a woman had been wounded in 2002. The
Kabele was inhabited by approximately 3,000 people, including 30-50 displaced
families from Eritrea. Two out of three communities had landmines. MRE had been
undertaken in 2002 by the NGO RaDO. Finally, he expressed the opinion that the LIS
was a very good program, and that he was a part of the process.
The Evaluation has observed a very high commitment among the NPA information
collection teams, and finds that the information collection work is performed very
well and according to Protocol No. 3, Ethiopian version.
Protocol No. 3
The methodology of survey and the collection of information were discussed with
NPA representatives. No serious concerns on the Protocol were expressed. However,
NPA has revised the questionnaire, which has been adopted by SAC as an appendix to
the protocol, including a questionnaire for Internally Displaced Persons (IDP) and
nomadic pastoralists as mentioned below. The major problem was the time taken for
transport, preparation and contact with the people.
EMAO and ERPMU are waiting for the results of the LIS to be used for the strategic
planning. Therefore, the Evaluation finds that the community interviews and the
number of visited communities should be considered in order to optimize the inserted
resources in order to provide information and the actual need for information.
Recruitment and Training
The recruitment of local staff, including supervisors, interviewers and others, was
subcontracted to a local private company. The recruitment process was conducted in
close co-operation with NPA with great success. The Evaluation team has noted that
30 % of the interviewers were recruited from the Central Statistic Authority, which
gives evidence of relevant background and relation to a potential user of the collected
data. Subcontracting recruitment is a new issue in the LIS procedures and it might be
considered as an interesting option in future LIS.
According to the NPA-SAC contract, SAC carried out the training course. The course
was completed in November 2002, including a pre-test.
Internal Displaced Persons, Nomadic Pastoralists, and Refugees
It is difficult to implement LIS among the Internal Displaced Persons (IDP) and the
nomadic pastoralists, because of the unknown numbers of people and their
movements. Apparently, there is no specific agency in Ethiopia that takes care of the
people. On meeting with UNHCR it was advised that UNHCR only takes care of
externally displaced people (refugees). All refugees live in camps. Until now, no
mine/UXO problem has been identified in relation to refugees in camps.
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The LIS survey teams have developed a special methodology for interviewing the IDP
and pastoralists, using interviewers specially selected for this purpose. The ELIS
Questionnaire is inserted in the LIS Operational Protocol No. 3.
Quality Management
According to the Project Document and LIS Protocol 5 a Quality Assurance Monitor
(QAM) was provided by UNMAS. The budget prepared in September 2002 was for
USD 91,801. The QAM arrived on 15 November in Ethiopia and presented the first
QAM report in December 2002. He has recently visited the ELIS for the third and
final time. The second report has been finished and sent to UNMAS.
With reference to the first QAM report, the following was noted and discussed:
The MoU should have been reflected by the Advance Survey Mission (ASM) and
the MoU should address all preconditions of the ELIS with respect to the relations
between EMAO and ELIS.
The change of Expert Opinion Collection to Rapid Assessment was necessary
because of the size of the country and the scale of the mine problem.
It is difficult to enter some border areas and some parts of Somalia are not
accessible.
He recommended that more focus be given to communication, including a briefing
of stakeholders on the LIS work methods and the protocols. A communication
plan was recommended.
The work involved in the LIS had been underestimated by the ASM, which could
involve a high risk of stopping the LIS before completion because of lack of
funding.
Transfer of IMSMA competence from NPA to EMAO has not been planned.
UNDP is recommended to take action on this issue.
Post-monitoring and follow up were discussed with respect to the value of the
LIS, future use and the impact of LIS.
Finally, the QAM expressed the opinion that the protocols were not easy to read.
More user-friendly protocols were recommended. Lessons learnt from other LISs
should be shared. He noted that his employment for the QAM job had begun very late
in the actual LIS process, which was the cause for missing the training part and the
pilot test. He was not informed about the finalization of the job with respect to the
delay of the project, which included uncertainty on extension of his contract for a
possible fourth mission.
D. LIS Outputs and Impact
Because of the present stage of the LIS work it is too early to describe the output and
impact of the LIS. Generally, however, there is a very positive expectation for the
results and their impact in the mine action situation in Ethiopia.
According to the Head of ERPMU, the whole LIS exercise is in line with the
government’s polices and priorities. EMAO is currently waiting for the results of the
survey to be used in the ongoing strategic planning work, which was expected to be
completed at the beginning of September 2003. The question is whether the survey
will be completed by then. However, it is anticipated that even if the full and final
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report will not be ready by then, at least preliminary findings will be available to
EMAO in order to undertake the planning work.
The IMSMA database will be handed over to EMAO by the end of the survey. The
transfer of the database is facilitated by the replacement of the GIS specialist with a
local specialist. Analyses of data will be a part of the following planning work
assisted by CMA.
E. Conclusions, Findings, Recommendations
Main Conclusions
The Evaluation concludes that the ongoing ELIS is characterized by a high degree of
consensus and co-operation among the main stakeholders: EMAO, UNDP, NPA and
SAC. There is a clear need for the LIS as a basis for the national strategy for mine
action, which has considerable funding from a World Bank loan. The Ethiopian
government, represented by the EMAO, has expressed strong ownership of the LIS
project and commitment to the LIS process.
The ELIS fits into the integrated post-war development of Ethiopia, and the LIS is
expected to be very useful and worthwhile with respect to the to the ongoing
development project financed by the World Bank.
The LIS work performed by NPA is well managed and has been done thoroughly. It is
expected that the results of the LIS by the end of 2003 will be of good quality and
satisfactory for the EMAO strategic planning.
However, the ELIS project suffers from a poor and far too optimistic planning
process. The LIS process has been exposed to serious risks, which should have been
countered by a more detailed and proactive design and planning.
Findings
The key finding is that the planning process has been too quick and too optimistic. It
is noted that the ASM took place from 24 November to 7 December 2001. The final
ASM report is dated 10th December 2001 and the SAC–UNDP Project Document has
the same date. According the Project Document the estimated date of start of the LIS
is 1st January 2002. This is unrealistic planning for a project with a total budget of
approximately USD 2.4 million.
SAC and NPA signed the implementing contract on April 15 2002. The contract is
effective from the date of signing and NPA have started the project, but the start-up
had not been approved by the Ethiopian counterparts. After further negotiations, the
MoU was signed on 17th July and the project could start. The delayed signature of
MoU has an effect of seven months' delay on the project, with led to additional costs
of USD 300-500,000 to complete the survey, according to the QAM´s first report.
With reference to normal procedures in planning international development projects it
is good practice that no contract should be signed and activities begun before the
necessary implementing arrangements between the donors, the implementing partners
and the beneficiary partners, e.g. an Implementing Agreement (IA) or Memorandum
of Understanding (MoU) are signed. Therefore, the Evaluation finds that it was not
appropriate to start the LIS project before the signing of MoU between SAC, NPA
and EMAO.
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According to the Project Document a number of constraints and risks are listed,
including the risk of incorrect planning assumptions because of the nature of the
project. To mitigate these risks, the survey team will conduct very extensive research
during the first few months in the country, as well as use the built-in mechanisms of
the survey process to continually refine and update both operational and associated
plans. However, the Evaluation has not found evidence of such action having been
taken. The Evaluation finds that there is a lack of analyses and proactive actions in
order to minimize and encounter the risks. Furthermore, issues of the timing and
funding should be added to the risk.
With reference to Protocol 5 – Draft, Certification, Survey Proposal & Outline Plan it
is stated: “The outline plan is a basis to begin the survey project. Further development
of this plan will be an ongoing task conducted during the implementation of the
survey and will include refinements based on the results of both pre- and pilot –tests”.
The Evaluation finds that this is a very weak guideline, which has opened a window
for poor planning. However, there is no justification for underestimation of the
Ethiopian administrative culture and needs for participation and influence on the
planning process.
The Evaluation finds that Protocols 2 and 3 are too rigid with respect to the actual LIS
process and special needs according to the Ethiopian context of mine action. The
objective of the LIS is to facilitate the Ethiopian mine action strategy. EMAO has
clearly expressed the urgent need for a basic survey and information necessary for the
planning of the strategy. The Protocols do not allow much room for special surveys
with selected data collecting focusing on the actual need. The Evaluation agrees with
the ASM and NPA in the introduction of the Rapid Assessment instead of the
prescribed EOC. However, the Team finds that the various options for a much quicker
data collection survey, including a serious reduction in the number of interviews and
the number of questions should have been analyzed and discussed.
It is noted that the Protocols and Advisory do not contain any requirements regarding
the content of the Project Document. The Team finds that there is a need for a
standardized structure of project documents like the structure used by international
organizations and donors.
The Evaluation finds that it is not acceptable to any of the involved parties to start a
project of this kind and size without ensuring that the necessary funds will be
available from the beginning to the end of the project. The budget must include a
reasonable budget line for contingency costs depending on the actual risk to the
project, e.g. risk of delays, disruptive weather conditions, accidents etc.
Finally, the Team finds that Quality Assurance Monitoring is costly and that the value
of the long-term monitoring period is doubtful. The Team does not see any serious
justification for not applying the Quality Management principles according to ISO
9000-2000.
Recommendations
General recommendations for future action:
 In order to improve the planning process it is recommended that SAC should
analyze and discuss the different steps of the planning process and prepare
advisory/guidelines for planning and design. It is also recommended that there be
laid down requirements and guidelines for preparation of the Project Documents.
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 It is recommended that risk management be introduced in the LIS in order to
reduce the risk of delays, financial losses, and loss of credibility and – naturally –
risk of accidents.
 It is recommended that more time should be spent on education and planning of
communication between the different types of stakeholder in order to improve the
mutual understanding of the LIS process and the various cultural, political, and
psychological issues.
 It is recommended that the most important protocols should be reviewed, e.g.
Protocols nos. 2 and 3, in order to make more room for flexibility and saving of
time and costs according to the nature and context of the mine action in the
individual countries affected.
 The survey results should be accompanied by possible recommendations for
future actions regarding the use of those survey results. Recommendations that
will inform future action in Mine Action will be highly important for prioritizing
activities and geographical areas for future action.
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Annex H: Mozambique Country Annex
A. Introduction and Background
The Mozambique Landmine Impact Survey (MLIS) was conducted between January
1999 and August 2001 by the Canadian International Demining Corps and Paul F.
Wilkinson & Associates Inc (collectively referred to as CIDC). The MLIS was
implemented in accordance with the guidelines promulgated by the Survey Working
Group (SWG). Independent quality assurance was provided primarily through a
Quality Assurance Monitor (QAM) contracted initially by the Survey Action Center
(SAC) and later by the United Nation’s Mine Action Service (UNMAS), and
secondarily by the National Demining Institute (IND) and CIDA.
The Landmine Impact Survey (LIS) in Mozambique is different from the other LISprojects (except Cambodia) in that the donor, Canada, was running the initiation of
the project and the disbursement of funds outside the SAC-system. The operator was
chosen through an open tender inside Canada, and CIDA in the end decided upon
CIDC. The survey was part of a larger capacity building program (the Canadian Mine
Action Programme), where CIDA is supporting the mine action sector in
Mozambique, a program based on a Memorandum of Understanding between the
Governments of Mozambique and Canada. UNDP is the implementing partner in
charge of the capacity building program in Mozambique, and this program is still
supporting some of the people that work with the results of the MLIS.
The Objectives of the MLIS was “to collect, record and analyze information on the
location of known or suspected mined areas throughout the country, and to provide an
overview of their social and economic impacts as perceived by the residents of
landmine-affected communities”10.
The MLIS-organization set up office in Maputo and hired employees through a
national recruitment process. The employees were people with a University degree, in
particular social scientists, some people from Mozambican demining organizations
and some had computer background or had worked in the government structures. The
main office was set up outside the Instituto Nacional de Desminagem (IND), which
hampered the communication between the organizations11. The LIS-process had
determined contact-persons within IND, but as far as the Evaluation could determine
the information flow was not based on a written plan to structure it.
The Survey followed the methodology approved for LISs by the SWG and UNMAS,
but had to do some adaptations to address the conditions in Mozambique: the size of
the country and its limitations in transportation infrastructure, the widespread
distribution of landmine-affected communities, the absence of a national gazetteer and
inadequate mapping, and the relatively limited availability of expert opinion. These
adaptations did not change the methodological approach, but the process and the
practical implementation of the MLIS might have been affected.

10

As stated in the final MLIS report.

11

It should be mentioned that CIDC also set up the data analyzing unit inside the IND, but this fact
does not change the evaluation team’s view on the matter of communication between CIDC and the
IND.
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The MLIS was originally planned by CIDA and had a budget of CND 1.5 million and
a timeline of 12 months. CIDC's original bid for the MLIS had a budget of about
CND 1.8 million, but the survey ended up costing approximately USD 2.2 million. Of
this, almost USD 500,000 was spent on vehicles and equipment that were handed over
to IND for its ongoing mine-action program. CIDC ended up spending 12 months
planning the LIS12 and an additional 16 months implementing it. During the planning
period, a two-month training program plus a pilot and field testing of the research
instruments were conducted.

B. Planning the LIS
Prior to the implementation of the MLIS and the tender process that CIDC ended up
winning, a CIDA-hired representative went on a fact-finding mission (needsassessment) to Mozambique in 1997. This is the only activity resembling the
described Advance Survey Mission that the Evaluation found.
The consultant stayed at the IND for 4-5 weeks, to support the production of the
"Strategic Plan for Mine Action in Mozambique". This document contained a section
entitled “Research about the location of mined areas” which is the only attempt at
identifying the mine/UXO problem that could serve as a basis for designing the LIS
that the Evaluation came across. This document was used as the background for the
Project Document that was prepared for a multi-donor capacity building project at the
IND. This document (in fact not dated till April 13, 2001) was distributed among the
potential donors at the time to support the capacity building project coordinated by
UNDP. The MLIS was subsequently included as a major component of Canada’s
support for mine-action in Mozambique.
Demining had been taking place for a number of years in Mozambique prior to the
LIS taking place. Three operators worked in three different regions of the country:
Halo Trust in the north, Norwegian People’s Aid (NPA) in the center and the UNDPfunded Accelerated Demining Program (ADP) in the south. These three organizations
therefore had a lot of experience, and also felt that they had generated a lot of relevant
and valuable information through the surveys they themselves had undertaken in the
regions where they worked.
CIDC spent considerable efforts to dialogue with these three organizations, but they
never succeeded in establishing good working relationships with them. There seem to
have been several reasons for this.
The NGOs were not very happy with the fact that CIDC, which was seen as both a
quasi-commercial outfit, and not one with demining or survey experience, was given
the task of carrying out the LIS. More important, perhaps, was the feeling that the LIS
was unnecessary and that the information that the NGOs had produced was seen as
sufficient for general planning purposes.
There seem to have been other factors at work as well. One thing is that there were
misconceptions throughout the process about what the LIS was and was not. The
difference between a standard Level 1-survye (identifying mine affected areas) and
the socio-impact impact survey, which is concerned with identifying how

12

A number of practical issues delayed this “preparatory” phase.
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communities assess the impact of various mine/UXO threats, was not fully understood
by some13.
Some of the NGO staff also seem to have believed that there was no need for a
national survey. The idea was that a reasonable picture could be stitched together
from the data that existed, and then perhaps supplement with some further work, but
not to carry out a full-scale national survey from scratch.
The information the Evaluation got, however, is that the data that the demining
operators produced were unsuitable for a LIS study. First of all, they were primarily
concerned with identifying mined areas and UXO problems, so they did not collect
much in the way of socio-economic indicators. There were no surveys of the
population’s own views on issues like severity of the mine problem, blockages, etc.
While some victims data wee collected, they were not systematic with regards to a
number of the variables that are key to the LIS, such as identifying the accident site.
The variables and definitions and methodologies used were not uniform across the
NGOs, and there was no attempt at ensuring consistency and completeness – largely
because the NGOs themselves did not worry about this since the data were largely for
their own planning purposes. There was no particular quality assurance on the data
collection and analysis, so it was impossible for somebody outside the organization to
know anything about the reliability and validity of the data. Finally, the surveys were
not publicly available, so they quite simply were not accessible and thus of no use.
The Mozambique survey was among the first ones to be carried out. CIDC therefore
had no practical models to build on regarding a number of the issues that came up.
This included how to structure the communication with the other mine action (MA)
actors. How the dialogue, particularly between the mine operators and CIDC, was
handled is hotly disputed. CIDC feels they put in a lot of effort to establish
communication lines and involve the other actors. But these actors, on their side, are
insistent that there was little if any dialogue, and that CIDC simply went ahead and
carried out the survey the way they wanted without consulting properly with others.
A number of informants have furthermore pointed to the inexperience of the first team
that was responsible for the LIS. A number of changes to personnel took place, and
management had to carry out a fair amount of trouble-shooting. The Quality
Assurance Monitor played an important role at several points, ensuring that the
process got back on track.
The bottom line, however, was that the national authorities had decided on a LIS –
whether the NGOs liked that or not. There is therefore the question why it was not
possible to ensure that all the mine actors got together as long as a national decision
had been taken. But in the end this never really happened – the poor dialogue and
distrust continued throughout the LIS process, and clearly lingers on: the Evaluation
was struck by how the parties still seem far apart in their perceptions of what
happened, and disagree strongly on why a better process and a better result was not
produced.
Regarding national actors, the situation was a little more ambiguous. The national
mine action authority, IND, was seen as a fairly weak actor with little political clout
either nationally or at the level of operations, in the provinces. The demining
13

The fact that all the mine operators in Mozambique also were members of the Survey Working
Group, where the LISs were defined and discussed, does not seem to have led to much information
sharing with the field offices.
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operators therefore largely discussed and decided their operations with the provincial
governors and the donors who were funding the various activities, rather than with
IND in Maputo. The IND was also a fairly recent creation, and was trying to shake off
the accusations of corruption and mismanagement that had hampered its predecessor
organization, and which had made both the donors and the demining operators quite
critical of it and how it was operating.
When it came to discussing the basic questionnaire and the weighting/impact scoring,
there seems to have been little involvement of other actors. Information about what
was intended, and requests for feed-back were made, but with little response. This,
however, is not unusual in Mozambique, where a large number of consultancy-driven
processes overwhelm a small central bureaucracy and weak local institutions such as
the university. But the result was, however, that the planning for the LIS did not
generate a lot of participation and ownership, either among the mine operators or
national bodies that potentially should have had an interest in the LIS.
No links seem to have been established to national or regional planning processes.
Mine Action is presently not included in Mozambique’s Poverty Reduction Strategy
Paper (PARPA). This issue seems to have been discussed in August 2003, and the
government now claims that mine action will be included in the next version of the
PARPA, which is to be revised in 2004.

C. Implementing the LIS
The MLIS began its work in February 1999 with the Expert Opinion Collection
(EOC). This work continued until September 1999, but was partly re-visited between
March and February 2001 since it became evident that the original EOC had not
provided the results expected and needed.
The MLIS then moved on to carry out group interviews in the 791 communities that
self-identified as landmine-affected14. Carrying out a national survey over such a vast
and poorly linked territory was a logistical nightmare. Once the process got underway,
from a management point of view it seems to have progressed as well as could be
hoped for, with tight communications between the field and the head office permitting
tracking of progress.
A total of 6,772 persons participated in these group interviews – an average of almost
nine persons in each interview. The average duration of these interviews was just over
100 minutes, but where these interviews could range from 15 to 250 minutes. Women
participated in only 17.6% of them, however, which was a lot less than would have
been desirable.
The survey started its work in the northern areas of Mozambique and worked its way
south until it ended up in the Maputo province. The reason for choosing this approach
was mainly the severe flooding that hit most of Mozambique in early 2000. The
flooding was especially severe in the central and southern provinces, and CIDC
therefore decided to begin field data collection in the northern provinces.
The process itself is highly contentious. While CIDC believes that a very serious and
committed effort was made to collect reliable and valid data, many of the informants
on the ground disagree. While there is little reason to doubt the commitment and the
14

938 communities that were not defined as landmine-affected were sampled through individual
interviews, 208 communities were inaccessible.
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seriousness with which the work was carried out, there are questions regarding the
quality and comprehensiveness of the information collected.
The first issue that is raised is that the typical visit in a community was very short.
This was in large part undoubtedly due to the large number of areas that needed to be
visited, and the long distances that had to be covered. But a number of informants
believe that the process was too rushed, and that this had an impact on the quality and
consistency of the socio-economic data that was collected. The CIDC was aware of
the problem, but felt that there was little that could be done about this, given the
constraints under which the survey had to work: “[there is a] sacrifice in accuracy as a
part of the trade-off for acquiring nation-wide information over a relatively short
period and at a moderate cost”.15
There are strong disagreements about to what extent the LIS included regional and
local authorities in the survey. In Mozambique, with a relatively high degree of
decentralization and often long continuity of the local administrators, these authorities
are vital sources of information. While CIDC believes these officials were
systematically visited and canvassed throughout the LIS process, others claim that this
was done superficially and that key information was therefore missed.
The flooding has also been given as a reason for apparent discrepancies between the
number of suspected mine-affected areas (SMAs) in the LIS, and the number of
SMAs in the more recent findings of the regional operators, where a number of new
SMAs have been identified. The argument is that the survey teams were not able to
reach all the areas due to the flooding, and therefore could not carry out the interviews
on site. While this is undoubtedly true in some cases, some informants claim that both
the short interviews, and the sampling that was done, was such that a number of
known SMAs were missed16.
The quality of the survey staff posed some challenges, where the MLIS faced the
normal problem in Mozambique of trying to find personnel with the desired skills.
The enumerators employed by the MLIS were mostly recent graduates and students,
although some were from the mine action community.
CIDC was aware of this problem. It believes first of all that they in fact succeeded in
getting the kinds of staff they were looking for, but secondly that the training
provided gave the surveyors the skills necessary to do the job well.
The criticism from the mine action community was that they lacked skills in assessing
distances and topography, and the general challenges of getting the coordinates right.
Very few had prior mine action related (including military) experience, which meant
they did not have much experience in assessing information given to them about
SMAs – both the likelihood of the information being correct, but also being able to
properly identify the areas and draw the boundaries well.
This criticism is in many cases undoubtedly correct, but at the same time reflects the
biases and misunderstandings within the mine action community about the LIS. While
mine operators wanted, as mentioned before, the LIS to help them identify the new
SMAs and map them out well, this was not the priority concern of the LIS at all.
15

Quote from paper by Paul F. Wilkinson and Brigitte Masella, “ MLIS: Optimising Mine Action”,
PFWA, 2003
16

The UN Certification Committee, in its certification letter to CIDC of 14 September 2001, noted with
concern that the level of coverage of the survey left some questions as to its completeness.
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Criticizing the LIS for not doing a job it never was intended to do is therefore misdirected.
But key informants also feel that the filled-out questionnaires varied in quality, both
in terms of how well and extensively they were produced, and how valuable and
accurate the information gathered was. It is claimed by several informants spoken
with that some of the interviews conducted were not done according to the protocols.
Places that were described as surveyed had not been visited in person or by a team of
enumerators. Furthermore it was claimed that some of the interviews had been done
with persons who were more or less randomly gathered and therefore did not provide
any kind of representative sample of the community. Combined with the short time
available for the conversations led to the information collected being of poor quality.
CIDC hotly disputes these claims, believing that the management was on top of these
kinds of issues and that this does not represent any kind of systematic problem with
the survey. But the quality assurance system in place was not as solid as those that
have been developed by later surveys, and the fact remains that to many of the
informed observers in Mozambique, the quality and comprehensiveness of the LIS is
seriously questioned.

D. LIS Outputs and Impact
The MLIS produced the following outputs and results:
The largest product produced by the MLIS was the populated database (IMSMA),
in English and Portuguese, linked with a Geographic Information System (GIS).
It produced a national village-level overview of the social and economic impacts
of SMAs.
It yielded, in English and Portuguese, research protocols and instruments suitable
for further use, either in Mozambique or for instance in Angola.
It compiled the first national gazetteer of places, names and locations, in the form
of a computerized toponomy database containing the official and alternate names
of some 11,300 communities.
It prepared computerized maps suitable for future use.
It provided through the final report, certified by the UN, a potential guide for
donors and other national and international actors.
A key finding was that landmines were found to be a threat all over Mozambique,
both in the cities and in the rural districts. Overall mining is fairly light, except around
particular infrastructure areas such as power pylons. But the country-wide yet very
dispersed distribution of the mines therefore represents a major challenge in terms of
planning and carrying out mine action.
The subsequent national five-year plan developed by IND is largely based on the
results of MLIS. This in itself is a strong indication that the national authorities take
the LIS seriously, and wish national programming to be based on it.
Actual mine action in Mozambique does not follow the five-year plan, however.
Neither the provincial authorities nor the three major mine operators respect the LIS
or use it much for their own decisions.
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At the level of the provincial governors, evaluations of specific mine programs have
shown that the governors often prioritize based on purely political criteria (Demex
2002, Scanteam 2003). Since they do not have to answer to national authorities on
these matters, there is little IND can do about this.
The mine actors believe that the MLIS is not accurate, and in particular that it
overestimates the SMAs, especially in the northern region (the maps show some SMA
boundaries that the mine operators claim are vastly exaggerated, and that a more
careful survey should have been able to capture). While there is undoubtedly cases of
badly exaggerated SMA boundaries, this Evaluation also believes that this criticism
misses the mark somewhat: the LIS was to record the information and views that the
communities themselves have on the contamination areas and risks, but not to conduct
technical assessments of this information.
Furthermore, the mine operators receive a lot of their funding directly from the donors
and for projects that have largely been developed locally. Since the funding therefore
flows on the outside of the government channels, there is once again little IND can do
about influencing decisions of the different mine operators. The ability and incentives
for the actors to come together and plan jointly are therefore weak. It also means that
both provincial authorities and mine operators in fact have an interest in not giving
credence to the LIS, since a LIS that is seen as relevant and of quality would provide
IND with leverage in influencing priority setting. This has led to a situation where the
IND is largely without influence when national mien action priorities are being set.
This situation is exactly what the LIS was intended to address.
IND’s five-year plan advocates a shift in funding and importance from just clearing of
landmines to technical survey and Mine Risk Education (MRE) and Victims
Assistance (VA). The findings of the MLIS shows that there are relatively few high
impact places left in Mozambique, and this lack of high impact in the country are
correctly reflected by the IND in the five-year plan. This is not mirrored in the
operators’ actions or the donor support and this again is an indicator of the problem
that IND lack practical power and influence to steer and orchestrate MA in
Mozambique. MRE and VA get only about one percent of the total funding for MA in
Mozambique, and this shows that although the MLIS correctly pointed to these areas
as being important the shift of funds has not taken place.
The claim by the operators is that since the LIS is of such poor quality, it is not
possible for them to use it as a planning tool. The argument that the government uses
the LIS as the platform for their decisions does not carry much weight, because it
must be recognized that IND has no choice but to rely heavily on the LIS, since it has
no other information base for its own planning and decisions. Disregarding the LIS
would politically be impossible since it was the government that had agreed to have
the LIS to be carried out in the first place.
But the MLIS was also to be part of an on-going capacity building program for the
Mine Action sector that CIDA is funding. The program is based upon a MoU between
the governments of Canada and Mozambique. In terms of longer-term impact on the
capacity of IND, the MLIS as such seems to have contributed relatively little.
The information that was collected was checked and then entered into the Information
Management System for Mine Action (IMSMA) database. The use and maintenance
of IMSMA is key to the longer-term management of MA, and in this area IND has not
seen much capacity development. While the IMSMA is now owned by and operated
by IND, the actual operations are dependent on a single person’s knowledge and
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interest. This person is still part of and is paid by the capacity building program,
funded by CIDA and other donors, organized by UNDP. There is a real and large
chance that he will find other work once or if he is transferred to IND and their salary
system.
The follow-up and present usage of the IMSMA-database leaves a lot to be desired.
With weak links between the MA-operators and the IND, the gathering of information
is slow and inefficient. The information gathering lacks a systematic structure and the
MA-operators often use different formats than what is compatible with the IMSMAdatabase. Finally the lack of resources to follow-up and continuously update leaves
the database in an operational vacuum.
But the IND is presently conducting a number of information spreading exercises to
change this situation. It is also communicating with the different NGOs to iron out
discrepancies regarding SMAs. These initiatives, together with the necessary
commitment and structured reporting from the NGO-operators, will certainly help
update the IMSMA-database and start building the confidence in the survey results.
The MLIS and the final report have been certified by UN, but with comments on the
level of coverage of the survey. The Certification Committee has also noted that the
Certification Guidelines were not specific as to what procedures should be followed in
MLIS.
The above mentioned process contributed to the fact that while the impact scoring
provided by the LIS was being used to develop the National Demining Strategy, it did
not serve as a tool for actual priority setting for mine action activities. Statistics from
June 2002, two years after the MLIS was completed, show that only four of the 19
high impact areas that were identified had been cleared, ten of the 165 medium impact
ones, and 44 of the 607 low impact areas defined were cleared17.
But the MLIS is clearly the best and most comprehensive list of suspected mine
affected areas in the country18. While mine action operators find new SMAs, this is of
course natural as mine action work spreads. The challenge is to structure the
information flow so that new SMAs are entered into IMSMA and subsequently used
in the analysis for setting priorities.
The lack of links to the Poverty Reduction Strategy process is another challenge for
the IND and the use of the IMSMA. So far, there has been little contact and interest in
using the IMSMA outside the MA community – in part a reflection of the weak
political power of IND as a national institutions.

E. Findings, Conclusions and Recommendations
Main Findings:
The key findings are the following:
The MLIS was among the first Landmine Impact Surveys conducted. It faced
a series of challenges in terms of the logistics of carrying out a national survey
across a vast territory during the most difficult land transportation period in
17

These numbers are slightly different from the 20 high and 164 medium impact places described in
the final MLIS report.
18

According to a paper by Paul F. Wilkinson and Brigitte Masella, statistical analysis shows that
90.4% of all the affected and identified SMAs were visited by the MLIS.
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Mozambique’s recent history (the 2000 floodings). The links with other mine
action operators was poor, with lack of collaboration and subsequent distrust
of the LIS results.
The IND has developed a five-year national mine action plan mainly based on
the MLIS report, but the priority setting by the operators and the actual mine
action work being conducted does not follow the five-year plan.
The capacity at IND has not improved much as a function of the MLIS. The
Institute is still in need of technical assistance through donor funded projects
(notably the UNDP capacity building program).
The priorities of mine action in Mozambique do not reflect the potential for
different ways of working. There has been no visible increase in the support to
a coordinated MRE program, nor has the work on assistance to victims
increased notably. It should be noted that UNICEF has just launched a MRE
project in Mozambique.
The socio-economic information gathered by the MLIS is not being used by
anyone. The web-site of IND has some information on it, but the Evaluation
believes there is room for considerably more development in this area.
Conclusions:
The major "lessons learned" from this LIS exercise include the following:
1. Weighting/impact scores:
The mine action efforts in Mozambique after the MLIS shows that failure to
include all the important stakeholders, or their refusal to participate, in the
planning of the MLIS and the development of the weighting, the impact scores
and the questionnaire will lead to a lack of ownership and reluctance to fully
follow and use the priorities set based on the results of the LISs.
2. Capacity building:
The potential for using the LIS also for capacity building was not exploited.
3. Implementation:
There is a need for more flexibility in the approach when implementing a LIS in
a country such as Mozambique, with a long history of mine action and a number
of operators already working in the country. The considerable information
already in place could both have been used as starting points for the survey
rather than ignoring them, and also using these resources to quality assure the
final LIS findings more aggressively.
Recommendations:
The planning and implementation of the LIS, from the Advance Mission Survey
through deciding the weighting and impact scores, should be more of a national
exercise. The protocols developed by SAC should become less of a blueprint SOP
and more of a reference tool, and the focus should be on national usage and
ownership and not on the establishment of internationally comparable data-sets.
In countries where humanitarian mine action has a history and solid international
representation the LIS should be based much more on what has been done already,
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and not become a “new” and independent exercise. Flexibility is key, both in
terms of time-limits, implementation partners and instruments. .
The LIS should be connected to a central, national office that can make sure the
results, both within the MA itself and the development arena, are being utilized
more effectively and efficiently. In the case of Mozambique the IND is connected
to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, but should also have worked much closer with
other relevant institutions such as the Central Statistical Office, the Ministry of
Planning and Finance (for the PRSP/PARPA links), and the Ministry of Local
Administration.
The capacity of the national mine action authorities must be assessed more
critically before initiating the LIS, so that the LIS can also be used to build
national capacity, especially within the national mine action authorities.
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